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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY
MAY 2014
CEM OYVAT
B.A, ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce
This dissertation examines the evolution of inequality during the development process.
Specifically, the study will focus on two factors that crucially influence the evolution of
distribution: 1) industrialization and urbanization, and 2) agrarian structures and land
inequality. The dissertation consists of three essays: The first essay examines the impact
of the initial conditions of agrarian structures on income inequality over the long run. It
develops a model showing that at the same level of national income, countries with more
unequal land distribution can be expected to experience greater agglomeration in the urban
sector. The excess labor in the urban sector of these countries is added to the subsistence
sector that functions as a reserve army of labor and lowers wage shares in the urban capitalist
sector. Hence, higher land inequality also increases urban income inequality. The essay’s
theoretical model is also supported by an empirical analysis that finds that the level of
pre-urbanization land inequality has a significant impact on determining today’s income
inequality.
The second essay applies the theoretical arguments developed in the first essay, by means
of a comparative analysis of the relationship between land and income inequality in Turkey,
vii
Korea, and Brazil. The essay evaluates the existing literature on the impact of agrarian
structure on Turkey’s income distribution. Turkey is compared with two extreme cases:
Brazil, which historically has a very inegalitarian agrarian structure, and Korea, which
experienced a very redistributive land reform following World War II.
The third essay examines the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. Unlike the majority of
the literature on the Kuznets Curve, this essay first scrutinizes the arguments suggested in
Kuznets’s own work. The essay focuses on three aspects: a) changing weights of sectors, b)
informal employment, and c) education inequality. Panel data techniques are also used to
empirically test the validity of the mechanisms that might lead to an inverted-U relationship
between income and inequality.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This three-essay dissertation examines the impact of prior land distribution and eco-
nomic development on the levels of income inequality experienced during and after ur-
banization and industrialization. Income distribution is influenced by a wide variety of
institutional factors and policy choices, including tax policies, education and healthcare
investments, changes in the labor standards, strength of unions, trade openness, financial
liberalization, and subsidization in the rural sector. I argue that a thorough analysis of in-
come distribution in developing nations must include a consideration of earlier patterns of
land distribution and how income inequality changes in different phases of industrialization.
As supported by previous empirical work, there is a strong relationship between land
and income inequality (Carter, 2000; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; Easterly, 2007).
Countries with inegalitarian land distribution are also countries with large income inequal-
ities even when their economies are dominated by the urban sector. We also have good
reasons to believe that income inequality increases as GDP per capita rises. According
to estimates of Alwyn Young (2013), 40% of total inequality in developing countries is
explained by the urban-rural gap and 19% is explained by educational inequality. These
structural characteristics would certainly change following economic growth, which would
have secondary effects on income inequality in developing countries.
1.1 Questions to answer
This dissertation aims to answer two sets of questions regarding structural causes of
income inequality in developing economies. These can be summarized as:
1) Why is there a categorical difference between the income distributions in different
regions? Why do Latin American or Southern African countries have income inequalities
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higher than the countries in East Asia or the Middle East? Is this regional difference just
a coincidence or does it result from similar initial conditions of development?
2) Why are income Gini coefficients generally higher in developing countries than in
even the most unequal developed nations?1 Does economic growth generate rising income
inequality? Or did only more equal countries become “developed”?
In response to the first set of questions, this dissertation argues that countries with sim-
ilar levels of income inequality during development began with similar agrarian structures.
Initial conditions of development do seem to have long run effects. There are several theses
on the roots of the initial agrarian structures and pre-urbanization inequality. Engerman
and Sokoloff (2002) argue that climate and soil quality affected the evolution of inequality,
since they determined the set of crops that would be cultivated on the land. They claim
that commercial crops like sugar are usually produced in large-scale plantations; whereas,
the production of food crops like grains are more associated with the small independent
family farms. Following this, Engerman and Sokoloff suggest that, the difference between
agrarian structures naturally led to greater land inequality in the sugar-producer areas and
lower land inequality in the grain-producer areas2.
Another perspective on the historical roots of inequality focuses on “colonial origins
of inequality”. Acemog˘lu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002) claim that the institutions
formed in the colonies with smaller settler populations are more likely to be designed to
expropriate resources and surplus. The highly hierarchical institutional structure formed in
these countries lead to a greater distinction between native and colonizer populations, and
hence an inegalitarian structure. According to Acemog˘lu, Johnson and Robinson, the share
of settler population in the colonies is either dependent on the endemic diseases preventing
the settlements of Europeans or the colonized country’s initial population density.
1According to the dataset used in the fourth chapter, for the period 2005-2010 the median income
inequality observation (0.299) among developed nations is lower than all of the income Gini coefficients in
the developing sample. Even the highest Gini coefficient (0.47) in the developed sample is still than 64.5%
of income Gini coefficient observations in the developing sample.
2The hypothesis of Engerman and Sokoloff is also supported by the empirical study of Easterly (2007),
which finds a strong correlation between income inequality and the ratio of the production of wheat and
sugar.
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One or maybe all of the factors mentioned above might explain the land inequalities
before industrialization. In any case, both historical studies (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005)
and the previous empirical evidence (Carter, 2000; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; East-
erly, 2007) show that initial conditions in agriculture are very influential in determining
current levels of income inequality. The mainstream economics literature explains the
relationship between land and income inequality by the means of the intermediate link
of education and resulting differences in worker productivity. Several studies (Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1996; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996; Galor, Moav and Vollrath,
2009; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) argue that land inequality can influence educational
opportunities, which later creates skill gaps between individuals. Indeed, there are cases
of developing economies such as Korea and Taiwan in which lower inequality helped the
expansion of the education frontier (Griffin and Ickowitz, 1998; Voitchovsky, 2011).
The education linkage is very incomplete, as it dismisses other aspects of class relations
within the urban sector. This dissertation contributes the literature by focusing on land
inequality’s impact on class relations and wage bargaining in the emerging urban sector.
In countries with greater land inequality, a large share of the rural population migrates to
the urban areas. However, the growth in the urban sector typically cannot create sufficient
productive jobs. Therefore, in the “overurbanized” economies, a larger share of the urban
population becomes a part of the urban subsistence sector, piecing together a livelihood
through informal and/or irregular activities. Those subsisting on these activities later serve
as an urban reserve army of labor and suppress wages in the urban capitalist activities.
Land inequality’s wage bargaining effect has been mentioned in studies whose focus is
not the relationship between land and income distribution (Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz,
2002), and in several case studies on Latin America (De Janvry, 1981; Harris, 1978), Korea
(Amsden, 1989; 1990) and Turkey (Keyder, 1987). This dissertation first organizes and
formalizes this idea by developing a theoretical model based on the assumption that the
rural-to-urban migration is shaped by the expected urban and rural incomes. The theo-
retical model clarifies the points in the existing literature that might create confusion. For
instance, Keyder (1987) in his influential work “State and Class in Turkey” claims that the
dominance of the small peasantry in Turkey “exerted an upward pressure on urban wages”.
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Gu¨rel (2011) criticized Keyder on this point and argued instead that the Turkish agrarian
structure is a type that puts downward pressure on wages rather than the type that exerts
upward pressure on wages.
By benefiting from model, I show that Gu¨rel’s classification of two types of agrarian
structures is artificially restrictive. Indeed, even the most egalitarian land distribution
cannot reduce urban inequality, since the existence of “unlimited supplies of labor” still puts
downward pressure on urban wages. Nevertheless, the model presented here demonstrates
that negative impact of urbanization on urban wages can be less in the countries with more
equal land distribution. In countries with higher land inequalities the expected income for
the average rural dweller is low, which encourages rural-to-urban migration even in the
cases where there isn’t sufficient labor demand in the urban capitalist sector. This feeds
the growth of population in the urban subsistence activities that serves as a reserve army
of labor in the urban capitalist sector. Hence, unequal land distribution is also transmitted
to the distribution in the urban sector.
The main limitation of my model is that it is less useful on explaining the cross-country
differences between the countries that have significantly different long-run growth rates. The
model does not focus on land inequality’s impact on capital accumulation. Land inequality
influences various factors like profit shares (Goodwin, 1967; Skott, 1989), utilization rates
(Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990), crime rates, corruption, social unrest, development of human
capital (Griffin and Ickowitz, 1998; Voitchovsky, 2011) and agricultural productivity (Voll-
rath, 2007). These factors interact in unpredictable ways to determine long-run growth, a
process my model does not attempt to predict or explain.
I support the central arguments regarding land distribution and income inequality de-
veloped in the theoretical model with both an empirical analysis and a comparative case
study on Korea, Turkey and Brazil. The empirical analysis examines the significance of
the urbanization channel suggested in the model. First, the analysis tests the influence
of land inequality circa 1960s on today’s urban and overall income inequalities. Next, the
analysis tests whether higher land inequality leads to overurbanization. Last, the analysis
tests the role of urbanization on determining the cross-country differences of income in-
equality. The empirical analysis controls for GDP per capita and institutional factors like
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education inequality and the level of democracy. The results show that the urbanization
channel explains cross-country differences of income inequality better than the education
channel.
The comparative case study analysis on Turkey, Korea and Brazil highlights the trajec-
tory of land reform and other institutional changes that bear on income inequality. The
expansion of education in Korea accelerated following the progressive land reform after
World War II, (Fields and Yoo, 2000) and the returns to education were at all levels smaller
in Korea than in Brazil (Park, Ross and Sabot, 1996), all of which helped to reduce income
inequality. Korea’s progressive land reform helped to moderate income inequality in part
through the channel of education.
Wegenast (2010) for Brazil and this dissertation for Turkey empirically show that the
regions with higher land inequality also have lower education investments and enrollment
rates. Nevertheless, the education channel cannot explain why income inequality in Brazil
is higher than in Turkey. Indeed, the dissertation shows that Brazil succeeded as well
as Turkey in expanding education. However, Brazil is more overurbanized than Turkey,
which left Brazil with a larger reserve army of labor - a larger share of informal and/or
subsistence and/or irregular employment within the nonagricultural sector. This made
income inequality in Brazil higher than in Turkey.
The second set of questions that this dissertation aims to answer are derived from the
famous Kuznets hypothesis - the inverted-U relationship between income per capita and
income inequality. Unlike the majority of the literature on the Kuznets Curve, this essay
first scrutinizes the arguments suggested in Kuznets’s own work by focusing on three as-
pects: changing weights of sectors, informal employment and educational inequality. These
aspects are preferred considering that Kuznets (1955) in “Economic Growth and Income
Inequality” explains the inverted-U relationship between income per capita and distribution
through changing sectoral weights, urban-rural gaps and the social mobility between rural-
to-urban migrants and urban dwellers living in cities for a longer period. Urban/rural value
added and employment shares are important parts of Kuznets’s analysis. Societies with
smaller education gaps and smaller informal sector have more homogeneous labor markets.
Therefore, I use nonagricultural informal employment and education inequalities as proxies
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to gauge the divide between recent rural-to-urban migrants and established urban dwellers.
Significant shifts in sectoral shares, informal employment or the education frontier are not
characteristics of a developed, mature economy. Therefore, I argue that the Kuznets hy-
pothesis can only hold in developing economies. The specific characteristics of developed
countries are discussed in the fourth chapter in detail. As the characteristics of developing
country converge to those of a developed economy, the mechanisms mentioned by Kuznets
become weaker.
The contribution of this essay is that it empirically tests the validity of the mechanisms
suggested by Kuznets using panel data techniques and a cross-country dataset. The results
of the analysis support the claim that that income per capita affects income inequality
through sectoral shares and informal employment. However, the evidence is weaker on
income per capita’s influence through education inequality.
1.2 The plan for the dissertation
The plan for this dissertation is as follows. The second chapter presents the theoretical
arguments concerning the relationship between land and income inequality. Based on the
framework in the chapter, a theoretical model is developed, rooted in the Harris-Todaro
(1970) migration model, which shows land inequality’s impact on income inequality through
urbanization. Last, the chapter presents a cross-country analysis testing the mechanism
proposed in the theoretical model.
The third chapter is a comparative analysis illustrating how land inequality helps explain
differences in income inequality in Turkey, Brazil and Korea. This chapter first discusses the
characteristics of agrarian structures and income inequality in Turkey, Brazil and Korea.
Then I trace the possible influence of the prior agrarian structure on the path of income
inequality during development. The argument is also tested with an econometric model.
The fourth chapter discusses and tests the Kuznets hypothesis. It first analyzes the
mechanisms through which rising per capita income might magnify income inequality. Next,
it empirically tests the Kuznets hypothesis and whether the mechanisms –urban-rural di-
vide, informal employment and education inequality– are the reasons behind the possible
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Kuznets Curves. Last, the fifth chapter summarizes the outcomes of this dissertation and
concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
AGRARIAN STRUCTURES, URBANIZATION AND INEQUALITY
2.1 Introduction
Land distribution is not only about the welfare of rural dwellers. Indeed, land distribu-
tion can partially explain differences in income inequality even in urbanized societies. This
is because land inequality can influence the urban and overall national income distribution
through its effects on institutions and labor bargaining relations within the urban sector.
The long-run effects may continue even as the country becomes an urbanized society.
The impact of land inequality on urban distribution has been examined in several prior
studies (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; 2005; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon,
1996; Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Frankema, 2009;
Wegenast, 2009). These studies focus on institutions, pointing out in particular that greater
wealth inequality would lead to institutions that bias education capabilities and policies
against the poor. This would result in the transmission of land inequality to urban inequal-
ity.
The contribution of this chapter is an analysis of the impact of land inequality on class
relations and wage bargaining in the urban sector. Consistent with the Harris-Todaro (1970)
framework, I assume that the difference between expected urban incomes and rural incomes
determines the migration decision. The fallback position of the new urban dwellers thus is
formed by the previous rural incomes. As in the Lewis (1954) model, the rural-to-urban
migration suppresses wages in the urban sector. In countries with higher land inequality,
more migrants are willing to move to the urban sector for lower wages, and the migration
process therefore has a more pronounced negative impact on the urban wages.
The wage-bargaining effect of land distribution has been relatively ignored in the ex-
isting literature. It is mentioned in a few paragraphs in empirical studies examining the
relationship between land and income inequality, in studies whose focus is not on the link
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between land and urban distribution (Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz, 2002) and in case studies
(De Janvry, 1981; Harris, 1978; Keyder, 1987, Amsden, 1989; 1990) of selected regions.
Building on these earlier insights, this study offers a thorough theoretical analysis by de-
veloping a model based on the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework as extended by Fields
(1975, 2005). The model is then tested in an empirical analysis that examines whether the
wage-bargaining effect is relevant even when we control for the education gap and other
institutional variables.
As land distribution and urban inequality are closely connected, the implications of this
paper are also important for understanding long-run development paths. Inequality often
creates impediments to long-run growth. Unequal income distribution has been shown to
limit educational opportunities for the poor and/or middle classes, elevate credit constraint
problems, decrease domestic demand, increase crime rates and corruption, lead to social
unrest in the society and pull down per capita income and educational attainment through
higher rates of fertility (Griffin and Ickowitz, 1998; Voitchovsky, 2011). In addition, inegal-
itarian agrarian structures can lead to lower land productivity (Vollrath, 2007)1. A wide
range of empirical work (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Alesina and Rodrik; 1994; Deininger and
Squire, 1998) confirms that the countries with historically more egalitarian distribution en-
joyed greater rates of growth in the second half of the 20th century. In a world where 48 %
of the population still lives in rural areas (World Bank, 2012), our results provide support
for agrarian policies favoring egalitarian landownership.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section examines the simple correlation
between income inequality and land inequality across dozens of countries. The third section
develops the theoretical framework that links the two. The fourth section provides a simple
model of the relationships among urbanization, income and land distribution. The fifth
section presents an econometric test of the theory, and the last section concludes.
1In a cross-country analysis, Vollrath (2007) empirically finds that the land Gini coefficient has a signifi-
cant negative relationship with land productivity. Consistent with this finding, a number of studies (Cornia,
1985; U¨nal, 2012; Githinji, Konstantinidis and Barenberg, 2011) empirically exhibit that smaller farms have
greater land productivity.
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2.2 A comparative perspective
A comparative examination of development experiences in different regions suggests a
positive relationship between land ownership inequality and income inequality. Historically,
Latin America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa are associated with a high degree of con-
centration of land. In much of Latin America, the agrarian structure is characterized by
the coexistence of large plantation-type structures and extremely small family farms, called
latifundios and minifundios, respectively (Furtado, 1976). The landlords holding latifundios
mostly hire wage labor to cultivate their land. These landlords wield not only economic
but also political influence over labor and institutions. The power inequality secures the
existence of the inegalitarian agrarian structure (De Janvry, 1981). Similar structures are
observed in some regions of sub-Saharan Africa (Frankema, 2010).
On the other hand, the agrarian structure in Asia tends to be associated with a greater
prevalence of owner-cultivators and tenants. Among the East Asian countries, Korea and
Taiwan experienced progressive land reforms, which led to agrarian structures in which small
and medium family farms dominate. Even in South Asian and Middle Eastern countries
without significant land redistributions, the land inequalities are lower than in Latin Amer-
ica and the proportion of landless labor in the rural population is smaller (see Appendix
A).
Although agrarian structures may be an important factor underlying interregional dif-
ferences between levels of income inequality, this does not mean that the regions are entirely
dominated by a single agrarian structure. Medium-scale family farms are common in parts
of Latin America (Furtado, 1976; Barraclough and Domike, 1966), while in Asia many
peasants work under a wage labor relationship (Bardhan, 1984; Boratav, 1989). In addi-
tion, even countries with similar agrarian structures may exhibit dissimilar levels of land
inequality. Therefore, the national land Gini coefficient is a more accurate measure for land
inequality than crude regional dummies.
Prior empirical studies have documented the positive relationship between land and
income Gini coefficients (Carter, 2000), and shown that a greater share of land owned
by small and medium (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998) and/or family farms (Easterly,
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2007) reduces overall income inequality. Figure 2.1, constructed for this study, exhibits a
positive relationship between early land inequality and later overall income inequality for 62
countries. The horizontal axis on the figure is the value of land inequality for years in and
around the 1960s, here taken as a measure of pre-urbanization land distribution. A large
dataset for land Gini coefficients is not available for earlier years, and the massive flows of
rural-to-urban migration in the developing world had begun after 1950s (Araghi, 1995). The
figure’s vertical axis is the most recently measured income Gini coefficient for the country2.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the income and land Gini coefficients is 0.48.
The Southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland
and Zambia) have very high income inequality values compared to their initial land in-
equalities and appear as outliers in Figure 2.1. One explanation for that might be Southern
African countries’ high degree of dependence on incomes from minerals, which tend to be
very unequally distributed3. Interracial income gaps also are an important factor increasing
income inequality in some Southern African countries (O¨zler, 2007). In Figure 2.2, I exclude
the Southern African countries from the sample. Figure 2.2 presents a clearer positive rela-
tionship and the Pearson correlation coefficient increases to 0.58. In summary, the figures
suggest that initial conditions of land distribution matter for determining national income
inequality in the long run.
2.3 Theoretical framework
There are two groups of arguments that explain the close relationship between income
and land inequalities. Figure 2.3 presents a schematic picture of both arguments. The
institutional mechanism is drawn in blue, the bargaining mechanism in red. This study’s
2Our larger dataset also includes values of expenditure inequality, but these are excluded in the figure.
These observations will proxy income inequality in the econometric analyses, with the use of a dummy to
account for the difference between income inequality and consumption inequality.
3Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) claim that Botswana is an exceptional case, as most of the
revenues coming from minerals are captured by the government. They also claim that most of these revenues
are used for productive activities like infrastructure investments. Nevertheless, the government of Botswana
is also the biggest employer in the country and the salaries that the government pays to high-ranked gov-
ernment officers is substantially higher than the incomes in the rest of the country (Good, 1993). This may
be one of the reasons why Botswana is still one of the most unequal countries in the world with an income
Gini coefficient of 0.60 (Martin, 2009).
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emphasis is on bargaining. Nevertheless, I will begin with a brief summary of the institu-
tionalist arguments, and I will control for institutional variables in the regression analysis.
2.3.1 The institutionalist aspect
The institutionalist studies focus primarily focus on wealth distribution’s impact on hu-
man capital and biases in education policies. They mostly follow the neoclassical assumption
that income differences are the results of labor productivity gaps between individuals. The
first group of institutionalist studies addresses the direct impact of land distribution on
income inequality. In underdeveloped countries, the poor cannot invest on education due
to credit constraints (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Even when credit is potentially available, in-
vestment in education is more costly for the poor, since most of it is financed by borrowing
capital rather than by intrinsic family incomes (Galor and Tsiddon, 1996). In addition, the
returns to investment in education are minimal for very low levels of education. Therefore,
education investment becomes beneficial only for the rich; for people with lower income
levels the costs of education exceed its expected returns. As a result, the lower-income peo-
ple are trapped in an inferior education equilibrium. Only the rich benefit from technical
change, and income inequality increases4.
The second line of institutionalist studies addresses the connection between land dis-
tribution and power inequality, which might be crucial in determining education policies.
According to Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), in underdeveloped agrarian societies, the
landlords tend to block education reforms that would extend the education frontier to a
larger portion of society. This is because landlords see little benefit in having an educated
peasantry, so they refuse to finance widespread access to education. The greater land in-
equality brings landlords greater power to limit public spending on education (Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2005; Frankema, 2009; Wegenast, 2009). Eventually, however, industrializa-
tion results in a shift of power toward urban capitalists who are more willing to finance
4In the later phase of development, a larger portion of the society can and would invest in education as
the credit constraint loosens and labor productivity (and hence wages) increases with improving technology.
As a result, the negative impact of land inequality would be reduced (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and
Tsiddon, 1996).
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public education since educated urban wage laborers are valuable to industrial employers
(Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009; Bowles, 1978).
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) analyze the politics of state support for public educa-
tion. According to Bourguignon and Verdier, in undemocratic societies the educated oli-
garchy might not have incentives to initiate democratic transition, since democracy forces
the rich to subsidize the poor’s education. Bourguignon and Verdier show that if inequality
is high, the elite would block the democratization process, because the elites’ loss from the
new taxation would be greater than their gains from the productivity improvements earned
by the spread of education. However, if inequality is lower, the rich could benefit from an
expanded education frontier as education of the poor results in rising productivity.
Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) show that Bourguignon and Verdier’s theory is consistent
with the historical experience in the Americas. In the Latin American countries which have
relatively hierarchical structures, the franchise and extent of voting enlarged more slowly
than in the US and Canada in which more egalitarian structures were observed in the 19th
century. As a result, for the period 1850-1950, the literacy rates in the Latin American
countries were significantly lower than the literacy rates in the US and Canada. Thus, the
education frontier did not extend to a large segment of population in Latin America.
2.3.2 The bargaining aspect
The second aspect of the land-income inequality relationship involves the bargaining
impacts of land distribution. In his groundbreaking article “Economic Development with
Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” Lewis (1954) claimed that flows of labor from the subsistence
to the capitalist sector help the accumulation of capital by suppressing wages and enhancing
the growth of surplus in the capitalist sector. The flow of labor in the Lewis model is usually
associated with rural-to-urban migration (e.g. Ranis and Fei, 1961; Anand and Kanbur,
1985). If we identify rural-to-urban migration with the unlimited supplies of labor in the
Lewis model, the model suggests that urbanization will raise the proportion of lower-income
groups within the urban population and hold down wages in the urban sector.
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Proceeding from this insight, we need to address two questions: 1) What are the major
factors that stimulate urbanization? 2) How does the flow of “unlimited supplies of labor”
influence urban income inequality?
An individual’s decision to move from a rural area to the city is influenced by a host
of factors including age, family relations, culture, disasters, conflicts, diseases, and more.
Nevertheless, the trend of urbanization is mostly stimulated by changing income opportu-
nities both in the urban and rural areas. Historically, the rate of urbanization accelerated
with capitalist development. Indeed, the percentage of the world population living in cities
of 20,000 or more was only 2.4% in 1800. It increased to 9.2% in 1900 and to 20.9% in 1950
(Davis, 1955). Most growth of the world urban population during this period occurred in
the nations that were early industrializers.
In the underdeveloped world, the growth of industry was slow until the 1950s. There-
fore, between 1925-1950 only 10% of the rural population moved to the urban areas in the
developing countries for which data is available (Araghi, 1995). Then from 1950-1975 the
percentage of the rural population that moved to the urban sector jumped to 25%. This may
be due in part to the emerging industrial policies5 and availability of cheap food reducing the
costs of labor. In addition, push factors like the spread of labor-saving technologies in agri-
culture (De Janvry, 1981; Ko¨ymen, 2008), the destruction of “z-goods” production (Hymer
and Resnick, 1969), and an urban bias in national policies (Lipton, 1976; Williamson, 1988)
might have stimulated urbanization in the developing economies.
A variety of models such as Harris-Todaro (1970) (also Cole and Sanders, 1985; and
Fields, 1975, 2005) seek to explain urbanization on the basis of the difference between
expected rural and urban incomes. Moreover, a considerable amount of empirical evidence
(e.g. Bowles, 1970; Fields, 1982; Schultz, 1982) shows that intersectoral differences in
income levels significantly affect migration decisions. The expected income of a regular
rural dweller is determined by both per capita rural income and the distribution within the
rural sector. Thus, for the same per capita urban and rural incomes, there will be greater
5Amsden (2001) and Chang (2008) give good summaries on how import substitution and export-oriented
industrial policies stimulated the growth of industry in the developing world.
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urbanization in countries whose land distribution is more unequal. The congestion in cities
pull down wages, especially of the urban unskilled workers.
This phenomenon is briefly mentioned by Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz (2002) in this
passage: “The incomes of the rural poor set a floor for urban wages, since no one will
migrate from the countryside to the city unless they expect to be at least as well off as
before migration. Higher rural incomes will therefore raise the ‘reservation wage’ of the
urban poor and this will help to reduce urban poverty.” The authors go on to note that
redistributive land reforms influence urban distribution.
A number of studies (e.g. Harris, 1978; De Janvry, 1981) on ‘inegalitarian’ Latin Amer-
ica argue that the poor peasants supply cheap labor both for urban and rural capitalist
activities. Cheap labor becomes even more readily available when the rapid spread of a
labor-saving technology leaves the workers in plantations unemployed. This suppresses ur-
ban wages in the Latin America. On the other hand Amsden (1989, 1990) for Korea and
Keyder (1987) for Turkey6 claim that the predominance of family farms made staying in
agriculture a better option for peasants. This kept urban inequality in Korea and Turkey
at lower levels7 than the inequality in Latin America.
A significant proportion of rural-to-urban migrants cannot be absorbed by the urban
capitalist sector. However, consistent with the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework, these indi-
viduals still migrate with the future expectation of being employed in a formal job (Banerjee,
1983). For a period of time, the unemployed new urban dwellers spend their savings and/or
receive remittances from their family back in the rural sector (Mazumdar, 1976). In the
6See Ko¨ymen (2008), O¨nal (2010) and Gu¨rel (2011) for the critiques of Keyder’s(1987) thesis. The main
argument in these studies is that the average peasant incomes in Turkey were still low and do not have a
positive impact on urban inequality. Gu¨rel explains the higher Turkish wages in 1960s and 1970s by the
labor movements at the time. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that the labor movements are not
entirely exogenous and the agrarian structures can influence the emergence of these movements.
7Keyder (1987) frames this as “the agrarian structure exerted an upward pressure on urban wages”.
The impact of egalitarian distribution is probably better explained by Amsden (1989) who argues that as an
outcome of land reform in Korea “rural-urban migration and downward pressure on manufacturing wages
can be assumed to have been less massive than it would otherwise have been”. We need to keep in mind
that in any case the flow of rural to migrants exerts pressure on urban wages, but the pressure is lower for
the countries with lower land inequalities.
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medium run, these individuals become underemployed in the urban subsistence sector8.
These individuals wait to be employed especially in formal jobs, where they would receive
guaranteed and higher income. Thus, there is a reserve army of labor located within the
urban subsistence sector (Patnaik, 2008; Hart, 1973; Williams and Tumusiime-Mutebile,
1978)9. The existence of this reserve army limits the bargaining strength of labor and
reduces the urban wages in the formal or capitalist sector.
In developing economies, the long-run changes in urban employment are smaller than the
developed economies so the waves of urbanization mostly affect the size of urban subsistence
sector, which is generally larger than the pool of the unemployed (Fields, 1975). There-
fore, this study will focus on the urban subsistence sector. The term “urban subsistence
sector” here is slightly different than the classical usage of urban informal sector that in-
cludes all unregistered activities (e.g. Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010; Castells and
Portes, 1989). My definition of subsistence sector is similar to the Lewisian definition. The
subsistence sector consists of petty commodity producers and self-employed, but excludes
unregistered activities that employ wage-labor solely in pursuit of profit maximization.
There are two main characteristics attributed to the subsistence sector. First, the sub-
sistence sector does not accumulate a significant amount of capital. The subsistence ac-
tivities survive through supplying cheap goods and services to the lower-income groups
(Gerry, 1978). The capitalist enterprises leave these activities to the subsistence sector,
since these activities are less profitable. Moreover, in the subsistence sector the barriers
to entry are very few, which inevitably leads to competition between numerous subsistence
agents. Therefore, the markup rates of subsistence activities are low and many of them can
survive only with the help of self-exploitation. These producers consume the majority of
8Urban unemployed’s ties with their family also loosen in time. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that the urban unemployed will not be supported by their already lower income families for a long period
of time.
9None of these social scientists explicitly use the term subsistence in their work, but they meant activities
similar to subsistence activities used in this paper. Patnaik (2008) mentions that there is a “distant reserve
army of labor” within the precapitalist sector. According to Williams and Tumusiile-Mutebile (1978) the
petty-commodity producers in Nigeria and according to Hart (1973) the underemployed in Ghana’s informal
sector act as a reserve army. In Hart’s study where the term “informal sector” is first defined, Hart uses
“informal sector” as to the refer to the unproductive activities of the self-employed that are very similar to
the activities I characterize as subsistence sector activities in this paper.
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their surplus and can accumulate very little capital (Kalyan, 2007)10. As a result, growth
in the urban subsistence sector is significantly lower than growth in the urban capitalist
sector. In addition, agents in the subsistence sector have only a very small likelihood of
successfully taking on more profitable activities (Nattrass, 1987). The subsistence agent
faces disadvantages of capital, skill and institutional structure. Thus, very few activities
change sectors and very few subsistence agents become capitalist entrepreneurs.
The second characteristic attributed to the subsistence sector is zero marginal produc-
tivity of labor. According to Lewis (1954), there is excess labor employed in the subsistence
sector. He defines excess labor using the concept of “disguised unemployment”. This term
implies that an increase in labor supply does not contribute to the production in the sub-
sistence sector. A few examples fitting this would be street trader/hawkers or small family
stores and restaurants in poor neighborhoods that hire unpaid family labor. Both the entry
of new street hawkers/family stores and additional family labor engaging in these activities
can only have a marginal effect on overall urban subsistence production. We should accept
that zero marginal productivity of extra labor is an oversimplification. Nevertheless, it is
plausible to assume that congestion in the urban subsistence sector leads to greater impov-
erishment since an extra laborer only marginally increases total production while reducing
the slice of income that each subsistence individual can get.
Next, we will analytically examine how the agrarian structures influence urban inequality
through leading to congestion in the subsistence activities.
2.4 A simple model on urbanization and inequality
2.4.1 Migration Behavior
For the reasons discussed above, we will assume that the rural-to-urban migration deci-
sion depends on the incomes within the urban and rural sectors. For a reasonable analysis,
not only the intersectoral income gap but also migrants’ chances of being employed should
10Kalyan (2007) frames the activities we mention here as “the need economy”. He proposes a circuit of
capital like M-C-C’-M’-M-C in which M’-M is producers’ consumption. In this study, we are easing Kalyan’s
assumption of zero accumulation.
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be taken into account. Therefore, I follow the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework in which
differences in expected incomes are considered. This can be written as
W eU = SR + C (2.1)
where W eU is migrants’ expected income in the urban sector and SR is peasants’ pre-
migration returns. This study will be concerned about the rural-to-urban migration of the
masses -peasants in family farms and wage workers in plantations, rather than owners of
large landlords who are in the upper income brackets. Because I assume that poor and aver-
age rural dwellers are agents who influence urban wages, I focus on peasants pre-migration
returns (SR). SR is determined by per capita agricultural product and the structure of
distribution in different agrarian structures. It would evolve following the agrarian changes
in the society. The variable C is the cost of migration from the rural to the urban areas.
The cost of migration for rural dwellers is not only the monetary cost of settling in an urban
place, but also the psychological cost of the change in lifestyle. I assume that there is a
one-way migration trend from the urban to the rural sector, since this paper is interested
in long-term effects of rural structures. Therefore, the cost of migration is only relevant for
migration from rural to urban.
Like Fields (1975, 2005), this paper assumes that the Harris-Todaro equilibrium con-
dition holds in the developing economies. In fact, Pissarides and McMaster (1990) show
that interregional migration responds to the changes in regional inequalities; however, in-
dividuals follow a lagged response to the changes. Therefore, in reality economies mostly
diverge from the Harris-Todaro equilibrium. Nevertheless, this paper examines the long-
term impacts of agrarian structures on the urban inequality. The Harris-Todaro equilibrium
condition would be a reasonable assumption for analyzing these long-term tendencies.
Some of the studies following Harris-Todaro also investigate whether the expected urban
and rural incomes have symmetrical effects (Fields, 1982). The empirical studies (Fields,
1982; Schultz, 1982) show that both declining rural and increasing urban incomes have
significant effects on the migration decisions. Therefore, for simplicity changes in the urban
and rural incomes are taken to have a symmetric impact on migration.
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The expected urban incomes of migrants depend on the urban wages, and the rate of
employment. The expected urban income of migrants is
W eU =
WFLF
LU
+
WSLS
LU
(2.2)
where WF is an employed migrant’s wage, LF is the volume of urban employment, WS
is an underemployed person’s income, LS is the volume of urban underemployment and LU
is the urban labor force. An examination of empirical data shows that the unemployment
rates generally were not worsened following the urbanization trend (Fields, 1975). The
growth in the urban sector rather changed the share of underemployed in the developing
economies (Rauch, 1993). Therefore, this study also focuses on urban underemployment
and avoids urban unemployment11. Hence, the urban population is
LU = LF + LS (2.3)
Underemployed individuals are urban dwellers doing subsistence activities. For the
reasons that we discussed above, the agglomeration of labor in subsistence activities will
not increase overall production, it will rather pull down the average subsistence income.
Following Fields (1975), we will assume that the urban subsistence income is equally shared
and per capita income is
WS =
YS
LU − LF =
YS
LS
(2.4)
where YS and LS are total urban subsistence income and the number of underemployed
respectively. Combining all, the Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition is
W eU =
WFLF
LU
+
YS
LU
= SR + C (2.5)
11It also avoids the changes in labor participation rate through changing labor participation of women.
We will examine the impact of the non-agricultural labor participation of women in the empirical section of
this paper.
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2.4.2 Agrarian structures and urban wage determination
Since this model assumes no urban unemployment, we assume that a member of the
urban labor force will either be employed as a wage worker or will be underemployed in the
urban subsistence sector. Urban wages for those employed are determined by a function
dependent on urban workers’ fallback position. The urban subsistence sector acts as a
reserve army of labor and is considered to contain individuals who search for jobs within
the urban capitalist sector (Patnaik, 2008; Hart, 1973; Williams and Tumusiile-Mutebile,
1978). Thus, similar to a Phillips Curve relationship, the urban capitalist wage is a positive
function of the rate of employment within the urban capitalist sector. The urban capitalist
wage is also dependent on the reservation wage z, which is the urban subsistence income in
this model. Therefore, urban wages are determined by the following function12:
WF = f(z,
LF
LU
) = f(
YS
LS
,
LF
LU
), f1 > 0, f2 > 0 (2.6)
In this model, x number of capitalists own x identical firms whose production is described
by the production function
yf = n(lf , k) (2.7)
where lf is the number of workers employed and k is the capital stock in each firm.
Following this, the overall production in the urban capitalist sector is
YF = F (lFx, kx) = F (LF ,K) (2.8)
where LF is the total employment in the urban capitalist sector and K the total capital
stock in the urban capitalist sector. The first and second order conditions for the production
function are
12This condition is also similar to the non-shirking condition function in Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984), which
examines the wages from a slightly different perspective by considering the conditions of shirking.
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F1 > 0, F2 > 0, F11 < 0, F22 < 0, F12 > 0 (2.9)
Wage improvements reduce employers’ incentive to hire. Following this the aggregate
labor demand (LD) is
LFD = g(WF ,K), g1 < 0, g2 > 0 (2.10)
In summary, the bargaining and labor demand functions determine the levels of urban
wages and employment. Thus we can rewrite the bargaining equation (BC) as:
WF = f(
YS
LS
,
LF
LU
) = f(
YS
LU − g(WF ,K) ,
g(WF ,K)
LU
) (2.11)
From here the impact of urbanization on wages is
dWF
dLU
=
YSf1/(LU − g)2 + gf2/L2U
YSf1g1/(LU − g)2 + g1f2/LU − 1 < 0 (2.12)
In the case that all other conditions are the same, the increase in the urban population
pulls the urban wages down by reducing urban subsistence income and the employment
rate. We can rewrite the bargaining equation (BC) and labor demand (LD) as a function
of urban population and reorganize the Harris-Todaro equilibrium:
WF = h(LU ), h
′
< 0 (2.13)
LF = g(h(LU ),K), g1 < 0, g2 > 0 (2.14)
g(h(LU ),K)
LU
h(LU ) +
YS
LU
− SR − C = 0 (2.15)
which gives
dLU
dSR
=
L2U
−YS + h′(g1h+ g)LU − gh (2.16)
dLU/dSR will surely be negative, if (g1h + g) > 0. This condition holds if the wage
elasticity of labor demand is greater than -1. Most of the empirical studies on develop-
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ing economies including studies on Latin American, African, Eastern European and Asian
countries (Fajnzylber and Maloney, 2005; Lucas, 1996; Basu, Estrin and Svejnar, 2000; Min,
2007) show that the wage elasticity of labor demand is significantly greater than -1. Thus,
dLU/dSR is very likely to be negative. When this is so, from (2.13),(2.14) and (2.16) higher
income for peasants leads to higher wages and lower employment in the urban capitalist
sector.
dWF
dSR
> 0,
dLF
dSR
< 0 (2.17)
Also from (2.6) and (2.12), we know that increase in LU cannot reduce LS by creating
more employment(LF ) than the increase in LU . Hence,
dLS
dLU
> 0,
dLS
dLU
dLU
dSR
< 0,
d(YS/LS)
dSR
> 0 (2.18)
The implications of the model can graphically be observed in Figure 2.4. In the figure,
the wages are determined by the bargaining (BC) and labor demand (LD) curves. The curve
BC ′ represents bargaining when peasant incomes are lower. That is, when peasant incomes
are lower, so are urban capitalist wages. The reasoning here is that when peasant incomes
are lower, there is a greater push toward the cities. Nevertheless, not all of these extra
migrants will be able get employed in the urban capitalist sector. Hence, a greater number
of urban dwellers will be congested in the urban subsistence sector. The congestion will pull
the per capita urban subsistence incomes down to an even lower level. This would decrease
the fallback position for the urban wage workers and allow a slightly greater number to be
employed in the urban capitalist sector. Hence, if the wage elasticity of labor demand is
above -1 the profit shares increase:
d((YF −WFLF )/YF )
dSR
< 0 (2.19)
Figure 2.5 exhibits the possible increase in the urban Gini coefficient. In the Lorenz
Curve, the urban population is divided into the three categories of urban underemployed,
urban employed, and urban capitalists, listed in order of ascending income. The ratio be-
tween proportions of urban subsistence income to total urban income and urban subsistence
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workers to total urban population
( (YS/(YF+YS)
LS/LU
)
gives the slope on the left part of the Lorenz
Curve. As the congestion in urban subsistence sector does not lead to greater employment
in the urban employed, the rise in the overall urban inequality will be guaranteed. This can
clearly be seen from
d
(
(YS/(YF + YS)
LS/LU
)/
dLS =
(d(LF /LS)/dLS + d(x/LS))/dLS)
(1 + YF /YS)
−(d(YF /YS)/dLS)(LU/LS)
(1 + YF /YS)2
(2.20)
where x is the number of urban capitalists. In this condition, a decline in the peasants’
income increases overall urban inequality, since the slope representing the underemployed
becomes flatter and the urban population share of subsistence workers increases. Since the
profit share would also rise, the Lorenz Curve would expand.
The incomes of peasants will be determined by the combination of the overall level of
agricultural production and the distribution imposed by agrarian structures. There are
several agrarian structures that can be considered and in each structure different outcomes
for distribution could be observed. The agrarian structures that we will examine are:
a. Subsistence rural sector with fully egalitarian distribution: As with the urban sub-
sistence sector, we make the extreme assumption of zero marginal productivity of labor;
the extra family labor does not contribute to production. This is an assumption imposed
in the Lewis (1954) model and could be a reasonable approximation for many developing
economies. The assumption of fully egalitarian distribution gives us the result that each
peasant’s income is equal to the average product:
SR =
YR
LR
(2.21)
where YR and NR are the total amount of output and labor in the rural sector. It is
assumed that all of the rural labor is employed, so the labor force is equal to employment
(NR = LR).
b. Subsistence rural sector with identical peasants and income extraction of rentiers: In
many of the structures with subsistence farms, we observe that subsistence farms coexist
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with larger landlords. The large landlords also take a rentier class position and earn rent
through sharecropping/fixed rent contracts. In addition, they extract part of peasants’ sur-
plus through merchant and usury activities. This kind of surplus extraction is a significant
feature of the agrarian structures in various parts of Asia (Bardhan, 1984; Chang, 1989;
Boratav, 1989).
In these kinds of structures the distribution of land between small and large farms
influences the shares of rent extracted. First, a monopsonic landowner holds an opportunity
to demand a higher rent in fixed rent contracts or a greater share in sharecropping contracts
(Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz, 2002). Even where the 50-50 rule is common in sharecropping
contracts, the monopsonic landowner can extract a greater share of rent through leaving
the burden of input on the tenants. Second, as the land concentration increases the larger
landlords can achieve greater control of merchant and usury activities, which would improve
their share of rent.
We can see the impact of greater land concentration through the following model. We
assume that large landlords own βF of total land (HT ), lease α of their land through fixed
rent or sharecropping contracts, get λ of surplus from leased land and extract γ of peasants’
income through merchant or usury activities. We still follow the Lewisian assumptions for
subsistence activities. Therefore, peasants’ total incomes from self-owned (YP ) and rented
(YR) land are
YP = yPHP , YR = yPHR (2.22)
where yP , HP , HR are identical small peasants’ production per land, amount of total
land owned and amount of land rented respectively. Hence, income for each subsistence
peasant is
SR =
(
(1− βF )ypHT + (1− λ(βF ))αβF ypHT
NP
)
(1− γ(βF )) (2.23)
NP is the number of small peasants in the rural sector. Greater land concentration (βF )
raises landlords’ share on rent contracts and usury and merchant activities for the reasons
suggested above. From here, the migration function for this type of agrarian structure is:
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g(h(LU ),K)
LU
h(LU ) +
YS
LU
− S∗R(1− γ(βF ))− C = 0 (2.24)
where S∗R = ((1− βF )ypHT + (1− λ(βF ))αβF ypHT ))/NP
From the implicit function theorem, the impact of greater land concentration on the
level of urbanization is
dLU
dβF
=
ypHT ((1− γ)/NP )(1− (1− λ)α+ λ′αβF ) + γ′S∗R
YS/L2U + gh/L
2
U − h′(g1h+ g)/LU
(2.25)
If we follow the assumption the wage elasticity of labor demand is greater than -1, then
dLU/dβF > 0, since α, λ, γ and βF are between 0 and 1, and (dNP )/(dLU ) = −1. The
impact of land concentration will rise as monopsony power of rentiers influence the rent
contacts and usury and merchant shares. Therefore, higher rentier share would increase
urban inequality as in Figure 2.6.
c. Latifundio-minifundio type farms: The plantation-type farms are rural structures in
which the production is done by wage workers. These structures are mostly associated with
the Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile and Peru (Furtado, 1976). Like urban cap-
italist enterprises, plantations are concerned with profit maximization. In Latin American
countries, latifundios co-exist with minifundios in which peasants own an extremely limited
income that would hardly enable them live. These are very small-scale subsistence family
farms. Hence, it is plausible to assume that in minifundios the marginal labor does not
contribute to overall production. Hence, peasant income in minifundios is
SM =
YM
LM
=
(1− βL)HT yM
LM
(2.26)
where YM and LM respectively are the total production and labor in minifundios and
HT , βL, yM are overall rural land size, latifundios’ land share and minifundios’ production
per unit land.
The total output in latifundios is dependent on labor and land size:
Y W = Y W (LW , βLHT ) (2.27)
with the conditions of
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Y W1 > 0, Y
W
2 > 0, Y
W
11 < 0, Y
W
22 < 0, Y
W
12 > 0 (2.28)
We take latifundios as profit maximizing structures with following profit function
piW = Y
W (LW , βLHT )−WWLW (2.29)
where WW is wage and LW is amount of wage-labor in latifundios. The first order
condition Y WW = W
∗
W will give the amount of wage labor in plantations (L
∗
W ).
We have not yet examined what will determine the wage in latifundios (WW ). Since the
minifundios and latifundios mostly coexist together, the labor markets in each structure
are not entirely distinguished from each other. In minifundios, extreme poverty forces
the peasants to work in plantations either as temporary or permanent worker (De Janvry,
1981). If LW is the number of landless peasants in latifundios and is LM the labor living
in minifundios, the owners of latifundios will demand extra labor (t) from minifundios, as
long as the following condition exists
Y W1 (LW , βLHT ) >
YM
LM
(2.30)
The flow of labor from minifundios will stop at
W ∗W = Y
W
1 (L
∗
W , βLHT ) = S
∗
M =
YM
L∗M
(2.31)
where
L∗W = LW + t, L
∗
M = LM − t (2.32)
Thus, we get an equivalent level of income minifundios and wage workers in latifundios,
which determine the level of income for marginal peasant. By using this model we can
also show the impact of changing distribution in these structures. The income of each
minifundista can be rewritten as
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SM =
(1− βL)HT yM
LM − t
(2.33)
From here we can get two equations that explain the changes in the latifundio-minifundio
structure:
F 1 = Y W1 (LW + t, βLHT )− (1− βL)HT yM/(LM − t) = 0 (2.34)
F 2 =
g(h(LU ),K)
LU
h(LU ) +
YS
LU
− (1− βL)HT yM
LM − t
− C = 0 (2.35)
The changing land share affects both the amount of t and LU . The impact of land share
is determined by

dF 1
dLU
dF 1
dt
dF 2
dLU
dF 2
dt


dLU
dβL
dt
dβL

+

dF 1
dβL
dF 2
dβL

= 0 (2.36)
From here the Jacobian is
∣∣∣∣J∣∣∣∣ =

(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2
dLM
dLU
+ Y W11
dLW
dLU
Y W11 −
(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2
(g1h
′
h+ gh
′
)LU − gh
L2U
− YS
L2U
+
(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2
dLM
dLU
−(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2

(2.37)
and
∣∣∣∣J∣∣∣∣ < 0 (2.38)
considering that the total decline in population in minifundios and latifundios is the
growth of population in the urban sector (dLW /dLU + dLM/dLU = −1) and following the
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assumption that the wage elasticity of labor demand is greater than -1. The impact of land
share on the urban population is
dLU
dβL
= −

Y W12 HT +
HT yM
LM − t
Y W11 −
(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2
HT yM
LM − t
−(1− βL)HT yM
(LM − t)2

∣∣∣∣J∣∣∣∣ (2.39)
Thus, the sign of dLU/dβL becomes positive when
(1− βL)HT
LM − t
Y W12 + Y
W
11 < 0 (2.40)
which is satisfied when
d(LW + t)
d(βLHT )
<
LM − t
(1− βL)HT (2.41)
Thus, a regressive redistribution favoring latifundios pushes peasants to the urban sector,
if the redistribution cannot create as many jobs in the latifundios as the number of the
minifundistas losing their land. This depends on labor productivities in latifundios and
minifundios.
According to Furtado’s definition, the latifundios in Latin America are classified as
farms hiring more than 12 workers. To examine the labor productivity ratios between
latifundios and minifundios, we can check empirical studies. Thiesenhausen and Melmed-
Sanjak (1990) examine the labor productivities in Brazilian farms for 1970s and 1980s.
According to their estimates in the farms with land size between 2000-10000 hectares, the
labor productivity is 5.2 times more than the farms with size between 10-50 hectares, 12.1
times more than the farms with size between 1-10 hectares and 22 times more than farms
with land below 1 hectare. Therefore, if there is a regressive land distribution favoring
latifundios’, latifundios new land over wage labor created cannot exceed the production
over labor ratio in minifundios. Hence
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dLU
dβL
> 0 (2.42)
is very likely to be observed. Therefore, a regressive land redistribution pulls down
both incomes of minifundios and wages in latifundios13 and pushes peasants to the urban
sector. Following our model, urban inequality is expected to be greater in a less egalitarian
minifundio-latifundio structure.
2.4.3 Limitations of the model
The model presented above suggests a mechanism connecting land and income inequal-
ities. Nevertheless, it excludes several issues that might deserve attention in future studies.
First, the model takes the growth of capital in the given sectors as exogenous. The reason
for that is that income inequality’s influence on the long-run economic growth depends on
various factors that can hardly be fully understood by the simple assumptions imposed in a
model. The classical Lewis (1954) model conceives the flow of “unlimited supplies of labor”
as positive for capital accumulation, since it lowers the capitalist wages and contributes
to the growth of surplus. On the other hand, the neo-Kaleckian models take the capacity
utilization rates into account and suggest that the Lewisian arguments might not hold.
Among the neo-Kaleckian models, Dutt (1984) suggests a model which exhibits developing
economies as wage-led, and Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) show that economies might either
be wage or profit-led depending on their structures. In addition, the neo-Marxian models
(Goodwin, 1967; Skott, 1989) claim that growth and wage shares are endogenous to each
other; therefore, the unemployment rate and wage share follow circular cycles.
There are other factors that these models do not capture. As mentioned in the pre-
vious sections, high inequality creates an important impediment to the development of
human capital. In addition, high inequality might lead to problems such as credit con-
straint problems, increased crime and corruption and social unrest (Griffin and Ickowitz,
1998; Voitchovsky, 2011) that might impede long-run economic growth. Indeed, several
13The latifundios often also extract part of minifundios’ income through usury and merchant activities
(De Janvry, 1981). Following Griffin, Ickowitz and Khan (2002), greater land concentration will have even
further negative influence on SR due to latifundios’ greater rent extraction.
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empirical studies (Easterly, 2007; Alesina and Rodrik; 1996; Deininger and Squire, 1998)
show that higher income inequality reduced long-run growth during the second half of the
20th century. Due to the complex structure of inequality’s long-run influence on growth,
this essay does not attempt to incorporate inequality’s impact on capital accumulation.
Second, the model does not take the urban-rural terms of trade into account. Following
the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework, urban-rural terms of trade are influenced by the ratio
of total urban and rural incomes. However, it might also be reasonable to assume that
the urban-rural terms of trade converges to the world prices and, therefore turns into an
exogenous variable as the economies become open to trade (Skott and Larudee, 1998).
Nevertheless, my model does not have a detailed interpretation of inequality’s impact on
growth. Therefore, the model does not include a variable on the urban-rural terms of trade.
Third, the model does not consider the urban “marginal mass” consisting of workers
who are not able to function as a reserve army for many industries (Nun, 2000)14. The
group of workers described as the “marginal mass” might not be capable of working in the
sectors that require skilled labor. Nevertheless, the marginal mass might still increase the
surplus in the skilled sectors through providing cheap services to the wage workers, which
might pull the skilled wages down in nominal terms.
Lastly, here I assume that rural dwellers are employed only in the agricultural sector.
However, in the contemporary world an increasing number of peasants are employed in
industry or services, which are often associated with the urban sector (Keyder and Yenal,
2011; Bernstein, 2003). These individuals either are employed in full-time jobs in the
industrial or services sector or they work for wages part-time and pursue their traditional
activities part-time. The direction that the new rural sector is moving towards is not entirely
inconsistent with the framework depicted in this article. Higher land inequality might not
enforce migration, that is physical relocation in every case. However, the individuals still
can be added to the reserve army of labor as they seek jobs outside agriculture, even while
they are living in the rural areas.
14Also see Kay (1989) for a detailed summary discussions around the marginal mass argument.
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2.5 Empirical analysis
2.5.1 Variable selection
This section presents an empirical analysis testing the relevance of the arguments in the
model. We will try to examine land inequality’s influence on both urban and overall income
inequality. For measuring land distribution, I use a dataset of 99 countries including Gini
values from the 1960’s. Using land distribution data from the 1960s has two advantages.
First, it demonstrates the lasting effects of the pre-urbanization initial conditions. Second,
it prevents any questions of reverse causality from clouding the analysis.
The overall income inequality is measured with an income Gini coefficient. However,
some countries report only expenditure Ginis rather than income. This study uses expen-
diture Ginis as a proxy for income Ginis, but since expenditure Gini coefficients are smaller
than income Ginis for the majority of countries that report both (Deininger and Squire,
1996), the regression includes a dummy variable controlling for the use of this proxy. The
measurement of urban income inequality follows the same procedure: income Ginis where
available, expenditure Ginis and a dummy variable when necessary. For measuring the level
of urbanization, I used the share of population living in the urban sector.
The regressions also control for the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis by using log(GDP per
capita) and its square. This is similar to the estimations in a number of studies (Ahluwalia,
1976; Jha, 1996; Mbaku, 1997; Barro, 2000). Another variable that might affect income
inequality is trade openness. The mainstream argument relying on the traditional trade
theory claims that trade openness increases inequality in the developed economies and
reduces it in the developing economies (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). Nevertheless, many
political economists (Burke and Epstein, 2001; Kaplinsky, 2001; Onaran, 2009; Pollin, 2002;
Rao, 1998; Rudra, 2008) claim that trade openness leads to more unequal distribution in
both the developed and developing world. They assert that trade openness reduces labor’s
bargaining power through rising flexibility and substitutability of labor. This might lead
to lowering wage shares and hence higher overall inequality. The possible effects of trade
openness will be controlled by a variable measuring trade openness as a ratio of trade volume
(exports + imports) over GDP.
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This study conceives of the rural-to-urban migration as an important source for the
creation of a larger reserve army of labor. However, there are other sources that can also
help to sustain high levels of labor surplus. Both Marx (1867) and Lewis (1954) discuss the
role of women’s labor participation on the growth of the reserve army/unlimited supplies of
labor. Therefore, this study also controls for the non-agricultural labor participation rate
of women.
The regressions on the level of urbanization control for the logarithm of the country total
land area. Many countries experience “first city bias”, where a significant part of the urban
activities agglomerate around one or two cities (Todaro and Smith, 2009). In countries with
a large land area, large distances between the leading cities and rural areas might limit the
growth in the share of urban population by increasing the costs of migration.
Lastly, this study also tests the relevance of arguments by Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor
and Tsiddon (1996), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Galor and Moav and Vollrath
(2009) concerning institutions and education inequality. Controlling for the institutional
mechanisms that might translate land inequality into urban income inequality allows us to
see whether the bargaining effect makes a contribution independent of education disparities.
The outcomes of higher education inequality can be observed in the longer run. Hence, I
used 10-year lags of education Gini and indices of democracy. This also relieves the problem
of reverse causality in the regressions where education Gini and indices of democracy are
controlled.
2.5.2 Data sources
The land distribution dataset presented in this study is available in Appendix A. For
consistency, I relied mainly on the land distribution dataset of Frankema (2010). Neverthe-
less, data from major sources like Deininger and Squire (1998), Muller and Seligson (1987),
Berry and Cline (1979) and IFAD (2001) are also added to the sample15. In these studies,
FAO’s reports on the World Census (1950, 1960, 1970) are important sources for the cal-
culation of the majority of the land Gini values. Nevertheless, the agriculture surveys are
15Countries with a population below 1 million are excluded from the sample.
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not conducted yearly. For the majority of countries, there is a long time span between two
surveys and for many of the countries there are only 1-2 available land distribution obser-
vations. This does not allow us to have a balanced series for land distribution. Therefore,
this study uses one observation from a year around 1960.
The overall income/expenditure Gini coefficients are from CEPAL database for Latin
American, PovcalNet for Asian and African, Asian Development Bank database for Asian,
Eurostat database for European and OECD database for non-European developed coun-
tries. Various other sources were helpful including UNU-WIDER (2008)’s World Income
Inequality Database for reaching data not available in any of the sources above16. The
details for the data sources are listed Appendix A. The urban inequality dataset is lim-
ited compared to the dataset for overall income inequality. One of the reasons for this is
that in most of the developed economies, a clear divide between urban and rural sectors
disappeared. Hence, for the majority of developed countries Gini values are not calcu-
lated separately for urban and rural sectors. For the developing countries, two UN-Habitat
(2010a, 2010b) reports, “State of the World Cities 2010/2011: Bridging the Urban Divide”
and “The State of African Cities 2010: Governance, Inequality and Urban Land Markets”
are important sources for urban Gini coefficients. The rest of the observations come from
CEPAL (2011), PovcalNet (2011), Eastwood and Lipton (2004) and various other sources
listed in the Appendix A. Since the observations for urban Gini are already limited, I only
used the most recent urban Gini observations.
For GDP per capita, I used the data of Penn World Tables v7.0. The level of urban-
ization, trade openness, non-agricultural labor participation rate and total land area come
from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Education Gini coefficients come from
Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal’s (2012) study. Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal
calculate education inequality by using Barro and Lee (2012)’s dataset on educational at-
tainment. I used education Gini coefficients for population aged 15 and over. For controlling
the levels of democracy I used two different indices. The first index is Polity IV formed
16The main problem with the UNU-WIDER (2008) database is that it has not been updated recently;
the database ends at 2006
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by Marshall and Cole (2011). This index measures whether a country’s regime is closer to
full democracy or full autocracy. The second index I used is World Bank’s Voice and Ac-
countability index of Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank defines it as an index
reflecting “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
a free media”. The increases in both indices imply improvement in democracy. As these
indices exhibit the citizens’ capability of participating in political process, they can also be
considered as a proxy of power inequality.
2.5.3 Empirical results
The cross-country equations I estimate are in the form of
urbanginii = β0 + β1landginii +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i (2.43)
incomeginii = β0 + β1landginii +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i (2.44)
where for country i and in year t, urbangini, incomegini, and landgini are urban income
Gini, overall income Gini and land Gini coefficients respectively. I use OLS regressions,
since the land inequality data are very limited, imbalanced and discrete. Moreover, the
land inequality data are richer for 1950s, 1960s and 1970s; whereas, the income inequality
data are richer for the period after 1990. This does not allow a reliable empirical analysis
using country fixed effects. Nevertheless, OLS regressions are useful for our purposes, they
allow us examine whether the cross-country differences of land inequality are transmitted
to the cross-country differences of urban and income inequalities.
First, Table 2.2 reports the results for the urban Gini coefficient. Consistent with our
model, the results support a positive relationship between land inequality in the 1960s and
recent urban Gini coefficient, when we control for Southern African countries (Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia) and several other vari-
ables. The Southern African dummy is significant for all of the regressions; however, we
cannot see a significant proof for the existence of the Kuznets Curve and or the impacts
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from trade openness. There is a weak evidence on women’s labor force participation rate’s
negative impact on urban income inequality. Lastly, the coefficient education inequality is
insignificant and the democracy indices take wrong signs implying that the expansion of
democracy increases the income inequality. The lack of significance in some of the coeffi-
cients might be due to size of the sample used. Thus, we might expect the regressions with
overall income inequality to give clearer results.
Next, the estimations for the overall income Gini coefficients are exhibited by Tables
2.3 and 2.4. The significance of coefficients in these tables improves with the larger number
of observations. The coefficients for the land Gini are significantly positive in all of the
regressions, which supports our hypothesis. In Table 2.3, the signs for log(GDP ) and
log(GDP )2 are respectively positive and negative and they significant at 1% level, when
trade openness and women’s non-agricultural labor participation are controlled. This seems
to be an evidence in favor of the Kuznets hypothesis.
The impact of trade openness is not significant in all of the regressions and has contra-
dictory signs. Thus, we cannot find strong evidence for the net impact of trade openness on
overall Gini coefficients. The coefficient for women’s non-agricultural labor participation is
only significantly positive at 10% level in two of the four regressions; however, the signs are
positive for all regressions. Thus, there is only weak evidence that women’s non-agricultural
labor participation tends to increase income inequality17. One potential explanation for the
weak effect of women’s labor force participation may be that, especially in the more de-
veloped economies, some women might occupy capitalist or rentier class positions. In this
case, some of the increase in women’s labor force participation is not captured by the reserve
army of labor.
The effect of education inequality is positive at 10% significance level for only one of
the three regressions that control for the education Gini coefficient. Thus, the evidence on
the impact of education inequality on the overall income inequality is surprisingly weak.
This might be explained by two reasons. First, the education Gini coefficients are strongly
17We need to keep in mind that the income inequality in here is majorly measuring the inequality between
households. For the obvious reasons, greater labor force participation of women is expected to increase the
income gaps within households. However, this effect cannot be captured by this study’s dataset.
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correlated with GDP per capita. This is because the education Gini is strongly nega-
tively correlated with the years of schooling18 (Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal, 2012;
Thomas, Wang and Fan, 2011), and increasing income per capita has a strong positive
effect on years of schooling. For this reason also, education Gini’s coefficients are more
significant in the regressions where log(GDP ) and log(GDP )2 are not included. We will
not be concerned with the correlation between education Gini and GDP, since the focus of
this study is exhibiting the importance of the bargaining aspect. Second, in many countries
the premium for skill increases due to skill-biased technical change (Autor, Katz and Kear-
ney, 2008). The increasing skill premium might keep income inequality at higher levels in
countries where the education inequality is lower.
The inequality reducing impact of democracy is significant only in one of the six regres-
sions in which I used Polity IV and the Voice and Accountability index as a proxies for
democracy. Although democracy might expand the education frontier as depicted in Bour-
guignon and Verdier (2000) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), as with education inequality,
better democracy might not necessarily reduce inequality due to rising skill premium. The
signs for land Gini coefficients remain significantly positive in the regressions that control
for education Gini. Hence, our hypothesis regarding land inequality’s impact on bargain-
ing relations is not rejected19 even when we control for education inequality. Moreover, the
lack of evidence on the influence of education inequality and democracy indices suggest that
the bargaining aspect explains that relationship between land and income Gini coefficients
better than the institutionalist aspect focusing on the education inequality.
To support the interpretation above, we will examine whether the positive relationship
between land and income inequalities is due to the mechanism I posited in the theoretical
section. First we will examine whether higher land inequality led to greater agglomeration
in today’s urban sector:
18The correlation coefficient is -0.63 for the recent data.
19The correlation between education inequality and land inequality is very weak and surprisingly negative.
The correlation coefficient between land and education Gini coefficients are -0.126. Similarly, the correlation
coefficient between Polity IV index and land Gini coefficient are 0.094 the correlation coefficient between
Voice and Accountability index and land Gini coefficient are 0.057
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urbani = β0 + β1landginii +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i (2.45)
where urban is the level of urbanization. Table 2.5 presents the results for the cross-
country OLS estimation. The results are consistent with the argument that greater land
inequality pushes more individuals to the urban sector. Also, as expected, higher GDP is
associated with greater level of urbanization.
We then test the influence of greater urban agglomeration on income inequality. An
OLS regression between urbanization and income inequality would likely suffer from an
endogeneity problem20. Hence, I instrumented urbanization with its 20 year lag in the
following form:
log(urbani) = β0 + β1log(urban90i) +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i (2.46)
incomeginii = β0 + β1log(urbani) +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i (2.47)
Table 2.6 show the results for the 2SLS regressions. The regressions exhibit that an
increase in urbanization leads to higher inequality when other variables are controlled.
Thus, consistent with the model, for a given income level, a greater congestion in the urban
sector increases income inequality. The relationship is significant at the 5% level in four
of the five regressions.For testing the robustness of results, I also report the simple OLS
regressions where a higher level of urbanization is found to increase income inequality. The
estimations in Table 2.6 do not support the claim that the expansion of education frontier
is a significant determinant of the cross-country differences of income inequality. This again
suggests that the bargaining aspect has more explanatory power than the institutionalist
aspect.
20Indeed, the Hausman test shows that there is an endogeneity problem between urbanization and income
inequality.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter explores how the development paths that the developing countries follow
are influenced by their agrarian structures. Much of the literature on the land-income
inequality relationship suggests that land inequality leads to unequal educational oppor-
tunities that are often exacerbated by institutions favoring the non-poor (Engerman and
Sokoloff, 2002; 2005; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996; Galor, Moav and
Vollrath, 2009; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). On the other hand, a number of stud-
ies briefly point out that land inequality also adversely affect bargaining power of workers
(Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz, 2002; De Janvry, 1981; Harris, 1978; Keyder, 1987, Amsden,
1989; 1990). This study’s contribution is to put the bargaining aspect at the center of the
analysis and to develop a more thorough model explaining the causal link between land
inequality and the distribution of income among different groups of urban dwellers.
My conclusion is that if the countries had lower land inequalities, a lower share of these
countries’ population would have been engaged in urban subsistence activities with low
productivity. This would have allowed wage-workers to earn higher wages and hence the
countries would have followed a more egalitarian development path with lower poverty. The
results are supported by an empirical analysis showing that land inequality circa 1960s has
significant positive impact on both more recent urban and overall income inequalities. The
analysis also tests the robustness of bargaining effects by considering the education aspect.
The impact of land inequality remains significant even when controlling for education Gini
coefficients and power inequality/level of democracy, supporting my contention that land
inequality influences urban income inequality through the wage bargaining mechanism. This
bargaining effect operates independently of the education mechanism.
The results suggest that policies such as progressive land reforms or/and subsidies pro-
tecting small peasantry can have a positive long-term influence on the urban income dis-
tribution. Moreover, a significant amount of work suggests that countries with egalitarian
agrarian structures can experience faster accumulation of human capital (Easterly, 2007;
Deininger and Squire, 1998; Griffin and Ickowitz, 1998; Voitchovsky, 2011), which would in-
crease the rates of long-run growth, as observed in the “East Asian Miracles” that followed
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serious redistributive land reforms. Considering that almost the half the world’s population
is still living in rural areas, policies favoring the small peasantry can have lasting positive
impacts; hence, more countries experiencing successful egalitarian development models can
emerge. The results presented in this essay do not cover several issues, like the role of urban
marginal masses or the evolving structure of the rural sector. Hence, this study leaves space
for further examination of the relationship between income inequality and land inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROOTS OF GINIS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
TURKEY, KOREA, AND BRAZIL
3.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the impact of land distribution on income distributions through
a comparative analysis. The chapter compares Turkey with two countries, Brazil and South
Korea, which are characterized by markedly different income distributions and agrarian
structures. Brazil is included as an inegalitarian Latin American case, with an agrarian
structure characterized by very small-scale farms (minifundias) and large-scale farms (lat-
ifundias, commercial farms) employing wage labor. Korea is a relatively egalitarian East
Asian economy that implemented a successful land reform beginning in the late 1940s. Al-
though Korea was subject to authoritarian regimes and restricted labor rights until the late
1980s, its level of inequality is only slightly higher than those of European countries such
as France, Germany and the Netherlands1. This is partly the result of the early wealth
redistribution experienced in Korea. Turkey represents an intermediate case between Brazil
and Korea, with an average level of inequality2 and an agrarian structure in which family
farms and semi-feudal structures co-exist.
There are two primary reasons for including a comparative analysis of Turkey, Brazil
and Korea in this dissertation. First, focusing on specific countries allows us to conduct
a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms affecting overall income distribution. Second,
a comparative analysis allows us to employ detailed and relatively reliable data and to
1According to Kim (2011), Korea’s Gini coefficient throughout the late 2000s is 0.310, which is slightly
higher than France’s, Germany’s and Netherlands’s Gini values for late 2000s, which are 0.293, 0.295 and
0.294, respectively (OECD, 2011).
2Turkey’s income Gini coefficient for 2012 is estimated at 0.40 (Turkstat, 2013).
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minimize the data problems and inconsistencies that can occur in cross-country analyses
that consider a large number of countries.
The results of the analysis indicate that land inequality distinguishes Turkey’s income
inequality from conditions in Korea and Brazil through two mechanisms. First, the more
egalitarian agrarian structure in Korea keeps Korea’s educational inequality below that of
Turkey. However, this channel does not explain the differences between Turkey and Brazil,
as Brazil’s higher level of urbanization reduces the inequality in educational attainment.
However, overurbanization in Brazil has a second effect on income inequality; it encourages
the growth of subsistence, informal and part-time employees that function as a reserve
army of labor for the urban formal sector. Thus, by generating overurbanization, the more
unequal distribution of land in Brazil ensures that Brazil’s income Gini coefficient is greater
than Turkey’s.
This chapter first discusses why I compare Turkey with Korea and Brazil. Next, I
discuss the impact of land inequality on the educational inequality in Brazil, Korea, Turkey
and Brazil. The fourth section discusses how the distribution of land affects the income
distribution in Korea, Turkey and Brazil by determining level of urbanization and the shares
of informal, subsistence and part-time employment in these three countries. In the fifth
section, the arguments proposed in this essay are tested through an econometric analysis of
Korea, Turkey and Brazil. The final section concludes.
3.2 Why analyze Korea, Brazil and Turkey?
3.2.1 Brazil
Latin American countries are historically associated with high levels of inequality. The
large Gini coefficient values can be associated with various factors such as the biased de-
velopment of institutions or weaker bargaining power among new urban residents. These
factors may be highly correlated with initial conditions characterized by the substantial land
inequality resulting from the “colonial origins” of Latin American countries (Engerman and
Sokoloff, 2005; Acemog˘lu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; 2002).
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Among the Latin American countries, Brazil is considered one of the most inegalitarian.
As Table 3.1 indicates, the Gini coefficient for income in Brazil is generally estimated to
exceed 0.60. During the 2000s, Brazil’s Gini experienced a substantial decline in response
to Lula da Silva’s policies (Fishlow, 2011; Neri, 2010); nevertheless, 2012 data reveal that
Brazil remains the second most unequal Latin American country after Guatemala3 (CEPAL,
2013). Thus, Brazil is included in this study as an example of high inequality.
The longstanding inequality experienced in Brazil could be substantially related to the
agrarian conditions that existed during the early phases of Brazilian industrialization. Ac-
cording to Furtado (1976), during the period 1950-60, latifundios represented 4.7% of farms
but owned 59.5% of total land, whereas minifundios that represented 22.5% of farms only
owned 0.5% of total land (Table 3.2). When calculating this statistic, a minifundio is de-
fined as a plot of land that is too small to provide employment for two individuals. Because
the ’minifundistas’ were never able to obtain a minimum income level above the absolute
poverty line, they served as a resource for cheap labor for commercial farms.
Furtado defines a latifundio as a landholding employing over twelve permanent workers.
These holdings are often associated with semi-feudal relations of production (De Janvry,
1981a; Barraclough and Domike, 1966). The landlords thus not only enjoy economic power,
but they also have substantial political influence in the area (Barraclough and Domike,
1966). Landholders often exercise influence over local police and army officers, and churches
and schools require a landholder’s approval to prosper.
Data on the period 1970-80 indicate that sharecropping activities were very limited in
Brazil. In 1970, only 3% and in 1980 only 2% of the total agrarian labor was engaged
in sharecropping activities (Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak, 1990). In summary, the
Brazilian agrarian structure is characterized by a combination of very small-scale farms and
large and medium enterprises hiring wage labor. This type of structure is associated with
the high level of land inequality in Brazil. For different years, the land Gini coefficient in
operational units and the Gini coefficient for land ownership are approximately 0.80 and
3In 2012, Brazil was the second most unequal Latin American country with a Gini coefficient of 0.567
(Cepal, 2013), which is slightly lower than Guatemala’s 0.585.
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0.85, respectively (Table 3.3). These figures are significantly higher than South and South-
eastern Asian land Ginis of approximately 0.60s or East Asian land Ginis of approximately
0.30-0.40s (Frankema, 2010; Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz, 2002). The natural result of a high
degree of land inequality is an inegalitarian rural sector in Brazil (Table 3.1).
In addition to the latifundios, medium-scale farms also employ an important share of
permanent and temporary workers in Brazil. Furtado (1976) defines farms that employ
between 4 and 12 individuals as medium-sized farms and notes that these enterprises em-
ployed 42% of total agricultural labor in Brazil between 1950 and 1960 (Table 3.2). A study
examining Brazil’s agrarian structure in the 1970s indicates that farms with areas in the
range of 200-2000 hectares employed 33% of total hired permanent and 18% of temporary
labor (Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak, 1990). Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak con-
sider these to be medium-sized farms. They also report that the shares of temporary and
permanent hired labor in total agricultural labor and the share of employed labor hired by
medium-sized farms rose between 1970 and 1980. This can be interpreted as an indicator of
an increased commercialization of Brazilian agriculture due to the activities of medium-sized
farms.
3.2.2 Korea
Korea is included in this study as example of an egalitarian developing country with
distributional characteristics comparable to those of European countries. According to var-
ious estimations, Korea’s Gini coefficient has remained at levels in the 0.30s (Table 3.4),
which can be interpreted as low for a developing economy. A seemingly counterintuitive
observation regarding the Korean experience is that income redistribution policies in Korea
have been extremely limited. The Korean government generally prioritized investments over
social transfers encouraging consumption (Amsden, 1989). The large conglomerates called
chaebols benefited from substantial government subsidies (Kang, 2002). These conditions
were partly the result of the long-term presence of authoritarian, military governments.
Moreover, labor rights in Korea were extremely restricted until 1987. Furthermore, the
Korean education system instilled Confucian values in students such as “loyalty, discipline,
hard work, diligence and social harmony” (Kim, 2008). The Confucian values created patri-
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archal and paternal relationships in Korean workplaces and reduced social cohesion between
employers and workers (Koo, 1993). As a result, the number of strikes in Korea was very low
relative to Latin American countries (Jenkins, 1991). In summary, the relationship between
Korea’s social and political history and its levels of distribution has been unconventional.
Nevertheless, Korea achieved lower levels of inequality through the redistribution of wealth,
specifically the land reform following World War II, rather than income redistribution. This
makes Korea an interesting case for this study, as it reflects the impact of lower levels of
land inequality on urban and overall inequality.
Before the land reform in Korea, tenancy was widespread: 48.8% of farmers were pure
tenants and 34.7% were part tenants (Table 3.5). Rents represented 50-60% of all harvests.
Moreover, tenants were responsible for cultivation costs (Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz, 2002).
The distribution of land at the time was markedly unequal: the wealthiest 4% owned 50%
of total land, and Japanese landlords owned 20%.
Following the Second World War, the US military government began to impose land re-
forms. In 1949 and 1950, the civilian government introduced further reforms, and plots over
3 hectares were seized by the government and redistributed. The land reforms proved highly
successful. Tenancy declined sharply over a brief period of time. By 1954, approximately
90% of farmers either fully or partially owned the land they cultivated. Following the land
reform, levels of land inequality remained low due to institutional support for smaller farms
(De Janvry, 1981b) 4. The Gini coefficients for Korea’s land inequality were estimated at
0.35 in 1961 (Deininger and Squire, 1998), 0.31 in 1970 and 0.37 in 1990 (Frankema, 2005)5.
4Following the land reform, the Korean government supported small farmers using various policies. First,
the government implemented a payment plan that gave tenants advantages in purchasing land. According
to the plan, tenants that purchased redistributed land were required to pay the landlords 1.5 times the
annual yield over five years. In many cases, the government extended the repayment period to eight years.
Moreover, during the first half of the 1950s, the government imposed price controls for tenants/new owners’
payments to landlords. The regulated price for rice was significantly lower than its market price, which
redistributed income from the larger landlords to smallholding peasants purchasing new plots of land (Jeon
and Kim, 2000). Second, during the first half of the 1960s, the Park Chung Hee government increased
irrigation investments and implemented a debt reduction program for peasants (Burmeister, 1992).
5Land Gini coefficient values for Korea indicate the inequality in the disposable land per farm rather
than inequality in land ownership
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This ensured that agricultural inequality remained low. The Gini coefficient for agricultural
income inequality fluctuated around 0.30 during the period 1965-1993 (Table 3.4).
3.2.3 Turkey
The Turkish case could be considered to have substantial similarities with development
experiences in Latin America. During the period 1962-1979, Turkey experienced substantial
industrial development through Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies focus-
ing on the domestic market. The ISI policies represented an important basis for further
industrialization; however, they were incapable of producing high-quality goods that could
compete in global markets. Similar to Latin American cases, this issue was addressed with
the implementation of trade liberalization policies after 1980.
Turkey’s history of industrialization is similar to those of Latin American countries; how-
ever, Turkey’s agrarian structure differs significantly. According to Keyder (1983, 1987),
Turkish agriculture is historically characterized by the predominance of an independent,
small-scale peasantry. Landless peasants do not represent an important category in ru-
ral Turkish society6. Nevertheless, Turkey’s agrarian structure is not entirely egalitarian.
Turkey’s land Gini coefficients are estimated within the range of the 0.60-0.70s in agricul-
tural surveys (Table 3.7). Accordingly, income inequality is higher in Turkey than that in
Korea and lower than that in Brazil (Table 3.6). Thus, Turkey is included in this study as
an intermediate case between Brazil and Korea.
Keyder’s claim regarding the dominance of small-scale peasantry, noted above, is also
supported by statistics indicating that most peasants in Turkey cultivate their own land.
However, three considerations help explain why Turkey’s rural sector is not entirely egali-
tarian. First, a semi-feudal structure persists in southeastern Anatolia, where the relations
of production differ from those in the rest of the country. Southeastern Anatolia is host
to tribal leaders and large landowners called ag˘as (Aydın, 1986). Ag˘as are not merely
landowners, but they also exercise authority over peasants beyond their economic power.
Peasants serve as corvee labor and are required to perform other duties assigned by the
6The share of landless peasants in Turkey was 14% in 2002 (U¨nal, 2012)
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ag˘a. If they refuse to comply, the ag˘a will either expel them from the village or mistreat
them. Peasants typically cultivate the ag˘as’ lands through various forms of sharecropping
agreements; landless agricultural laborers also work on the ag˘as’ lands as wage laborers.
Second, by engaging in usurious lending practices, moneylenders have expropriated an
important share of small-scale peasants’ surplus (Boratav, 1969). Ko¨ymen (2008) asserts
that usurious lending also significantly affected the distribution of land. Many of the peas-
ants who cannot pay their loans are forced to sell their land to large landowners.
Third, studies on Turkey’s past agrarian structure indicate that large-scale capitalist
farms existed in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions (Ko¨ymen, 1981; Kıray, 1999)7.
These farms generally produced export crops such as cotton and tobacco. The land distri-
bution statistics for 1950 reflect the presence of large-scale farms in these regions (Table
3.7). However, Aks¸it (1999) observes that the villages where capitalist farms existed have
become more egalitarian over time. Some of the large farms were divided among the chil-
dren and relatives of the landlords. These farms were divided into smaller parcels and
became medium-sized capitalist farms. The sharecroppers in the villages owned their land
and became petty commodity producers. This is consistent with the decline in land in-
equality between 1950 and 1970 and the reduction in rural inequality after 1973 (Table
3.6). However, some of this decline might actually reflect data issues. For example, the
extreme inequality in the Mediterranean region and its rapid decline must be interpreted
with caution.
Next, this chapter examines the relationship between land and income inequality in
Turkey, Brazil and Korea. We first discuss the role played by institutions and educational
inequality in this relationship. Then, we examine how land inequality might affect income
inequality through its effects on the level of urbanization.
7Ko¨ymen’s (1981) study considers the earlier years of the Turkish Republic (1923-1938). Kıray (1999)
examines the relations of production in Mediterranean villages at the beginning of the 1970s.
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3.3 Impact of education inequality
3.3.1 Theoretical framework.
The effect of the distribution of land on education is an important characteristic that
distinguishes the urban or nonagricultural income inequality in Korea from that in Brazil
and Turkey8. An unequal distribution of land can influence urban income inequality through
two channels. In low-income societies with inegalitarian agrarian structures, lower income
families might wish to have their children educated; however, they may be unable to invest
in education due to credit constraints (Galor and Zeira, 1993). When these families have
access to credit markets, the marginal returns to education might be minimal for the lower
levels of schooling. This reduces poor families’ incentives for investing in education (Galor
and Tsiddon, 1996). Economic growth reduces the credit constraints on schooling, in so far
as the average income for low-income households also increases. Nevertheless, improvements
in educational outcomes are slower in unequal societies because the marginal returns realized
by low-income households are expected to be lower.
To alleviate poor educational attainment, the state typically pursues remedies in an
attempt to expand educational attainment through public investment. Nevertheless, public
investments in education also depend on distribution of power among peasants, landlords
and urban capitalists. This relationship was initially identified by Bowles (1978), who
argued that large landlords perceive little benefit in expanding educational outcomes. The
expansion of educational outcomes would provide peasants with greater opportunities to
exit the traditional rural sector, which is undesirable for the large landlords because it
limits the availability of an inexpensive labor force in the rural sector. Conversely, urban
capitalists benefit from the growth of a relatively skilled labor force and share an interest
in promoting public education. Thus, as a society becomes urbanized, capitalists enjoy
increased power, and public investment in education accelerates.
8The urban income inequality data for Brazil, Turkey and Korea are not entirely comparable. We have
urban income inequality data for Brazil and Turkey; however, only nonagricultural income inequality is
reported for Korea. For this study, I use the nonagricultural income inequality in Korea as a proxy for
urban income inequality.
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Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) also suggest that land inequality negatively affects
the emergence of public education. In societies with an unequal distribution of land, a
greater proportion of educational expenditures is financed through taxes levied on large
landlords. This would encourage large landlords to block the expansion of public education.
Nevertheless, large landlords would begin to accept the state’s investments in education as
the urban sector grows and urban capitalists finance a greater share of public education
expenditures. However, in societies with inegalitarian land distributions, the expansion of
the education frontier can lag.
Although Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) complement the analysis of Bowles (1978),
their model generally fails to address power imbalances, which might be an important factor.
In Galor, Moav and Vollrath’s model, all landlords, peasants and urban capitalists should
support expanded education, independent of the land distribution structure or the share
of the urban economy in the total economy. However, the impact of these groups on state
policy depends on distribution and size of the urban sector, as demonstrated in several case
studies (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005; Frankema, 2009; Wegenast, 2009).
In their comparison between the US and Latin America, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005)
highlight that the lower degree of wealth inequality in the US contributed to the earlier
increase in political participation relative to Latin American countries. The political fran-
chise expanded earlier in US states with lower levels of inequality than in more unequal US
states. Engerman and Sokoloff also assert that the unequal distribution of land in Latin
America allowed the large landlords to dominate the political process. Therefore, in Latin
American countries, political participation in elections was generally restricted to large
landlords during most of the 19th century. The result of these restricted elections was the
development of exclusive institutions that block egalitarian policies, such as the expansion
of public education. This led to a delay in the growth of public primary education in Latin
American countries.
In addition, Frankema (2009) holds that in majority of the Latin American countries,
state expenditures on primary education continued to be insufficient during the 20th century.
Latin American countries only began to address the shortcomings in their primary education
systems in the 1980s. Moreover, in contrast to Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), Frankema
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notes that the poor quality of primary education is not the result of a lack of public resources,
but rather Latin American states’ substantial bias in favor of public spending on tertiary
education. The public resources allocated to education are directed to educating the children
of wealthier families to the detriment of the education of poor children. This is a result
of the high levels of land inequality in Latin America, which reduce poor families’ political
influence.
Wegenast’s (2009) empirical analysis of a number of developing economies is also consis-
tent with the conclusions highlighted by Frankema. In a cross-country analysis, Wegenast
demonstrates that the shares of individuals with no formal education and higher education
increase, while the share of individuals with basic education declines, as plantation-type
agrarian structures become more dominant9. Moreover, Wegenast reports that the domi-
nance of plantations reduces public expenditures on secondary education. Similarly, in a
study of India, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) demonstrate that primary and secondary school
completion increases in states where the share of land held by individual cultivators and
collectives are higher. Banerjee and Iyer also report that the share of land held by indi-
vidual cultivators and collectives also has positive effects on high school completion rates;
however, the impact is weaker than the positive impact of agrarian structure on primary
schooling.
3.3.2 Education inequality in Turkey, Korea and Brazil
An egalitarian agrarian structure is also an important factor in the rapid expansion of
educational opportunities in Korea and contributed to the differences between Korea’s Gini
coefficient and those of Brazil and Turkey. Korea’s 1948 land reform not only increased
the share of land held by poor households and allowed them to invest in education, but it
also eliminated the political power of feudal landlords (Griffin, Ickowitz and Khan, 2002),
who might have otherwise hampered or blocked the state’s educational investments in rural
areas. Thus, the land reform created favorable conditions for reducing the education gap
9Wegenast (2009) employs the export share of plantation crops as a proxy to measure the extent to
which plantations or small holdings dominate a country’s economy. This is very similar to Easterly’s (2007)
approach, which uses the ratio of land suitable for sugar to that suitable for wheat as a proxy for the share
of land held by small landholders.
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in the country. Conversely, the agrarian structures in Brazil and parts of Turkey created
politically powerful rural elites who do not favor educational investments in rural areas. As
we discuss in this section, the elevated levels of rural poverty resulting from an unequal
distribution of land represent an important impediment to educational expansion.
Figure 3.1 depicts the potential influence of the land reform on the expansion of edu-
cation in Korea. However, the data for Korea are not entirely compatible with those from
Turkey and Brazil. In Figure 3.1, the pre-1942 data indicate the average years of schooling
for both North and South Korea, whereas the post-1955 data only reflect the average years
of education in South Korea. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw conclusions from Figure
3.1, as what would become South Korea was not more developed than what would become
North Korea as of the beginning of the 1940s10. Moreover, the average years of education in
Korea in 1955 is not entirely distinguished from the trend in education in pre-1942 Korea.
Figure 3.1 indicates that years of education in Korea, Turkey and Brazil exhibited
similar trends prior to 1942. Following the Korean land reform, the expansion of education
in Korea increased significantly. During the period 1920-1940, the average years of schooling
in Korea, Turkey and Brazil grew by 0.024, 0.012, and 0.027 years on average, respectively.
During the period 1955-1975, education in Korea expanded significantly more rapidly, and
the mean growth in the average years of schooling in Korea, Turkey and Brazil was 0.172,
0.118, and 0.058, respectively. By 1959, the average years of schooling in Korea already
exceeded the corresponding figures for Brazil and Turkey. Thus, the expansion of education
in Korea may have been a result of the land reform rather than the Japanese rule in Korea.
Moreover, Korean GDP per capita exceeded those of Turkey and Brazil by approximately
1980 (Figure 3.2), which indicates that the improvement in Korean education cannot merely
be explained by its rapid economic growth.
10Park (1999) notes that labor relocated from the poor, rice-growing southern provinces to northern
industrial centers during the 1930s and early 1940s. Most of these growing industrial centers were located in
contemporary North Korean provinces such as Kyongsong, South Hamgyong, North Hamgyong, Pyongyang-
Chinnamp’o, Hungnam-Hamhung and Ch’ongjin-Najin. Following the WWII and the Korean War, South
Korea became slightly richer. By 1953, South Korean per capita income was 39% higher than that of North
Korea (Kang, 2002). In the 1960, North Korea’s GNP per capita surpassed South Korea’s and remained at
a higher level until the mid-1970s.
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Figure 3.3 below depicts the historical development of education inequality in Korea,
Turkey and Brazil. As a result of economic development, the education Gini coefficients11
in all three countries decline over time. Nevertheless, the education Gini coefficient was
significantly lower in Korea than those in Brazil and Turkey throughout the period 1960-
2010. Thus, these figures are consistent with our claims on Korea above. The education Gini
coefficients might be correlated with per capita income12. Figure 3.4 helps us to examine
the changes in education Gini coefficients by controlling for the impact of per capita income.
Figure 3.4 depicts two outcomes. First, at a given level of GDP per capita, the education
Gini coefficient in Korea is lower than those in Brazil and Turkey. Second, the education
inequalities in Turkey and Brazil have a much steeper relationship with GDP per capita.
A possible explanation for this is that the negative influence of large landlords declined as
Turkey and Brazil urbanized. Thus, as in Bowles (1978) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath
(2009), in addition to GDP, the growth in the urban economy’s share of total GDP might
function as a second factor alleviating the impediments to education spreading.
Wegenast (2010) examines the impact of land distribution on Brazil’s educational in-
equalities in detail. According to Wegenast, Brazil’s relatively equal states, Santa Catanina
and Espirito Santo, are also those that implemented the first educational reforms in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries and historically placed greater emphasis on the public
education system. This may be a result of a lower degree of political influence exercised
by latifundistas in these states. Moreover, in a cross-sectional analysis between states,
Wegenast demonstrates that higher land inequality in the period 1995-1996 has a signifi-
cant negative effect on Brazilian states’ population shares enrolled in secondary education
in 2000. In addition, the analysis examines the impact of the political representatives of
agrarian elites (bancada ruralistas) on per capita education expenditures in each state. Con-
11The education Gini coefficients come from the education inequality dataset developed by Benaabdelaali,
Hanchane and Kamal (2012). They measure educational inequality in years of schooling.
12The correlation between the education Gini coefficient and GDP per capita will be discussed in greater
depth in this dissertation’s essay on the Kuznets Curve. Briefly, the Pearson correlation coefficient between
GDP per capita and the education Gini coefficient is -0.609, which is a somewhat strong correlation.
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trolling for other factors, the estimates indicate that greater representation of agrarian elites
in the parliament and senate reduces per capita educational expenditures.
Turkish landlords also enjoy a strong institutional influence in more unequal regions,
particularly in southeastern/eastern Anatolia. Similar to Brazil, the semi-feudal landlords -
ag˘as - or representatives of certain tribes/families become involved in politics to strengthen
their hegemony (Bes¸ikc¸i, 1969). Many of these landlords have served as deputies in the
Turkish parliament (O¨zer, 2000; Ates¸-Durc¸, 2009)13. Turkish political parties attempt
to earn the support of ag˘as in elections because the ag˘as are capable of delivering the
votes of individuals living in their villages. Ag˘as generally support the party that offers
them the most substantial favors and services (Leder, 1979); they often disregard ideological
differences between parties when making their political decisions. As expected, ag˘as demand
infrastructure investments such as roads, dams, irrigation channels or subsidized credits
from politicians. They exploit their political connections as a means of increasing their
profits (Bes¸ikc¸i, 1969); public education and healthcare investments are not included in the
ag˘as’ political agendas. Thus, in provinces with unequal land distribution, large landlords
are able to influence public expenditures in favor of their interests, which comes at the
expense of a larger part of population. Nevertheless, the political influence of large landlords
has declined in recent years as the urban population share increased in the majority of
Turkey’s provinces (O¨zer, 2000).
3.3.3 An empirical analysis on Turkey
In this study, I undertake an empirical analysis similar to Wegenast’s (2010) to explain
the influence of large landlords and the distribution of land on variations in educational ex-
penditures and years of schooling in Turkey. The analysis examines whether land inequality
in various provinces reduced student-teacher ratios in primary and secondary education.
Moreover, I also assess the impact of land distribution on secondary schooling rates. In a
middle-income country such as Turkey, secondary education rates might be a good measure
13Many of these landlords also have strong political ties with important politicians in Turkey. An example
of such a landlord is Kinyas Kartal. Kartal had a personal connection with Su¨leyman Demirel, who served
as prime minister for 10 years and president for 7. Ahmet O¨zer (2000)- a sociologist studying Kartal’s tribe,
mentions a visit that he and Kartal paid to Demirel’s home.
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of the extent of education. In Turkey, primary education was mandatory during the period
examined, and primary education enrollment rates were already high in all provinces14. The
education variables all come from the 2011/2012 academic year. The land Gini coefficient is
used to control for the distribution of land in each province. The provincial land Gini coeffi-
cients are the result of my calculations using the agriculture survey of 2000/2001 (Turkstat,
2013) covering 81 provinces. The data from 2000/2001 are the latest data available on the
distribution of land in Turkey.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict the negative relationship between the land Gini coefficients
and the number of teachers (per 100 students) in primary and secondary schools. This
negative relationship indicates that the Turkish state might not have invested in education
in provinces where the distribution of land is highly unequal and large landlords are more
politically dominant. Nevertheless, provinces characterized by high levels of land inequality
are also generally less developed. Therefore, my analysis controls for various other factors
such as the level of urbanization, GDP per capita and population density. The data used
to construct these variables from all provinces also come from Turkstat (2013). To address
the potential for reserve causality, data from the year 2000 are preferred15. Wealthier
provinces would likely have exhibited stronger demand for education. Thus, GDP per
capita is expected to have a positive effect on educational investment and the rates of
secondary schooling. Greater population density is a possible impediment to educational
expansion, as greater agglomeration in an area might increase class sizes. The effect of
the level of urbanization on education is ambiguous. The “lights of cities” might increase
educational opportunities within the provinces, as hiring skilled schoolteachers is facilitated
in cities. Nevertheless, increased urbanization might also reduce the number of teachers per
student, as substantial agglomeration in cities entails increases competition for school places
and class size. A possible decline in the quality of education might also reduce secondary
schooling rates.
14Net enrollment in primary education is over 95% in all provinces except Van, Tokat and Yozgat, which
have enrollment rates of 86%, 94%, 94%, respectively. (Turkstat, 2013)
15Moreover, after 2002, Turkstat began to publish regional GDP values rather than provincial ones.
Nevertheless, I preferred the GDP data from 2000, as Turkey experienced an economic crisis in 2001.
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Finally, the analysis controls for the Kurdish conflict, which might impede the spread
of education. Many assert that areas dominated by the Kurdish population suffer from
a lack of public investment16. Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that the conflict
between the Turkish state and PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is an impediment to the
development of Kurdish provinces. As a proxy for the extent of the Kurdish conflict, I used
a dummy variable for the provinces in which the Democratic Society Party (DEHAP) - a
political party associated with the Kurdish guerilla movement PKK17 - received over 10%
of the votes in the 2002 elections. When measuring DEHAP’s vote share, an earlier year is
preferred in an attempt to mitigate reverse causality.
Table 3.8 reports the estimates for the education variables. The first four regressions
examine the factors affecting the average number of teachers per 100 primary and secondary
school students. As expected, the land distribution has a significant and negative impact
on the average number of primary and secondary school teachers. Thus, our empirical
analysis is consistent with the argument that the political power of landlords reduces public
investment intended to expand education. GDP per capita has the expected positive sign,
while population density has a negative sign, both of which are significant at 5%. This
indicates that class sizes might have increased as a result of population pressures.
In the regression on the average number of primary school teachers, the DEHAP dummy
is only significant at the 10% level; nevertheless, it is significant at the 5% level for the re-
gressions assessing the factors affecting the average number of teachers in secondary schools.
Thus, the Kurdish provinces are disadvantaged with respect to public education investment,
16A possible example of is the speech by the co-chair of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), Gu¨lten
Kıs¸anak, in the Turkish parliament. According to Kıs¸anak, “people living in the provinces dominated by
the Kurdish population struggle with severe poverty along with the devastation created by severe war con-
ditions...The provinces where Kurds live are also the ones that perform the worst in terms of socioeconomic
development, and this situation hasn’t at all changed since 2002, when the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) was elected. Some might give us numbers. They can say that ‘we sent this amount of money, we
made this amount of public investment, we constructed this number of dams, this amount of two-lane roads’.
However...nothing in our lives has changed”. (GNAT, 2013)
17In 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey banned the political activities of the
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) by charging the party with “supporting the terrorist activities of
PKK”. The majority of DEHAP’s members remain active in politics through the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP) and People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which were formed after the ban on the DEHAP was
imposed.
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but their disadvantage is more marked in secondary education. The relatively better con-
ditions in primary schooling may reflect Turkish government education subsidies, which
primarily target primary education (Keyder and U¨stu¨ndag˘, 2006). The significance of the
coefficients on the level of urbanization is very low and its signs are negative. This may be
due to limited number of places available in cities with larger populations.
The last two regressions in Table 3.8 examine the factors affecting the net rates of
secondary schooling. The coefficients for provincial Gini coefficients, GDP per capita, pop-
ulation density and the DEHAP dummy are all significant at the 5% level and have the
same signs as in the previous regressions. The results of the analysis indicate that greater
levels of land inequality in Turkey not only decrease the number of teachers but also reduce
the schooling rates in Turkey’s provinces. Thus, high levels of land inequality appear to
contribute to the rise in income inequality in Turkey by constraining both the quality and
the quantity of education. Moreover, factors such as population density and the Kurdish
conflict might represent impediments to increasing secondary school enrollment rates by
reducing the quality of education at the primary and secondary levels.
3.3.4 Comparing education inequalities in Turkey and Brazil
A question that needs to be addressed is Turkey’s higher level of educational inequality
compared to Brazil. Indeed, we should expect Turkey to exhibit lower levels of education
inequality, as even Diyarbakır - which has the least egalitarian land distribution in Turkey
- has a land Gini coefficient below those in most of Brazil18. The higher level of educational
inequality in Turkey is a result of two factors. First, compared to Brazil, Turkey has a
substantial gender gap on education (Table 3.9). In Turkey, the average years of schooling
for females were 0.73 lower than the national average in 1960, 1.00 in 1980, and 0.87 in
201019. However, the gender gap in educational attainment is lower in Brazil. During
18According to Ko¨ymen (2008)’s estimates, the land Gini coefficient in Diyarbakır was 0.714, which is only
greater than the land Gini coefficients in 5 of the 20 Brazilian regions. Moreover, the most equal Brazilian
region, Santa Catarina, has a land Gini coefficient of 0.643; this value is still higher than the overall land
Gini coefficient for Turkey. The values for Brazilian land Gini coefficients are for the year 1992.
19In Turkey, the gender gap in education may also be the result of a vicious cycle between lower levels
of women’s education and women’s lower labor force participation. According to the ILO (2013)’s data
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the period 1950-2010, the average years of schooling for females in Brazil are at most 0.17
lower than the national average and exceeds the national average by 0.15 in 2010. The
large gender gap may not be reflected in the income Gini coefficients because the income
Gini coefficients we use reflect the inequality between households rather than the inequality
between individuals. Figure 3.7 only displays education Gini coefficients for men. Figure
3.7 indicates that the education Gini coefficients are slightly higher in Brazil when only
males are considered.
A second reason that overall education inequality in Brazil is lower than in Turkey is
Brazil’s institutional preference for educational expenditures. As a share of GDP, public
education expenditures in Brazil are significantly higher than in Turkey and even those of
Korea (Figure 3.8) in the majority of the years for which Brazilian data are available.
The overall ratio of public education expenditures in GDP is an important measure
of educational opportunities; however, it cannot provide a complete explanation for educa-
tional inequality. Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot (1996) note that while Brazil’s public education
expenditures are high, relative to Korea they are highly biased towards tertiary education.
This is also reflected in Table 3.10, which reports public expenditures per student/GDP
per capita ratios in primary, secondary and tertiary education. For tertiary education, the
public expenditures per student/GDP per capita ratio is clearly higher in Brazil than in
Korea. However, the same ratio is significantly larger for primary and secondary education.
Thus, Brazil’s public expenditures are biased in favor of a smaller, elite segment of the pop-
ulation, whereas Korea’s public education policies prioritize the expansion of education to a
greater extent. However, a similar comparison cannot be made between Brazil and Turkey.
The ratio of public expenditures per student to GDP per capita is smaller in Turkey than
in Brazil at all levels.
The institutional preference for higher public education expenditures may be a result of
Brazil’s higher level of urbanization. The returns to education are greater for urban resi-
dents; therefore, it is possible a larger share of the Brazilian population demands education
on 181 countries, Turkey has the nineteenth-worst ranking in terms of the ratio of female-male labor force
participation rates.
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investments. Moreover, the political influence of large landlords is lower in more urbanized
societies. Urban capitalists who benefit from improving human capital do not tend to ex-
ert their political influence to block public investments in education (Bowles, 1978; Galor,
Moav and Vollrath, 2009).
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 depict the impact of urbanization. Figure 3.10 plots the relationship
between the level of urbanization and the education Gini coefficients, with respect to years
of schooling, for the male population. The levels of education inequality are higher in
Brazil and lower in Korea, which is consistent with theories regarding the influence of
land distribution on education inequality. As discussed in the following section, a more
unequal distribution of land leads to a higher level of urbanization. Therefore, urbanization
may reduce inequalities in the distribution of land inequality and thereby reduce education
inequality in Brazil, at least with respect to years of schooling, which dampened the impact
of the education channel. Nevertheless, a higher level of urbanization leads to higher income
inequality in Brazil through another channel- expanding the urban reserve army of labor.
Although Brazil’s public education expenditures are greater than those in Turkey and
similar to those in Korea, Brazil’s education Gini coefficient for males is the largest of
these three countries (Figures 3.7 and 3.10), and its overall education Gini coefficient is
only slightly lower than Turkey’s (Figure 3.3). Compared to Korea and Turkey, educa-
tional expenditures in Brazil are inefficiently allocated, potentially due to its high level of
land inequality. Therefore, land inequality might affect educational inequality regardless of
institutional preferences. While public education expenditures are large at every level of
education, inequality might nevertheless reduce the poor population’s ability and/or incen-
tives to invest in education and hamper the expansion of education (Galor and Zeira, 1993;
Galor and Tsiddon, 1996).
Figure 3.11 plots the relationship between per capita education expenditures and the
average years of schooling in Korea, Brazil and Turkey. Because there are diminishing re-
turns to education expenditures (at least with respect to years of schooling), more unequally
distributed education expenditures and opportunities lead to lower years of schooling for a
given level of education expenditures. Figure 3.11 suggests that Korean education spending
is the most effective in terms of increasing the average years of schooling. This also may
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be an outcome of the more egalitarian distribution of educational opportunities in Korea
being enhanced by low land inequality. Figure 3.12 also indicates that the education Gini
coefficients are highest for Brazil and lowest for Korea for a given level per capita educa-
tion expenditures when only the male population is considered. This is consistent with my
hypothesis regarding the relationship between education inequality and land inequality.
3.3.5 The impact of land inequality on the quality of education
Another aspect that that has received relatively less attention in the literature is the
influence of land inequality on inequalities in educational quality. Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot
(1996) note that the educational quality is a particularly important issue in Brazil. During
the period 1950-80, despite rising primary enrollment rates, the quality of primary education
in Brazil decreased, as reflected in the high dropout rates. They argue that grade repetition
rates are a good measure of educational quality and indicate that the Brazilian primary
school completion rate (for eight grades) decreased from 60.1% in 1950 to 19% in 1980.
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) construct an “Inequality of Educational Opportunity” mea-
sure to estimate inequalities in the quality of education. The data for the measure are based
on OECD student test scores collected under the Program of International Student Assess-
ment (PISA). Students of approximately 15 years of age in many countries take these tests,
and scores on these tests represent an important source of information on education quality.
Table 3.11 reports the PISA scores for Korea, Turkey and Brazil for the year 2006. Con-
sistent with our previous predictions, inequalities in the quality of education are highest in
Brazil and lowest in Korea for all subjects. Ferreira and Gignoux also separately assess the
reasons driving inequality in the quality of mathematics education. Unfortunately, they do
not consider the impact of land distribution, but they do analyze the effect of inequality
in the ownership of durables, which is another important measure of the distribution of
wealth. Of the three countries in Table 3.11, the contribution of durables on Inequality
of Educational Opportunity is the most marked for Brazil. As expected, the high level of
inequality in durables is an important impediment to standardizing the quality of education
in Brazil, which suggests that the inequality of land ownership might also affect the quality
gaps in Brazilian education.
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3.4 Impact of urbanization
3.4.1 Theoretical framework
The influence of land inequality on income inequality can also be observed through the
urbanization channel. This channel can explain why income inequality is greater in Brazil
than in Turkey, both overall and in urban areas in particular. In the previous paper of
this dissertation, we observed that inegalitarian agrarian structures would exert downward
pressure on the urban capitalist wages by leading to increases in the urban subsistence
sector. In brief, the inequality-augmented form of the Harris-Todaro model can be written
as
g(h(LU ),K)
LU
h(LU ) +
YS
LU
− SR(β)− C = 0, dSR
dβ
> 0 (3.1)
where K is the amount of capital in the urban capitalist sector, h is an employed
migrant’s wage, g is urban employment, YS is total urban subsistence income, LU is the
urban labor force, SR is peasants’ pre-migration returns, β is the share of land held by large
landowners and finally, C is the cost of migration from rural to the urban areas. Considering
the following conditions,
h
′
< 0, g1 < 0, g2 > 0 (3.2)
we demonstrated that as the share of land held by large landowners increases, a greater
number of rural dwellers will driven into the urban sector20 provided that the wage elasticity
of labor demand is greater than -1:
dLU
dβ
=
L2U
−YS + h′(g1h+ g)LU − gh
dSR
dβ
> 0 (3.3)
This would lead to a larger urban subsistence sector, which functions as a reserve army
of labor for the urban capitalist sector (Patnaik, 2008; Hart, 1973; Williams and Tumusiime-
20The decline in the share of land held by large landlords increases median peasant incomes by not
only reducing inequality, but also by increasing mean land productivity. U¨nal (2012), Thiesenhausen and
Melmed-Sanjak (1990) and Jeon and Kim (2000) demonstrate that land productivity is higher for smaller
farms in Turkey, Brazil and Korea, respectively.
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Mutebile, 1978). A larger reserve army of labor also drives down wage shares in the urban
capitalist sector. A larger share of the urban subsistence sector and a lower wage share in
the urban capitalist sector lead to greater income inequality.
The model assumes that the reserve army of labor only comprises the population em-
ployed in the urban subsistence sector. Nevertheless, many Marxian scholars such as Davis
(2006) and Foster, McChesney and Jonna (2011) suggest that part-time/irregular employees
functions as a reserve army of labor for the urban capitalist sector, as part-time/irregular
workers seek regular employment. Thus, this chapter also examines the possible relationship
among land inequality, part-time employment and income inequality.
Next, this chapter examines whether the main argument in the previous chapter explains
the differences in income inequality across Turkey, Korea and Brazil. According to the data,
the model partially explains the differences in income Gini coefficients between Korea and
Turkey and Brazil. Nevertheless, the model only partly explains the difference between
Turkey and Korea. The reasoning behind this limitation of the model are discussed by
focusing on Korea’s higher capital intensity and other country-specific characteristics.
The model assumes that the reserve army of labor only comprises the population em-
ployed in the urban subsistence sector. Nevertheless, many Marxian scholars such as Davis
(2006) and Foster, McChesney and Jonna (2011) suggest that part-time/irregular employees
function as a reserve army of labor for the urban capitalist sector, as part-time/irregular
workers seek regular employment. Thus, this chapter also examines the possible relationship
among land inequality, part-time employment and income inequality.
Next, this chapter examines whether the main argument in the previous chapter explains
the differences in income inequality across Turkey, Korea and Brazil. According to the
data, the model partially explains the differences in income Gini coefficients between Korea
and Turkey and Brazil. Nevertheless, the model only partly explains the difference between
Turkey and Korea. The reasons behind this limitation of the model are discussed by focusing
on Korea’s higher capital intensity and other country-specific characteristics.
60
3.4.2 Urbanization in Korea, Turkey and Brazil
The relationship among urbanization, income inequality and land inequality has been
discussed in several studies covering Turkey, Brazil and Korea. For Brazil, there is a strong
opinion suggesting that the inegalitarian land structure increased urban income inequality
by driving rural dwellers into the cities (De Janvry, 1981a; Harris, 1978). In “Asia’s Next
Giant”, Amsden (1989) claims that due to the egalitarian land distribution and sharp rises
in the agricultural productivity in Korea, “rural urban migration and downward pressure
on manufacturing wages can be assumed to have been less massive than it would otherwise
have been”. Thus, she suggests that land inequality is an important factor reducing urban
inequality in Korea.
Various arguments have been advanced regarding the impact of the agrarian structure
on the urban distribution in Turkey. Keyder (1989) contends that the predominance of
small-scale peasantry in the agrarian structure exerted upward pressure on urban wages.
He argues that “the marginal product of the rural migrant was certainly not high, but he
always had the option of remaining in the countryside with a guaranteed average product,
and sharing the household’s income. Wages in the city therefore had to be high enough to
induce the peasant - who was not being pushed out - to accept urban employment”.
Nevertheless, numerous others (e.g., Ko¨ymen, 2008; O¨nal; 2010) contend that Turkey’s
agrarian structure is not entirely egalitarian and the average Turkish peasant is often “poor”
and being driven into the urban sector. Gu¨rel (2011) argues that Turkey’s agrarian structure
does not provide sufficient returns, which exerts “downward pressure on wages”. Gu¨rel
entirely discounts the impact of land distribution and attempts to explain increases in
urban wages in Turkey through the working-class struggle in the 1960s and 1970s.
A comparison of the three countries’ data is useful for understanding the reasons for
the levels of income inequality exhibited in each country. Figure 3.13 plots the level of
urbanization (%) in Turkey, Brazil and Korea for the period 1960-2010. As the figure
shows, in the period 1960-2010, the level of urbanization in Brazil has been greater than
the level of urbanization in Turkey. This is important because both countries had similar
61
GDP per capita levels during this period (Figure 3.2). Thus, the difference between levels
of urbanization might be a result of Brazil’s higher level of land inequality.
As depicted in Figure 3.13, Korea’s urban population share exceeded Turkey’s in 1967
and reached Brazil’s urban population share in approximately the 1990s. Moreover, during
the period 1960-2010, Korea grew significantly more rapidly than Turkey and Brazil. Figure
3.2 depicts GDP per capita for the three countries and clearly reflects “the Asian Miracle”
experienced in Korea. As an outcome of high growth rates, the pace of urbanization was
higher in Korea than in Turkey and Brazil.
To account for the impact of GDP per capita, I use Figures 3.14 and 3.15, which de-
pict the relationship between GDP per capita and the level of urbanization for the three
countries21. In these figures, I use Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered values to depict long-term
trends rather than temporary changes.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 reveal that the share of Korea’s population in the urban sector
increased in keeping with the growth in GDP per capita. Nevertheless, both Turkey and
Brazil had substantial waves of urbanization, even during periods when growth in per capita
income levels was relatively slow. Specifically, urbanization in Brazil continued from 1980 to
the mid-1990s, a period in which Brazilian GDP per capita did not increase (Figures 3.2 and
3.13). This period is also observable in Figure 3.15, where the share of the urban population
in Brazil is vertically increasing approximately $6000. In the first half of the 1980s, Turkey
also urbanized significantly more rapidly relative to its change in per capita income. This
may be a result of the neoliberal agricultural policies implemented after 1980. These policy
measures include reductions in state-subsidized purchases, agricultural credits grated by
public-owned banks and declines in fertilizer and fuel subsidies (O¨nal, 2010; C¸alıs¸kan and
Adaman, 2008). The impact of neoliberal policy measures is clearly reflected in Figure 3.16,
which indicates that the agricultural-nonagricultural terms of trade declined significantly
in the first half of the 1980s. During this period, the relationship between the level of
urbanization and GDP per capita becomes relatively vertical at approximately $5200-5400
per capita (Figure 3.15).
21Figure 3.15 is intended to emphasize the difference between Turkey and Brazil.
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Figures 3.14 and 3.15 indicate that for a given level of GDP per capita, urbanization is
higher in Brazil than in Korea or Turkey. This might be related to the higher level of land
inequality in Brazil. As in our model, the high land inequality in Brazil might have driven
peasants into the urban subsistence sector, which functions as a reserve army of labor for
the urban capitalist sector. As a result, the high degree of land inequality in Brazil might
translate into urban income inequality by expanding the share of the population in the urban
subsistence sector and reducing wage shares in the urban capitalist sector. Moreover, as
the agrarian structure in Brazil is dominated by latifundios, labor-saving technical changes
might have driven greater proportion of rural dwellers into the urban areas (De Janvry,
1981a; Harris, 1978).
Nevertheless, at a given level of income per capita, the levels of urbanization were lower
in Korea than they were in Turkey (Figure 3.14). This can be explained by Korea’s capital
intensity. Compared to Brazil and Turkey, Korea experienced a significant shift towards
capital-intensive activities in the nonagricultural sector. The structural shift towards these
activities is primarily a result of the Korean government’s strong emphasis on promoting
heavy industries, which was also underlined in Korea’s five-year plans during the period
1972-86 (Kim, 2008). According to Amsden’s (1989) estimates, Korean heavy industries
were less profitable on average than light industries at the beginning of the 1970s. However,
the Korean government created incentives for investing in capital-intensive heavy industries
through policies such as direct subsidies, cheapcredits and trade protection for industries
including shipbuilding, steel and automotives.
The industrial policies in Korea resulted in significant increases in capital intensity.
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 report the capital/labor and capital/output ratios, respectively, for
Korea, Turkey and Brazil. The capital stock data come from Marquetti and Foley (2012)’s
Extended Penn World Tables 4.0. Both the capital/labor and capital/output ratios clearly
demonstrate that Korea experienced a rapid structural shift towards capital-intensive sec-
tors. This structural change is more marked beginning in the 1970s, the period in which
capital-intensive industries in Korea were heavily subsidized.
Growth in capital-intensive activities increases average formal wages in the urban sector;
however, at a given output level, fewer formal urban jobs are created in countries with higher
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capital/output ratios. Nevertheless, increases in capital intensity promote rural-to-urban
migration by increasing expected returns in the urban sector. Many of these migrants are
employed in informal/traditional activities or/and part-time jobs and wait to be employed
in better jobs. This can also be represented using the inequality-augmented Harris-Todaro
equation that follows the urban capitalist/urban traditional divide:
dLU
dK
=
(g2h)LU
−YS + h′(g1h+ g)LU − gh > 0 (3.4)
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the capital stock increases the urban capitalist wages and
drives a larger share of the population to urban centers.
The interpretations of the results of this equation are also consistent with the Amsden’s
empirical data. According to Amsden, during the period 1970-84, manufacturing wages in
Korea and Turkey increased by 176% and 11%, respectively. During the same period, per
capita income increased by 140% in Korea and 32% in Turkey. Thus, unlike in Turkey,
Korea’s wages increased to a greater extent than per capita income between 1970 and
1984. Moreover, both Yun (2011) and Amsden (1989) note that Korea had a large share of
self-employed individuals in the urban sector.
3.4.3 The size of urban reserve armies
Next, we examine the shares of the urban subsistence and informal and part-time ac-
tivities that are argued to function as a reserve army of labor. Following our framework,
we expect Brazil to have a significantly larger urban reserve army of labor compared to
Turkey, which may lead to greater income inequality in Brazil than in Turkey. In the previ-
ous section, we noted that the level of urbanization in Korea is high due to its high capital
intensity, and the impact of these factors should be reflected in informal, subsistence and
part-time employment.
In this section, nonagricultural informal employment is defined as the share of workers
employed in the non-agricultural sector and lacking any social security protections. I use
the same definition for Brazil and Turkey to make an accurate comparison. Informal em-
ployment data are not available for Korea. Figure 3.19 suggests that Turkey and Brazil’s
nonagricultural informal employment shares depict an inverted U-shaped path, which is con-
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sistent with Rauch (1993) and Elgin and Oyvat (2013). Nevertheless, the level of informal
employment is between 6 and 22% larger in Brazil.
Next, I use two proxies for the size of the subsistence sector. The first measure is the
non-agricultural share of self-employed and unpaid family workers. This is also termed
the share of “vulnerable employment” by the ILO (2013). Turkstat (2013) and Cepal
(2013) report data on the share of self-employed and unpaid family workers engaged in
nonagricultural employment in Turkey and Brazil; however, Korea only reports data on the
shares of nonagricultural, self-employed and unpaid family workers in the overall economy.
Thus, the share of nonagricultural, vulnerable employees in Korea is predicted using the
share of workers engaged in vulnerable employment throughout the economy22.
According to Figure 3.20, the nonagricultural, vulnerable employment share in Brazil
is higher than in Turkey and Korea. This may be a result of overurbanization in Brazil,
as depicted in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. The inegalitarian distribution of land in Brazil drives
rural dwellers into cities, which supports the growth of subsistence employment in urban
areas. Korea’s share of nonagricultural, vulnerable employment is smaller than Brazil’s
and larger than Turkey’s after 1994. The dominance of capital-intensive and informational
industries limits the urban capitalist sector’s job creation capability in the Korean economy
(Yun, 2011). Therefore, a larger share of the Korean nonagricultural labor force is employed
in subsistence activities.
Another proxy for urban subsistence activities is the share of employment in service
activities. This is not a perfect measure because it also includes service activities involving
skilled labor and labor in various services activities such as employees in large grocery
stores, chain restaurants, finance, transportation, communication, and tourism activities
that could easily be considered part of the urban capitalist sector. Moreover, Kuznets
22The share of nonagricultural vulnerable employment is predicted by the following formula: ((overall self-
employment share+overall share of unpaid family workers)-(share of agricultural employment*(agricultural
self-employment share+the share of agricultural unpaid family workers))/share of nonagricultural employ-
ment
The agricultural employment share and shares of overall self-employed and unpaid family workers are from
the Korea Statistical Information Service (2013). I use a constant share of 77.9% for the sum of agricultural
self-employed and unpaid family workers. This is estimated using data from Heintz (2008) and the Korea
Statistical Information Service (2013) for 2005.
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(1966) empirically demonstrates that employment in service activities tends to increase as
countries grow. The growth in service activities may be accompanied by an increasing share
of urban capitalist activities in the service sector. Nevertheless, the employment share in
the services sector can provide an approximation of the size of the urban subsistence sector
in lower- and middle-income countries.
Figure 3.21 plots the employment shares of service activities at given levels of GDP
per capita in Korea, Brazil, and Turkey. As the shares of service activities increase as the
economy grows, plotting GDP per capita on the x-axis is more accurate for cross-country
comparisons. Figure 3.21 is consistent with Figure 3.14, which plots the relationship between
levels of urbanization and GDP per capita. For a given level of per capita income, the
employment share of service activities in Brazil is clearly higher than that in Turkey. This
suggests that higher levels of agglomeration in Brazilian cities led to increased labor supply
in less productive subsistence activities. Moreover, the sizes of the service sectors in Turkey
and Korea are similar. The rate at which service sector employment in Turkey’s urban areas
is lower than in Korea at lower income levels and exceeds Korea’s share at higher income
levels.
As noted by Davis (2006) and Foster, McChesney and Jonna (2011), another source for
the urban reserve army of labor is part-time employment. Figures 3.22 and 3.23 depict the
part-time employment rates in Korea, Turkey and Brazil. The part-time employment rate
for women and youths might only indirectly affect the household income distribution. Thus,
the part-time employment rate for males over 24 years of age is reported separately in Figure
3.23. The figures clearly indicate that Brazil’s part-time employment rate is higher than
Turkey’s or Korea’s. Of the three countries, Korea’s part-time employment rate was the
lowest until the East Asian financial crisis in 1998. Moreover, there has been an increasing
trend towards part-time employment in Korea since the East Asian crisis. Interestingly,
this trend is not reflected in Korea’s overall level of income inequality (Table 3.4). The
income Gini coefficient for Korea was 0.310 in 2010, which is slightly below the pre-crisis
Gini coefficient of 0.317. Thus, it would be difficult to claim that part-time employment
rates explain the income inequality gap between Turkey and Korea. However, the rates are
consistent with our argument that Brazil has a larger potential urban reserve army of labor.
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In summary, our data indicate that the effect of land inequality on urbanization can
explain the difference in inequality between Brazil and Turkey; however, it fails to explain
the difference between Turkey and Korea. In the next chapter, I empirically assess the
effect of land inequality on income inequality. I also examine whether the differences in the
income Gini coefficients operate through the channels proposed in this article.
3.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, I reexamine my interpretations of the above graphs and figures through
an econometric analysis. The framework is also designed to test the relevance of causal
relationships suggested by previous graphs and tables. Using an OLS analysis, I first exam-
ine whether the levels of urbanization and education Gini coefficients in Turkey differ from
those in Korea and Brazil when controlling for other possible determinants. The analysis
also assesses the impact of land inequality on the cross-country differences among Korea,
Brazil and Turkey.
The regressions for urbanization control for the logarithm of per capita GDP following
Kuznets (1966), in which economic growth is associated with growth in the urban sector.
According to the augmented form of the Harris-Todaro model proposed above, the growth
in the capital stock should increase the future growth in the level of urbanization when the
entire county’s labor stock is held constant. Therefore, I also control for the logarithm of the
capital/labor (K/L) ratio in separate regressions23. Controlling for the capital/labor ratio is
more consistent with the model, as the model includes the capital stock rather than overall
output. Trade openness might also affect the level of urbanization, as increasing trade
flows change the composition of economic activities, as is widely discussed in the trade
literature (e.g., Ohlin, 1935; Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson, 1977) In this analysis,
the ratio of trade volume (exports + imports) to GDP functions as a proxy for trade
23GDP per capita and the capital/labor ratio are included in different regressions, as there is substantial
correlation between the two variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient between log(GDP per capita) and
log(K/L) is 0.935.
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openness24. Structural factors other than these variables are controlled for using Korea
and Brazil dummies, which might partially capture the effect of land inequality on the
cross-country differences in income inequality25. Certain regressions also include a land
inequality variable. The land Gini coefficients and country dummies are not included in the
same regressions because this study is more concerned with the impact of land inequality
on the cross-country differences in income inequality than the effects of small changes in
land inequality.
Table 3.12 reports the estimates for the levels of urbanization. In the first regression,
the coefficient on Brazil dummy is significantly larger than that for Turkey (the omitted
dummy), which is consistent with my hypothesis regarding the impact of land inequality.
Moreover, and similar to Figure 3.14, the Korean dummy is not significant. However,
consistent with the augmented Harris-Todaro model, both the Korea and Brazil dummies
become significant when the regression controls for log(K/L). Thus, the explanation for
the higher levels of urbanization in Korea is related to Korea’s rapid shift towards capital-
intensive activities. Moreover, the coefficient for the land Gini coefficient is significantly
positive in the last two regressions, indicating that the land Gini coefficient is an important
factor affecting the levels of urbanization in Korea, Turkey and Brazil.
Next, the regressions examine whether there is a significant difference between the edu-
cation Gini coefficients of Korea, Brazil and Turkey when controlling for other factors. We
also report the effect of land Gini coefficient on the differences in education inequality. The
factors affecting education inequality are included in separate regressions, as compared to
Brazil and Korea, the gender gaps in education are a more crucial issue in Turkey (Table
24Data for GDP per capita come from the Penn World Tables 7.3 and are included on a PPP($) basis.
The level of urbanization and trade volume/GDP data come from the World Development Indicators. I used
Marquetti and Foley’s (2012) Extended Penn World Tables 4.0 data for the capital/labor ratio.
25For reasons of consistency, I controlled for the land inequality using a single type of the land Gini
coefficient. As additional data on operational holdings exist for Turkey and Korea, I preferred to base the
land Gini coefficient on operational holdings rather than that based on land ownership. The data for the
land Gini coefficients come from U¨nal (2012) and Frankema (2005) for Turkey, Frankema (2005) for Brazil
and Frankema (2005) and Deininger and Squire (1998) for Korea. The land Gini coefficient data are not
available for all years. I imputed the land Gini data in the missing years by assuming that a) the land Gini
values change linearly between two land Gini data points and b) the land Gini remains constant after the
most recent data point.
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3.9). The regressions control for GDP per capita, as Figure 3.4 indicates a negative relation-
ship between per capita income and education inequality in the three countries. Increasing
trade flows might also influence education inequality by creating incentives for educational
investment through increasing the skill premium in both developed and developing coun-
tries (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Acemog˘lu, 2003). Therefore, the regressions also control
for trade openness. The last four regressions control for the level of urbanization to account
for the effect of land inequality on education inequality through urbanization.
Table 3.13 reports that Korea’s education inequality is significantly lower than Turkey’s
when controlling for other factors. This is consistent with the literature documenting the
influence of land inequality on the expansion of education (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005;
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996; Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009; Banerjee
and Iyer, 2005; Frankema, 2009; Wegenast, 2009). However, the Brazilian dummy is only
significant when we control for the level of urbanization. This indicates that the similarity
between Brazil and Turkey’s education inequalities might be a result of the effect of land
inequality on the level of urbanization. Similarly, the coefficient for land inequality is not
significant in model (3), but it is significant in model (4), which controls for urbanization.
Moreover, according to all four regressions, the level of urbanization has a significant and
negative impact on education inequality.
Table 3.13 also indicates that gender inequality in education is a more severe problem
in Turkey than in Brazil. Brazil’s coefficients for education inequality among males are
significantly larger than its coefficients for overall education inequality26. Similarly, the
coefficient on land inequality is significant at the 5% level in model (7) but not significant
in model (3), which controls for the same variables as (3). Similarly, the coefficient on the
land Gini in model (8) is significantly larger than the corresponding coefficient in model (4)
at the 1% level.
In summary, Table 3.12 suggests that the capital/labor ratio is an important factor
contributing to the similarity of the levels of urbanization in Korea and Turkey, and Table
26At the 0.1% significance level, Brazil’s coefficient in model (5) is greater than its coefficient in model
(1), and its coefficient in model (6) is greater than its coefficient in model (2).
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3.13 suggests that the level of urbanization a crucial factor driving the similar education
gaps in Turkey and Brazil. These variables might be subject to endogeneity problems, which
I attempted to address using 2SLS regressions. First, I instrumented the logarithm of the
capital/labor ratio with its 10-year lag. Table 3.14 reports the estimates from the 2SLS-IV
regressions. The estimates are highly consistent with those in Table 3.12, suggesting that
land inequality has a positive impact on the level of urbanization. Further, the 10-year lag
of log(K/L) appears to be a strong instrument according both to the Kleibergen-Paap LM
underidentification and Kleibergen-Paap Wald weak identification tests.
Next, I instrumented the level of urbanization using the 10-year lag of the agglomeration
rate, i.e., the share of the population residing in cities with populations in excess of 1
million27, and re-estimated the results regarding the factors that affect the overall education
Gini coefficient and the education Gini coefficient for males. The Kleibergen-Paap LM
test statistics reject the assumption that the equations are underidentified at the 1% level.
Moreover, for all regressions, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-values are larger than the critical
values of the Stock-Yogo weak ID test, indicating that the 10-year lag of the agglomeration
rate is a strong instrument.
The estimates in Table 3.15 are consistent with those reported in Table 3.13. In models
(1) and (3), the results for Korea and Brazil are significantly different from those for Turkey
when controlling for various factors, including the level of urbanization. Moreover, according
to models (2) and (4), land inequality has a positive impact on the overall education Gini
coefficient and that for males. Consistent with previous estimates, the level of urbanization
also has a negative effect on education inequality.
Next, I analyze the impact of the land Gini coefficients on overall and urban inequality.
For consistency, the regressions again employ for the operational version of the land Gini
coefficients in all three countries. I also control for several additional variables. Following
the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, the regressions include the logarithms of GDP per capita
and its squared term. The impact of trade openness on inequality is also an important
subject of debate in both the neoclassical trade (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; Feenstra
27The rate of agglomeration data come from World Development Indicators (2013).
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and Hanson, 1997) and political economy literatures (Weller and Hersh, 2004; Onaran,
2009). Therefore, I also control for the impact of trade openness. Table 3.16 reports the
impact of the land Gini coefficient on overall and urban income inequality. According to the
estimates, the income Gini coefficient is significantly smaller in Korea and larger in Brazil
when controlling for other variables, including the level of urbanization. Moreover, the land
Gini coefficient has a significant and positive effect on income inequality. The results also
support the Kuznets hypothesis for these three countries when controlling for the country
dummies.
Finally, I analyze whether the cross-country differences among Brazil, Turkey and Korea
are caused by the impact of land inequality moderated by education inequality and the
level of urbanization. Turkey faces problems associated with a gender gap in education
and reduced nonagricultural labor participation rate for women. However, the income
inequality data for Brazil, Turkey and Korea measure the inequality among households
rather individuals. Therefore, the gender gaps might not be an important factor that would
create the cross-country differences in income inequality among households. Therefore, the
impact of overall education inequality and that for males are tested in separate regressions.
The regressions that include the effect of education inequality for males also include a
variable measuring the gender gap in education. I term this the “gender education ratio”,
which is the ratio of the average years of schooling for women to total average years of
schooling. In addition, I control for trade openness, GDP per capita and its squared term.
As education is likely to affect income inequality over the longer term, the regressions
control for the 10-year lags of the education variables. To address endogeneity concerns,
the level of urbanization is instrumented with the 20-year lag of the agglomeration rate.
Similarly, the 10-year lags of the educational Gini coefficients for the total population and
for males are instrumented with their 20-year lags.
Table 3.17 presents the results of the 2SLS-IV regressions. According to the Kleibergen-
Paap LM test statistics, the equations explaining the urban income and overall income Gini
coefficients are not underidentified. Moreover, the Kleibergen Wald F-values indicate that
the instruments included in the regressions for the income Gini coefficient are strong. Nev-
ertheless, the Kleibergen-Wald F-values for models (3) and (4) indicate that the regressions
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explaining the urban Gini coefficients are weakly identified. Thus, the estimates regarding
urban income inequality should be interpreted with caution.
The estimates in Table 3.17 support our predictions concerning the explanations for the
cross-country differences in income Gini coefficients. In all four regressions, the level of
urbanization and education Gini coefficients have a significant impact on the income Gini
coefficients. The gender education gap does not have a significant influence on the cross-
country income differences among Brazil, Turkey and Korea. Considering the coefficients
of the land Gini coefficient and the level of urbanization, and the overall and urban income
Gini coefficients in 2010, we can conclude that 53.5-67.3% of the total income inequality and
54.9-78.5% of the urban income inequality gap between Brazil and Turkey are explained by
the level of urbanization28. Moreover, for 2010, 139.7% of the overall income inequality gap
between Korea and Turkey is explained by education inequality among males. The inflated
impact of education indicates that there are other factors (e.g., skill-biased technological
change) that might increase Korea’s income inequality to a greater extent than Turkey’s.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter argues that land inequality is plays an important role in determining the
levels of income inequality in Korea, Turkey and Brazil. I explain the lower level of income
inequality in Korea in terms of the effect of land inequality on education inequality in Ko-
rea. The historical data clearly indicate that the spread of education in Korea accelerated
following the land reform (Figure 3.1). However, unequal agrarian land distributions be-
came an impediment to the spread of education in Turkey and Brazil. The negative effect
of land inequality is particularly noticeable in the Brazilian states and Turkish provinces
characterized by more inegalitarian land distributions.
Nevertheless, the effect of land inequality on education inequality cannot explain the
differences between Brazil and Turkey, due to the significant gender gap in Turkey and
Brazil’s institutional preference for higher levels of educational expenditures. The higher
28The differences between Brazil’s and Turkey’s levels of urbanization, overall income and urban income
Gini coefficients are 10.2, 0.174 and 0.180, respectively.
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education spending in Brazil may be a result of overurbanization, which reduced landlords’
ability to hamper educational policies and thereby increased the demand for educational
investment from Brazilian society. However, the inegalitarian agrarian structure in Brazil
reduced the efficiency of Brazil’s educational expenditures. While Brazil spends a signifi-
cantly higher share of its GDP on public education, Brazil’s education inequality is similar
to Turkey’s.
The difference between the levels of income inequality experienced in Brazil and Turkey
is explained by the larger urban reserve army of labor in Brazil. The high level of land
inequality in Brazil drives a larger share of the rural population into cities and towns. Nev-
ertheless, urban sector’s capacity to produce productive/regular jobs is limited. Therefore,
compared to Turkey, a larger share of migrants in Brazil is employed in subsistence, infor-
mal and/or part-time jobs and become a part of the urban reserve army of labor. This led
to larger urban and overall income Gini coefficients in Brazil.
The conclusions of this paper support the case for progressive land reforms and egal-
itarian agrarian policies that favor small peasants. Progressive agrarian policies have a
broad influence: they reduce inequality and poverty not only in the rural sector but also
in the urban sector. Moreover, educational policies can be more effective in the countries
with more equal agrarian structures. More equal countries are capable of expanding their
education while spending lower shares of their GDP on the public education.
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CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND THE KUZNETS HYPOTHESIS
4.1 Introduction
Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, the Kuznets Curve has been considered
one of the most groundbreaking ideas in the economic development literature1. Many
important scholars, including Acemog˘lu, Williamson, Barro, Agnion, Bourguignon, Piketty,
Fields, Anand, Kanbur, and Robinson, have performed their academic work within the
borders of the Kuznetsian framework.
The original version of the Kuznets Curve argument relies mainly on Kuznets (1955)’s
AER paper called “Economic Growth and Inequality”. In this article, Kuznets (1955) claims
that economic growth initially raises income inequality in the lower income countries for
two reasons. First, the population weight of the urban sector, which Kuznets assumes to be
relatively unequal, increases. Second, the gap between the average urban and rural incomes
widens. In the later phases of development, the income inequality declines as a larger
share of the urban population becomes “native” urban dwellers, and some of them pursue
entrepreneurial opportunities and enroll in the political process. Following the assumption
that the service sector is more equal than the industrial sector, Kuznets also claims that
the growing employment share of the service sector is also an important factor in reducing
inequality.
A large number of studies have examined the relevance of the Kuznets hypothesis by
empirical analysis. Some of the empirical works, such as Paukert (1973); Ahluwalia (1976);
Jha (1996); Mbaku (1997); Barro (2000); Chang and Ram (2000); and Thornton (2001),
have accepted the Kuznets hypothesis. Many other studies (e.g., Deininger and Squire,
1In 2011, American Economic Review named Kuznets (1955)’s “Economic Growth and Inequality” as
one of the top 20 articles published in AER during its first 100 years.
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1998; Cook and Ushida, 2008; Frazer, 2006; Angeles, 2010; Desbordes and Verardi, 2012)
have refuted it. Several studies (Tribble, 1999; List and Gallet, 2000) have suggested an
S-curve relationship between income per capita and income inequality; that is, the Kuznets
hypothesis holds for lower and middle income countries, but economic growth increases
income inequality as the level of per capita income rises further.
Most of the empirical work on the Kuznets hypothesis has simply tested the existence
of the Kuznets Curve using various methodologies. However, the papers cited above do
not examine the mechanisms behind the inverted U relationship between income inequality
and income per capita. The main contribution of this paper is to explore empirically
the channels that create a Kuznets Curve in developing economies. Following Kuznets
(1955, 1963, 1972) and several other influential theoretical works in the literature (Robinson,
1976; Knight and Sabot, 1983; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993), this
paper focuses on the influence of structural changes on income inequality. The structural
changes might be highly crucial for explaining income inequality in developing countries;
for instance, Young (2013) shows that the urban-rural gap on average accounts for 40%
of income inequality in developing economies. In this paper, I specifically scrutinize the
influence of the urbanization process, urban informal and/or subsistence employment and
education inequality on the overall income inequality.
The paper first distinguishes between developed and developing countries and claims
that the Kuznets hypothesis is valid only for developing economies because developing
economies have very distinct characteristics compared to mature economies. The extent of
urbanization, changes in the shares of urban informal sector and expansion/reduction of
the education frontier are noticeably greater in developing economies.
Next, the paper discusses the factors explaining the Kuznets Curve. The changing pop-
ulation weights of the urban and rural sectors partially explain the inverted-U relationship
between income per capita and income inequality. Nevertheless, the changing population
weights argument relies on the assumption of constant urban and rural inequalities, which
might be unrealistic in many cases. Moreover, the empirical analyses decomposing the in-
come inequality mostly indicate that the increase in the urban sector’s population weight
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is not always the main factor behind the changes in overall income inequalities (Eastwood
and Lipton, 2004; Kanbur and Zhung, 2013; Oyvat, 2010)2.
This paper prefers an approach that acknowledges the influence of changes in urban
inequality alongside changes in the ratio of average nonagricultural and agricultural incomes.
Contrary to the claim by Kuznets (1955), the statistics show that the sectoral ratios between
value added and employment shares tend to converge with economic growth (Table 4.3).
This convergence may be due to the acceleration of the urbanization process through ongoing
industrialization. The reduction in transportation costs and expansion of education in rural
areas might stimulate further urbanization and lead to convergence between sectors.
Nonetheless, in the early phases of development, economic growth together with ur-
banization expand the urban informal employment (Rauch, 1993; Elgin and Oyvat, 2013).
Hence, a part of the poverty in the rural sector is transmitted to the urban informal sector,
while a limited group of households in the urban formal sector prosper significantly. More-
over, the evidence in the empirical section of this paper shows that economic growth makes
access to education more restricted in very low-income countries. Therefore, in the early
phase of development, a group of individuals in the more privileged activities benefit more
from economic growth, which increases the overall income inequality. In the later phases
of development, the gains from economic growth spread to a larger part of population due
to several factors. First, the average nonagricultural and agricultural incomes continue to
converge in middle-income countries (Table 4.3). Second, the employment share of informal
and subsistence activities decreases in the nonagricultural sector (Rauch, 1993; Elgin and
Oyvat, 2013). This decrease contributes to the reduction in income inequality, as empirically
shown in the next sections. Third, education inequality declines (Table 4.4), which also can
reduce income inequality (Acemog˘lu and Autor, 2012). Hence, the economic growth in the
later phases of development leads to structural changes that reduce the overall inequality.
2As explained in the following sections, the changing population weights argument only focuses on the
direct impact of the growing urban contribution on the inequality component. The urbanization process
can influence income inequality both through internal changes within the urban and rural inequalities and
inequality between the urban and rural sectors.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the characteristics specific
to developing economies and identifies factors that theoretically might lead to the inverted-
U relationship between per capita income and income inequality. The third section presents
a cross-country econometric analysis to test the theory, and the last section presents the
conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical framework
4.2.1 Defining the Developing Economies
It is often overlooked that Kuznets’s (1955, 1963) original hypothesis is only applicable
to developing economies. Several empirical studies have presented their results for a sample
of countries including both developing and developed countries (Paukert, 1973; Mbaku,
1997; Frazer; 2006; Huang et al., 2007), while others also present results both for samples
including only developing and all countries (Ahluwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Jha,
1996; Angeles, 2010). Nevertheless, these works still do not emphasize that the Kuznets
Curve is not applicable to mature economies. In fact, there is a growing literature pointing
to the existence of a S-curve between GDP per capita and income inequality. Income
inequality increases at lower levels of per capita income, declines in middle and upper-middle
income countries, and increases again at high levels of per capita incomes (List and Gallet,
1999; Tribble, 2000; Galbraith, 2011). Milanovic (1994) calls this the “augmented Kuznets
Curve”. There might be reasons explaining the second rise of inequality in developed
countries, including skilled-biased technical change (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008) and
an increasing share of financial incomes (Krippner, 2005) in the higher income countries.
The increasing inequality in the developed world might also be the outcome of a historical
process. The outcomes of neoliberalism might start to dominate the inequality-reducing
mechanisms suggested in the inverted-U literature as the country converts into a mature
economy.
Whichever factor increases the inequality, the S-curve hypothesis is different from the
Kuznets hypothesis, at least the hypothesis in his own work (1955, 1963). The developing
economies in the Kuznets hypothesis have four characteristics that distinguish them from
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mature economies. These characteristics might lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship
between per capita income and inequality:
1) The developing economies experience higher rates of urbanization (Table 4.1).
2) Along with faster urbanization, the employment share of the agricultural sector de-
clines faster in the developing economies (Table 4.2).
3) The differences between labor productivities in the agriculture and non-agriculture
sectors are larger, especially in the lower income economies (Table 4.3).
4) The education frontier expands, and the inequality of years of schooling declines as
the developing economies grow. The decline in the education Gini coefficient slows down in
the higher income economies (Table 4.4).
Tables 4.1-4.4 support the developing-developed divide above. The tables exhibit char-
acteristics for the developed countries and developing economies grouped according to their
per capita income levels. For each decade, the countries are classified according to their per
capita incomes and levels of development at the midpoint of the decade (1985, 1995, 2005)3.
For the “developed” and “developing” classification, I used Human Development Index,
which relies on Sen (1999)’s capabilities approach measuring development by capabilities-
freedom of people to decide on what to do and what to be. The bundle of freedoms called
functionings should include access to education, healthcare, food, clean water, the right to
speech and movement and various other things that would improve a person’s welfare. The
functionings might be correlated with economic growth, but they are not always affected
by it4. Although HDI cannot measure the unlimited aspects of development that can be
derived from Sen’s approach, compared to income per capita, it can define development
from a broader perspective.
3The tables do not include the values for 1965 and 1975 because for 1975, only 5 countries and for 1965,
only New Zealand qualified as “developed”.
4Sen writes about cases where economic growth is not sufficient to improve every aspect of human welfare.
In his book “Poverty and Famines”, Sen (1981) claims that increasing agricultural prices are the reason for
the Bengal famine of 1943, although the higher agricultural prices resulted from the war-induced economic
growth in India. Similarly, in “Development as Freedom”, Sen (1999) shows that Kerala, a low-income state
in India, achieved great success in healthcare and education. He shows that the average life expectancy in
Kerala exceeded the average life expectancy of the black population in the US, although the income per
capita for the black population in the US was significantly higher.
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For this study, the Human Development Index (HDI) values of each country are cal-
culated for each 5 years. UNDP’s Human Development Reports classify the countries
with HDI scores over 0.800 in the “very high human development” group. Following this
categorization, I classify these countries as “developed”. One possible problem with the
developing-developed divide is that many countries that used to show the characteristics of
a developing economy are developed today. An example would be Korea, a developed econ-
omy that in 1960, according to the HDI scores, was less developed than today’s Uganda,
Nepal and Mauritania5. Therefore, countries are reclassified as developed according to their
HDIs in each period. The estimation of HDI is detailed in Appendix A.
Table 4.1 shows that the rate of urbanization is significantly higher in developing coun-
tries than in developed economies during these three decades6. Similarly, the average
changes in the employment shares of agriculture are higher for the developing economies
during the given periods (Table 4.2). Table 4.3 shows the ratio between the sectoral shares
of value added to total employment in agriculture, industry and services as a measure of the
relative average income in these sectors. Although agriculture’s ratio of the shares of value
added to the share of total employment is usually higher for the developed economies, we
cannot observe a consistent trend for the convergence of agricultural incomes towards mean
incomes. Nevertheless, the incomes in both the industry and service sectors converge to the
mean incomes as the countries develop. Hence, it is difficult to claim that the industry and
service sectors are “privileged” in the developed economies.
Finally, Table 4.4 shows that the decline in the education Gini coefficient for years
of schooling is usually less for the developed economies because the years of schooling
have an upper limit for the majority of the population. The years of schooling begin to
converge at the top as a greater number of people obtain a university degree. Therefore, the
education inequalities are very stable for some of the developed economies. The education
Gini coefficient in the UK remained approximately 0.24 between 1985-2010. Similarly,
5The HDI values calculated for this study are 0.457, 0.446 and 0.435 for 2010’s Mauritania, Nepal and
Uganda respectively, whereas Korea’s HDI score in 1960 is 0.423.
6The average changes for the 1960s and 1970s are not reported, as for 1965 only New Zealand was
classified as a developed economy, and for 1975, only 5 countries were classified as developed.
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Australia’s education Gini coefficient declined from 0.13 to 0.12 between 1980-2010, and
the education Gini coefficient in the US increased slightly from 0.10 to 0.11 between 2000-
2010.
In the next section, we will examine why characteristics specific to developing economies
affect inequality. Our first focus is the influence of the sectoral composition. We will first
examine the impact of changing shares in the agricultural, nonagricultural, urban formal
and urban informal sectors. Then, we will discuss how the education frontier changes with
economic growth and whether changing education inequality also affects income inequality.
4.2.2 Changing shares of employment in nonagricultural and agricultural sec-
tors
The first set of arguments on the Kuznets hypothesis centers on the direct impact of
changing sectoral composition. In his paper “Economic Growth and Inequality”, Kuznets
(1955) relies on a two-sector model involving the urban and rural sectors. Like Lewis
(1954), Kuznets takes industrialization to be the main feature of economic development.
He assumes that enlargement of the urban sector is the natural result of industrialization,
and indeed, urbanization is the determinant factor on the formation of the inverted-U curve
between per capita income and inequality. In developing his argument, Kuznets makes two
important assumptions: “a) the average per capita income of the rural population is usually
lower than that of the urban; b) inequality in the percentage shares within the distribution
for the rural population is somewhat narrower than in that for the urban population - even
based on annual income; and this difference would probably be wider for distributions by
secular income levels.”
Based on these assumptions, Kuznets claims that the overall inequality within a country
increases due to two reasons. First, urbanization followed by migration enlarges the share
of the relatively unequal component, the urban sector. The increasing weight of the more
unequal sector leads to greater overall inequality. Second, the emergence of industrialization
raises the per capita income gap between the urban and rural population, until the benefits
of industrialization are also shared by the rural population. Thus, “the relative difference
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in per capita income...is stable at best, and tends to widen because per capita productivity
in urban pursuits increases more rapidly than in agriculture” (1955:8).
There have been some attempts to model and depict the Kuznets hypothesis by de-
composing it to its income components. One of the earlier attempts to model the Kuznets
hypothesis is Robinson (1976)’s approach. Using log variance as a measure of inequality,
Robinson decomposes the urban and rural sectors into intrasectoral (within-sector) and in-
tersectoral (between-sector) components and examines how the distribution would change
over time. In his analysis, Robinson assumes that both the urban-rural gap and the in-
equalities within the urban and rural sectors are constant. Hence, Robinson’s model only
examines the impact of the changing employment shares of the sectors, ignoring the changes
to the intrasectoral inequalities and to the urban-rural gap. By using this abstract model,
he concludes that the inverted U curve hypothesis holds regardless of Kuznets’ assumption
of a richer and more unequal urban sector. The reasoning here is that the urban-rural gap’s
contribution to overall inequality is zero when a society is either entirely urban or entirely
rural. Hence, the urban-rural gap’s contribution to inequality is maximized somewhere in
the middle.
Anand and Kanbur (1993) also report a similar analysis for six different measures of
inequality7. They show that the inverted-U hypothesis holds for all six indices when given
conditions are satisfied under the assumption that the urban and rural inequalities and
urban-rural income ratio are constant. For their analysis on Theil’s T index, Anand and
Kanbur decompose Theil’s T to its within (TW ) and between (TB) components:
T = TB + TW (4.1)
Following that, they conclude that a turning point is guaranteed if:
[
∂T
∂x
]
=
[
∂TB
∂x
]
+
[
∂TW
∂x
]
< 0 (4.2)
at x=1, and
7The indices are Theil’s T, Theil’s L, the squared coefficient of variation, the decomposable transform
of the Atkinson Index, the Gini coefficient and the variance of log-income.
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(T1 − T2) < (θ − 1− logθ) (4.3)
Here, T1 and T2 are the Theil indices for sector 1 and sector 2, respectively; x is the
population share in sector 2; and θ is the ratio of the sectoral mean incomes (µ1/µ2).
If the conditions hold, then the within-sector and between-sector inequalities will have a
relationship with population share (x), which is similar to the shape in Figure 4.1. As
Figure 4.1 shows, the between urban-rural sector inequality does not contribute to the
overall inequality in societies that are either fully urban or fully rural. In addition, if we
follow Kuznets’s assumption of greater urban inequality, then the within group inequality
increases with urbanization.
Nevertheless, there aren’t good reasons to assume that the urban-rural income ratio
or the within-urban and within-rural inequalities are constant. Indeed, the majority of
rural-to-urban migrants do not join the urban sector as a median agent but begin working
in inferior informal activities (Banerjee, 1983; Joshi and Joshi, 1976). Hence, rural-to-
urban migration itself increases the urban inequality unless there are forces counteracting
it. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that urban inequality is affected by economic
development. Several studies have already shown that GDP per capita and/or the level
of urbanization affects both the employment and the output shares of the informal sector
(Rauch, 1993; Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Elgin and Oyvat, 2013), which is an important
factor in urban income inequality. Moreover, Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008) and McMillan and
Rodrik (2012) show that income per capita affects the ratio between the labor productivities
in the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors.
There are several studies (Eastwood and Lipton, 2004; Kanbur and Zhuang, 2013; Oy-
vat, 2010) examining the factors that affect changes in income inequality by decomposing
inequality into the contribution of intrasectoral inequality within and intersectoral inequal-
ity between the urban and rural sectors. Eastwood and Lipton examine eleven incidences
of changes in inequality from 7 countries: China, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Chile,
Brazil and Ghana. They report that the changing weight of the urban population is a major
factor explaining the change of inequality only in Indonesia between the years 1987-1993.
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Indeed, in seven of the eleven cases the decline in intrasectoral inequalities is the major
factor affecting overall inequality. In a similar analysis on more recent data for four coun-
tries, Kanbur and Zhuang (2013) show that the changing population weight is the major
driver of rising inequality in Indonesia and Philippines but fails to explain the changes of
inequality in China and India. Additionally, Oyvat (2010) shows that in Turkey, the intra-
sectoral inequalities contribute significantly more to the changes in overall inequality than
the increases in urban population share.
In summary, although the changing weight of employment might partially explain the
Kuznets hypothesis, we may require a more complete approach considering the changing
sectoral weights of both employment and output along with changes in intrasectoral in-
equalities.
4.2.3 Enriching vs. enlarging growth
Releasing the assumption of a constant urban-rural income ratio would allow a different
understanding of the impact of economic growth on income inequality. Following Fields’s
(2005) terminology, economic growth could be enabled either by the “enrichment” or the
“enlargement” of sectors. The enrichment of sectors would limit the benefits of growth to
a portion of society and might not create sufficient employment due to barriers to entry,
if the enrichment is in the higher income sector. The enlargement of sectors is the case in
which the growing sectors create significant employment and spread the benefits of growth
to a larger part of society.
Naturally, we would expect the enrichment of the higher income sector to increase income
inequality, whereas the enlargement of the higher income sector might lead to a decline in
inequality if sufficient employment is created in the higher income sector. Indeed, Kuznets
(1955) himself claimed that the emergence of industrialization raises the per capita income
gap between the urban and rural population until the economy reaches a turning point
where the benefits of industrialization are also significantly shared by the rural population.
However, Kuznets did not prioritize the changing urban inequality as a crucial factor behind
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the increase in income inequality during the early phase of industrialization8. Later, in
“Innovations and Adjustments in Economic Growth”, Kuznets (1972) specifically focuses
on the impact of unbalanced growth on intrasectoral inequalities and claims that “sectors
profiting from...technological innovations, the so called growth-sectors, will tend to yield
higher returns to labor and capital than the others...this set of economic inequalities are
built into the modern economic growth.”
Table 4.3 shows the ratio between the value added and the employment shares of the
service, industry and agriculture sectors for each per capita income level to provide an
understanding of the relative incomes of these sectors. These data clearly show that in the
lower income countries, the industry and services sectors are “privileged”, with significantly
higher average returns than to the agricultural sectors.
The higher incomes in the nonagricultural sectors might be due to two reasons: 1) the
costs of rural-to-urban migration and 2) skill requirements in some of the nonagricultural
activities. These factors would create a barrier to entering the higher income sectors and
maintain the premium in the higher income sectors at higher levels.
Harris-Todaro (1970) type of models (also Todaro, 1969; Cole and Sanders, 1985; Fields,
1975; 2005) propose that migration between urban and rural sectors is determined by the
expected urban and rural incomes9. A simplified equilibrium of the Harris-Todaro model
would be
E(WU ) = E(WF )
LF
LU
+ E(WS)
LS
LU
= SR + C (4.4)
where E(WU ), E(WF ) and E(WS) are the expected incomes in the urban, urban formal
and urban informal sectors, respectively. LF and LS are the volume of urban employment in
the formal sector and the volume of urban underemployment in the urban informal sectors;
LU is the urban labor force; SR is the peasant income; and C is the cost of rural-to-urban
8In “Economic Growth and Inequality”, Kuznets (1955) only mentions increasing urban inequality where
he claims that a group of individuals might benefit from new industries “by an unusually rapid rate of creation
of new fortunes”, which he expects to be “relatively stronger in the early phases of industrialization”.
9The empirical work for different countries (e.g. Agesa, 2000; Tunalı, 1996; Bowles, 1970; Fields, 1982;
Schultz, 1982) has also found that the average urban and rural incomes significantly affect the migration
between the rural and urban sectors.
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migration10. This model omitted unemployment for the simplicity reasons. Consistent with
a number of studies (e.g., Porta and Schleifer, 2008; Temkin, 2009; Yamada, 1996; Portes
and Schauffer, 1993; Yuki, 2007; ILO, 1972), the formal sector in this model is a sector with
better managerial organization and greater capital intensity and technology11.
The model predicts that even when the highly productive urban sector cannot produce
enough jobs, the rural dwellers move to the urban informal sector while waiting to be
employed in the formal urban activities. Thus, the expected urban-rural incomes should
converge unless there is a high cost of rural-to-urban sector migration. As in Lewis (1954),
the migration costs here include both physical costs such as settling and transportation costs
and the psychological costs of moving. As the costs of rural-to-urban migration widen, the
gap between the expected urban and rural incomes should increase.
The conventional form of the Harris-Todaro model follows the assumption that the skill
levels of the individuals in each sector are similar. Indeed, the skill gaps might be another
important factor limiting the migration of rural dwellers. If the skill gaps in a society are
high, the rural dwellers with lower skills would have lower opportunities, even in informal
urban activities, which would limit the migration of lower skilled workers and create an
extra premium for the urban activities. Indeed, a number of studies examining migration
behavior show that education is an important factor increasing the probability of rural-to-
urban migration (e.g., Agesa, 2000; Tunalı, 1996).
Depending on the costs of migration and skill gaps, the urban sector might either “en-
rich” or “enlarge”, which would affect the overall income inequality differently. Lorenz
Curves in Figure 4.2 show how the urban sector’s growth might affect income inequality
by changing the average incomes in the urban and rural sectors. In Figure 4.1, only two
10Unlike the previous chapter, where the urban sector is divided into urban capitalist and urban tra-
ditional, I chose to follow the informal-formal divide in this empirical chapter because subsistence is a
more abstract term, and the share of subsistence activities is harder to measure than the share of informal
activities.
11The characteristics attributed to the formal sector hold on average (Porta and Schleifer, 2008). How-
ever, there are informal activities that use technology better than some of the formal activities (Ranis and
Stewart, 1999). Also, as Harriss-White (2009) points out, large-scale unregulated activities can exist either
by the direct use of political power or with the protection of mafia and/or formal forces such as the police.
Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will assume that the migrants prefer to be employed in the formal activities,
which offer better incomes.
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types of individuals, urban and rural dwellers, are assumed to exist, with urban individ-
uals having greater incomes. In the first path, shown with black lines, the urban sector
is enriching without creating sufficient urban employment due to the barriers to entering
urban activities. This situation would lead to the expansion the of Lorenz curve. We can
observe that inequality increases in this case, although the slope of the line representing
urban dwellers is constant, implying that the ratio between per capita urban income over
per capita overall income does not change.
If the growth of the urban sector leads to the enlargement of the urban sector, as shown
in red lines in Figure 4.2, employment is created in the urban sector, which can spread the
benefits of the urban sector to a large portion of society. In this case, inequality is reduced
even when the ratio between the rural and overall per capita incomes are constant. The
empirical work of Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008) and McMillan and Rodrik (2012) find a U-
shaped relationship between the ratio of agricultural labor productivity to nonagricultural
labor productivity and income per capita. That is, economic growth leads to divergence
between the labor productivities in the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors in the lower
income countries. After a turning point12, the relative incomes of the agricultural and
nonagricultural sectors converge as a result of economic growth.
There might be two reasons for this convergence. First, improvements in the transporta-
tion facilities and infrastructure are expected outcomes of economic growth and might lead
to a decline in the rural-to-urban migration costs. Following my modified Harris-Todaro
equation, the reduction in the migration costs leads to convergence between the expected
urban and rural incomes. Second, Table 4.4 shows that the skill differentials decline in
developing economies following economic growth. This factor would also relieve the barri-
ers to rural-to-urban migration (Agesa, 2000; Tunalı, 1996) and close the gap between the
average incomes in agricultural and nonagricultural activities.
12McMillan and Rodrik (2012) find that the turning point for the U-shaped relationship between the
ratio of agricultural labor productivity to nonagricultural labor productivity and income per capita is ap-
proximately $9000. Similarly, Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008) identify a turning point near $5000-9000.
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4.2.4 Considering the formal/informal sector
The analysis of Figure 4.1 is incomplete, as the growth in the population share of the
urban sector does not necessarily lead to a spillover of benefits into the growing urban sector.
Indeed, the growth in the urban sector is also unbalanced. The impact of unbalanced growth
in the urban formal sector on inequality can be observed by considering the informal/formal
sector divide. The urban informal sector includes activities with lower labor productivity
(Shleifer and Porta, 2008) and/or subsistence activities with marginal productivity of labor,
similar to zero (Lewis, 1954; Fields 1975), as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that the growth in the urban formal sector is the main driver
of the growth in the urban sector. Still, many rural dwellers decide to migrate with the
expectation of finding a job in the formal sector and hold an informal job while seeking
alternative employment (Banerjee, 1983).
Nevertheless, if the growth in the urban formal sector cannot create sufficient jobs, the
move towards the urban informal sector might create a “Todaro Paradox” (Todaro, 1969),
where economic growth increases urban underemployment in the urban informal sector13.
Capitalist development might also pauperize the small peasants and create the following
factors that raise the Todaro paradox: 1) improvement in labor-saving technologies reduces
the demand for labor on large farms (Harris, 1978; De Janvry, 1981); 2) investments and
subsidies favoring large landlords reduce prices for agricultural goods (Boyce, 1993) and
lower the revenues of small farmers; 3) the spread of new goods damages the production
of non-agricultural rural goods, called “z-goods” (Hymer and Resnick, 1969); and 4) many
governments implement pricing policies that support industrialization by changing the terms
of trade against the agricultural sector (Kay, 2002; Lipton, 1977).
Nevertheless, there are also factors that might counteract the growing employment share
of the informal sector within the urban sector. According to many works in the Marxian
literature (e.g., Marx; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1994; Aglietta,
13The growth of the informal sector was observed in all Asian (Moser, 1978), African (Wuyts, 2001) and
Latin American (Portes, 1994; de Janvry, 1981; Furtado, 1976) countries in their early phases of development.
The informal sector has also recently been growing in China (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2007), which is
a lower income country transforming to a medium income one.
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2000), capitalist accumulation increases the size of corporations and concentrates capital
in fewer hands. We often observe the increasing concentration of capital together with the
collapse of the traditional activities14 that are attached to the informal sector. The argu-
ment in these studies is that the concentration of capital is a result of the capitalists’ desire
to eliminate the other firms and seek monopoly power. Monopoly power increases profits
and reduces risks - very appealing for a capitalist. Once a monopolistic or oligopolistic
structure is achieved in an industry, the capitalist creates and maintains barriers against
new, smaller enterprises. Therefore, we observe an asymmetric structure in capitalist devel-
opment. Structural changes in an industry that would lead to the destruction of traditional
informal activities and to the concentration of capital in fewer hands are likely. However,
a structural change that would destroy oligopolies in favor of the traditional sector is less
likely. This asymmetric tendency leads to the reduction of traditional informal activities
over time.
In addition to the influence of the concentration of capital, as urbanization continues,
pressure on the land decreases and agricultural income rises, making the remaining rural
dwellers less willing to move to the urban informal sector (Rauch, 1993). It can also be
observed from Table 4.1 that the rate of urbanization declines as the country reaches a
mature economy. Hence, combined with the growing centralization of capital, the slowdown
in the rural-to-urban migration might create a greater tendency for the urban informal
sector to shrink in more developed countries. Indeed, for different sets of countries, Rauch
(1993) and Elgin and Oyvat (2013) empirically show that the share of informal activities in
nonagricultural employment increases during the early phases of urbanization and declines
as the countries converge further to an urban society.
The growth of the urban informal sector can influence income inequality both posi-
tively and negatively through different mechanisms. The obvious influence of the informal
sector on inequality is its impact through changing weights. When the urban inequality
is decomposed into formal and informal sectors, the between component has an inverted
14In the previous section of this dissertation, I defined traditional/subsistence activities as activities in
which the marginal productivity of labor is close to zero.
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U relationship with the employment share of the informal sector, where it is minimized
for either fully informal or fully formal urban sectors. The between component of urban
inequality will be maximized at a point where the informal and formal sectors both exist.
Nevertheless, if the share of the informal sector that would maximize urban inequality is
very high, we might observe only a positive relationship between the share of the informal
sector and urban inequality in some countries.
Nevertheless, the changing weights approach is very incomplete, as it assumes that
people who lose their informal jobs or cannot be employed in the informal sector due to
the penetration of formal activities will find better paying formal jobs. However, if the
concentration of activities in the formal sector cannot create sufficient employment, then
the inequality in a country might increase even as the informal sector shrinks15.
Another factor that might increase inequality is that the vanishing of small informal
enterprises might lead to a more oligopolistic structure, which would increase the rates of
profits and also income inequality among households. Nevertheless, we should also note
that the mechanisms creating monopoly rents are also available in sectors where informal
enterprises significantly exist. In urban retailing activities, larger formal enterprises use their
monopoly power on small informal retailers/street vendors, and in outsourcing activities,
they use their monopsony power on informal subcontractors to exact a surplus from them
(Portes, 1994). Hence, formal enterprises’ penetration into informal activities might increase
the rates of profit, but it is not clear whether this increase will occur by a significant amount.
There are also reasons to believe that informality increases income inequality. First, as
explained by the model in chapter 2, subsistence activities constitute an important part of
the informal sector and function as a reserve army of labor for the urban capitalist sector.
Hence, a large employment share of subsistence activities reduces labor’s share of income in
the urban capitalist sector by improving the bargaining power of urban capitalist employees.
15Also, even when the increase in the employment share of formal activities reduces income inequality,
this reduction might not be desirable for some of the individuals whose incomes are relatively improving.
The wages in formal activities are mainly better than the informal wages or the incomes of the informally
self-employed (Maloney, 2004). Therefore, some of the informally self-employed are waiting to be employed
in formal wage jobs. However, some of the informally self-employed prefer their own business to formal wage
jobs, as they prefer to work in more flexible conditions.
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This issue might lead to an increase in overall inequality among households. Second, higher
levels of informality naturally lead to tax evasion and lower tax revenues (Rosser, Rosser and
Ahmed; 2000, 2003, 2007). States with limited resources cannot implement the effective
redistributive welfare policies that can be implemented through high tax revenues. In
addition, progressive income tax policies can only be implemented to a significant degree in
countries where incomes are accurately reported. The governments in countries with large
unofficial economies tend to collect revenues by consumption taxes that are conceived as
regressive (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Hence, the existence of a large informal sector leaves
less space for redistributive policies and has a negative impact on inequality.
In summary, the share of informal activities might influence the income inequality
through multiple mechanisms. In the empirical section, I will first test whether the inverted-
U relationship between income per capita and the employment share of the informal sector
exists. Then, I will examine which mechanism listed above has more influence on the overall
income inequality. Last, the article will combine both empirical findings and show how the
relationship income per capita can influence income inequality through informal activities.
4.2.5 Education and inequality
Education inequality is also a factor that can explain the mechanism behind the Kuznets
Curve in developing economies. In “Economic Growth and Inequality”, Kuznets (1955)
did not thoroughly analyze the impact of education and changing skills and only briefly
mentioned education’s role in ”Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations, VIII:
The distribution of income by size” (Kuznets, 1963)16. Nevertheless, beginning with Knight
and Sabot (1983), several studies on education/human capital inequality have attached
themselves to the Kuznets hypothesis (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996).
Some of these studies suggest a Kuznets Curve for human capital (Lim and Tang, 2008;
Morrisson and Murtin, 2013), meaning an inverted-U relationship between the average years
of schooling and the education Gini coefficients.
16In “Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations, VIII: The distribution of income by size”,
Kuznets (1963) mentions that the expansion of education is one of the factors that would reduce income
inequality. Nevertheless, he also claims that the move from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector
increases income inequality, as the education gaps are greater in the nonagricultural sector.
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Knight and Sabot (1983) performed the first analysis on the impact of education on the
Kuznets Curve. Knight and Sabot describe the influence of education on income inequality
as being determined by two effects: the changing composition of education, which they call
the “composition effect”, and the changing premium of income, which they call the “com-
pression effect”. The combination of these two effects creates an inverted-U relationship
between the contribution of education to inequality and the level of development, which is
consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis. Nevertheless, Knight and Sabot (1983)’s dataset
is very limited, and they do not discuss the factors that affect the education premium or
the education inequality.
Various studies (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1996; Galor, Moav and
Vollrath, 2009) theoretically examine education inequality and suggest that the changes in
education distribution are consistent with the outcomes of the Kuznets hypothesis. In the
earlier phases, the poor cannot invest in education due to credit constraints (Galor and
Zeira, 1993). Even if they have access credit, education investment would be very costly for
the poor, as most of it is financed by borrowing capital rather than intrinsic family incomes
(Galor and Tsiddon, 1996). In addition, extra years of education will not be significantly
high for very low levels of education. Therefore, educational investment becomes beneficial
only for the rich; for people with lower income levels, the returns of education are lower than
its costs. As a result, lower income people are trapped in an inferior education equilibrium.
Only the rich benefit from technical change, and therefore, inequality increases.
In the later phase of development, a larger portion of the society can and will invest
in education, for two reasons. First, as the credit constraint for the poor declines, a larger
segment of the population becomes able to finance their education. Second, as labor produc-
tivity (and hence wages) increases with improving technology, the lower-income individuals
prefer to benefit from these improvements and seek to obtain a similar amount of education
to the higher-income classes. As a result, the gap between rich and poor would be reduced.
Galor and Tsiddon (1996) and Galor and Zeira (1993)’s studies on inequality mostly
focus on intrasectoral inequalities, and their conclusions are consistent with the Kuznets
hypothesis. Nevertheless, they ignore the important question of whether state investment
in education could or would change the tendency mentioned in these studies. The obvious
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answer is that the institutions can change these tendencies, and inequality could be reduced
earlier by implementing public support for the education of the poor. However, the political
structure might not allow this process.
The possible policy lines of institutions in the early and late phases of development are
examined by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) in a separate article. In their framework,
any type of education reform requires a consensus among all segments of society: landlords,
urban capitalists and workers. In underdeveloped agrarian societies, the landlords would
block the education reforms that would extend the education frontier to a larger portion of
society due to the landlords’ unwillingness to finance the education of society, as landlords
at most benefit indirectly from the formation of human capital. The political restrictions
on extending education services increase not only urban but also overall inequality. The
negative impact of landowners becomes greater in underdeveloped societies with larger land
inequality, where the self-financing opportunities of peasants are more restricted.
The negative impact of land inequality is reduced by capital accumulation followed by
industrialization. The landlords trade with the urban sector, so they also benefit from the
rising productivity in non-agricultural sectors. As capital stock rises relative to the land, the
landowners’ gains from the non-agricultural sectors increase further. After a threshold, the
landlords’ benefit from rising inequality would exceed their costs from financing education;
thus, landlords would lose their incentives for blocking education reform.
According to Galor, Moav and Vollrath, both capitalists and workers would benefit
immediately from rising urban labor productivity; therefore, they would ally for education
reform at any level of development. Thus, education reform would be implemented once
the landlords are convinced to extend the education frontier. It also should be added that,
contrary to Galor, Moav and Vollrath’s assumption of “political consensus”, the political
impact of capitalists would be greater in the later phases of development, as the influence of
landlords might start to become irrelevant with the shrinking share of agricultural output.
In summary, there is a tendency for greater development to lead the political authority to
be more willing to provide education to their citizens, and thus the education inequality
would be reduced. Hence, Galor and Tsiddon’s, Galor and Zeira’s and Galor, Moav and
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Vollrath’s work on education claims that education inequality rises in the early phases of
development and begins to decline past a certain income threshold.
The changes in education inequality have also been examined empirically by several
studies. The outcomes of these empirical analyses depend very much on the methodology
implemented for measuring the education inequality. Gregorio and Lee (2002), Thomas,
Wang and Fan (2001) and Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal (2012) measure the ed-
ucational gaps using the standard deviation of years of schooling and find an inverted-U
relationship between the standard deviation (SD) of schooling and the average years of edu-
cation. In countries with lower average years of education, the SD of schooling initially rises
and the SD of schooling starts to decline following a threshold turning point. Castello and
Domenech (2002), Thomas, Wang and Fan (2001) and Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Ka-
mal (2012) measure inequality by the Gini coefficient of years of schooling. They find that
the years of schooling variable is positively correlated with the Gini coefficient of years of
schooling. Finally, Morrisson and Murtin (2013) and Lim and Tang (2008) attribute differ-
ent rates of return to each year of primary, secondary and tertiary education and calculate
“human capital Gini coefficients” that measure the inequality in the education premium.
Both Morrisson and Murtin (2013) and Lim and Tang (2008) find an inverted-U relationship
between years of schooling and human capital Gini coefficients. The marginal returns for
years of schooling in these studies come from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). However,
both studies treat the returns for primary, secondary and tertiary education as constant
and do not consider the changes in the education premium.
In Figure 4.3, the average Gini coefficient for years of schooling is presented for different
groups of countries: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, Europe, South
Asia, East Asia, Subsaharan Africa and other developed (USA, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand). In Figure 4.3, we can see that education inequality declined in all groups of
countries between years 1960-2010. Among the countries with lower education inequalities,
e.g., in the European countries, the decline in the education gap is very limited between
1960-2010; in the other developed countries group, the average education inequality ceases
to decline after 1980. For the given period, the decline in the education inequality is higher
in the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia compared to the other regions. We will
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examine the relationship between income per capita and the education Gini coefficients in
greater detail in the following sections.
The literature on the relationship between education and income inequalities is incon-
clusive and presents mixed evidence on the impact of the education frontier on income
inequality. In a cross-country analysis, Sylwester (2003) finds that the greater enrollment
in higher education in 1970 reduced the income inequality between the years 1970-1990.
Using the coefficient of variation and standard deviation of education, Park (1996) and
Gregorio and Lee (2002) respectively show that education inequality also reduces income
inequality17.
However, Castello and Domenech (2002) find a very weak correlation (0.27) between
the income and education Gini coefficients. In a separate cross-country analysis, Castello-
Climent and Domenech (2012) test the influence of changes in the education Gini coefficient
and, surprisingly, find that the change in education inequality between years 1960-1980 did
not have any significant positive influence on the change in income inequality between the
years 1980-2005. Indeed, at the 10% significance level, they find that the decrease in the
rate of illiteracy increased income inequality in the higher income OECD countries, and the
decline in the education Gini among the literate increased income inequality both in higher
income OECD and in less developed countries.
The cross-country studies on the education-income inequality relationship do not com-
pletely explain the influence of changing skills possible Kuznets Curves. Indeed, growth
in income per capita can also generate technological change, which would increase the de-
mand for skill. According to Goldin and Katz (2008), on one hand, technological progress
increases the demand for human capital; on the other hand, education investment reduces
the skill premium by satisfying the demand for skilled workers. Goldin and Katz call this
phenomenon “the race between education and technology”, meaning that the difference
between the influence of skilled biased technical change and expansion of the education
frontier will determine the ratio of the earnings of the skilled and unskilled.
17The problem in Sylwester (2003), Park (1996) and Gregorio and Lee (2002) is that they do not control
for the country fixed effects and prefer OLS regressions. Gregorio and Lee (2002) and Sylwester (2003) use
regional dummies.
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Acemog˘lu and Autor (2012) criticize Goldin and Katz’s approach and note that im-
proving technology might not necessarily reduce the incomes of the lower skilled. Although
technological improvements might be labor-saving in many tasks that do not require highly
skill analytical capabilities, some of the manual tasks in the services sector cannot be re-
placed by machines18, which would maintain the demand for lower skilled labor at higher
levels.
Because a good cross-country proxy for measuring “labor-saving technologies” is not
available, this study’s scope is limited to the influence of education inequality. Hence,
this study does not examine the impact of economic growth on income inequality through
changing technology. Nevertheless, as there is a rising supply of relatively skilled labor, the
relative incomes of skilled labor are more likely to fall in the countries where the education
frontier expands. Hence, I expect “the skilled biased technical change” to be a greater issue
in the countries where the expansion of education frontier has stopped (Goldin and Katz,
2008).
4.3 Empirical analysis
This section will empirically examine the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis and the
factors that might lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between income per capita
and income inequality. Panel regressions are used to gain a deeper understanding between
income per capita and income inequality.
4.3.1 Variable selection
For this paper, I selected the Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality. I
constructed a dataset of Gini coefficients based on different sources, which will be listed
in the following section. The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of income
inequality; therefore, it allows the construction of a larger dataset on the income inequality
among households. Nevertheless, the dataset for this study includes Gini data measuring
18Acemog˘lu and Autor (2012) explain this point by Moravac’s Paradox, which can be summarized as
“It is comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult-level performance on intelligence tests or playing
checkers, but difficult or impossible to give them the skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception
and mobility”.
95
both income and expenditure inequalities; income Gini coefficient data are not available for
every year and every country. For the purpose of having a larger dataset, the expenditure
Gini coefficients are used as a proxy for the income Gini coefficients for the years where
income Gini coefficient data are not available. However, the estimations in which the
Gini coefficient is the dependent variable include a dummy variable controlling whether
the dependent variable is income or expenditure inequality. Considering that the marginal
propensities of consumption are usually smaller for the lower income groups, the expenditure
inequalities are lower for the majority of countries (Deininger and Squire, 1996). Hence,
the expenditure dummy is expected to be negative.
In this study, I control for the impact of income per capita by using the logarithm
of income per capita and its square as independent variables. These two variables are
commonly used in a number of empirical studies on the Kuznets hypothesis (Ahluwalia,
1976; Jha, 1996; Mbaku, 1997; Tribble, 1999; Barro, 2000; Huang et. al., 2006). Several
studies applying nonparametric and semiparametric analyses (Frazer, 2006; Desbordes and
Verardi, 2012) also control for the logarithms of income per capita. The logarithm of
income per capita helps to demonstrate the impact of percentage changes in per capita
income rather than its levels.
The regressions in this study also control for several other measures. The impact of trade
liberalization on inequality is an important discussion in the trade literature. Although the
majority of studies confirm that increasing trade openness decreases wage shares (Harrison,
2002; Breuss, 2010; Guscina, 2006; Onaran, 2009; Jayadev, 2007; Oyvat, 2011), there is
no strong perception on the impact of trade openness on the income inequality among
individuals. Among the studies on individual income distribution, Milanovic (2005) finds
that trade openness increases income inequality in lower income states, and Weller and
Hersh (2004) show trade to have a negative impact on the income shares of the poor.
However, both Dollar and Kraay (2003, 2004) and Edwards (1997) find that trade openness
does not have a negative effect on the individual income distribution. In this study, trade
openness is controlled for by (volume of exports + volume of imports)/GDP ratio.
The regressions also control for the impact of economic recessions on the distribution
using an economic recession dummy. In a New York Times article, Shiskin (1975) suggested
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the definition of a recession as a case in which GDP falls for two consecutive quarters. Many
economists have used this as a rule of thumb for defining economic recessions (Claessens
and Kose, 2009). Following this rule of thumb, I define years of negative growth as years of
recession. Several studies show that (Gezici, 2010; Diwan, 2001; Harrison, 2002; Jayadev,
2007; Onaran, 2009) economic recessions have a negative impact on distribution.
In separate regressions, I include several other variables to explore the factors that
might help to explain the inverted-U relationship between per capita income and income
inequality. The share of nonagricultural employment in total employment (Nonagri Emp)
and the nonagricultural sector’s share of total value added (Nonagri VA) allow us to test
whether the “enriching” or “enlarging” growth of the urban sector has an impact on income
inequality. Following Figure 4.2, we expect that an increase in the nonagricultural sector’s
value added should increase income inequality, while the income Gini coefficient should
be reduced if the nonagricultural sector creates employment. Another way of measuring
the impact of the growth of urban sectors would be to control for the gap between the
value added and employment shares of the nonagricultural sectors. The decline of the
nonagricultural sector’s share in total value added minus its share in total employment
(Nonagri VA - Nonagri Employment) is expected to reduce income inequality by spreading
the benefits of growth in the urban sector.
To test the informal sector’s influence on income distribution, I used the nonagricultural
employment share of the informal sector derived from the household employment surveys.
In addition, I check for the impact of the nonagricultural self-employment share as a proxy
for the share of the traditional sector in the urban economy. In countries where the informal
sector and self-employment are dominant, the urban population can also meet at the bottom
and reduce income inequality19. Hence, the empirical analysis also controls the squares of
19For the informal sector, I did not choose other alternatives such as Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro
(2010) or Elgin and Oztunalı (2012), as both are constructed data, and the employment share of informality
is more central to our analysis of the impact of the informal sector on inequality. For nonagricultural self-
employment, I did not choose Key Indicators For the Labour Market’s (ILO, 2013) data, as it is very limited
with respect to developing economies. Also, KILM’s data is a mix of self-employment’s share in the whole
economy and its share only in the nonagricultural sector, which might lead to inconsistencies.
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the nonagricultural employment share of the informal sector and the nonagricultural self-
employment share.
Another variable that might be crucial for the Kuznets hypothesis is the education Gini
coefficient. The education Gini coefficient in this study is measured as the inequality in
years of schooling between individuals. The decline in the education Gini coefficient is also
expected to reduce the income inequality by reducing the skill gaps (Goldin and Katz, 2008;
Acemog˘lu and Autor, 2012). Because the influence of education inequality is expected to
be realized at a longer time interval, I used 10-year lags for the education Gini coefficients
in the regressions.
The analysis also includes regressions examining the factors that influence the share of
nonagricultural informal employment, nonagricultural self-employment and the education
Gini coefficient. I also tested the impact of per capita income on the gap between the nona-
gricultural sector’s share in total value added and its share in total employment (Nonagri
Gap). These regressions aim to clarify the mechanisms that lead to the potential Kuznets
Curves. Nonagri Gap might change due to changes in the (nonagricultural sector’s value
added share)/(nonagricultural sector’s employment share) ratio, which I call the Nonagri
Ratio. Nevertheless, Nonagri Gap can also change due to changing employment weights,
even when the Nonagri Ratio is constant. Therefore, Nonagri Ratio is also estimated in
separate regressions to determine whether the reason behind the changes in Nonagri Gap
are merely changing employment weights or the convergence/divergence between per capita
incomes in the nonagricultural or agricultural sectors.
4.3.2 Data sources
This article mainly uses the UNU-WIDER (2008)’s World Income Inequality Database
V2.0c to measure the income and expenditure inequality. UNU-WIDER classifies the in-
come/expenditure Gini coefficients from 1 to 4, in which 1 and 4 are the observations with
the best and the worst quality, respectively. Following Deininger and Squire (1996), the
observations with the quality of 3 and 4 are first excluded. Later, to increase the number
of countries in the analysis, data with a quality rate of 3 are also included for the countries
with fewer than two observations. The UNU-WIDER dataset continues until the year 2006.
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Hence, I expanded the dataset through different sources including the sources Cepal for the
Latin American, PovcalNet for the Asian, Eurostat for the European, and OECD for the
non-European developed countries.
For the GDP per capita, I used the Penn World Tables 7.1 database. Imports/GDP,
exports/GDP, government expenditures/GDP and the value added share of the nonagricul-
tural sector come from the World Development Indicators. The employment share of the
nonagricultural sector comes from ILO’s Key Indicators of Labor Market (KILM) database.
In the KILM database, changes in the methodology led to an increase/decrease in the em-
ployment shares approximately 10 times. Hence, I only chose one type of series and excluded
the data from different series. For the self-employment and informal employment data, I
used Charmes (2009)’s dataset from the labor force surveys. In the case of informal em-
ployment, the data spans from 1975 to 2007 in five-year intervals. However, in the case of
self-employment, the time span is from the 1970s to the 2000s in ten-year intervals. For
the period after 2007, I used the dataset of ILO/WIEGO (2012) for the informal employ-
ment. This dataset is also formed by country-wise labor force surveys. Charmes’s and
ILO/WIEGO (2012)’s informal employment estimations are consistent with each other.
Both define informal employment as non-coverage by social protection.
The education Gini coefficients are taken from Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal
(2012)’s dataset on education inequality. Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal calculate
the education Gini coefficient of years of schooling using Barro and Lee (2012)’s cross-
country dataset of educational attainment.
4.3.3 Empirical results
I first tested the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. The relationship between income
inequality and income per capita might be subject to problems of endogeneity and reverse
causality. Therefore, I instrumented the logarithms of GDP per capita and its square with
their 10-year lags using 2SLS methodology. Table 4.5 presents results for the datasets
including only developing and all countries. For the first two regressions, with 10-year lags
of GDP per capita, its square and cube are strong instruments according to the Kleibergen
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Paap rk Wald F values20. The estimates support the S-curve hypothesis (List and Gallet,
1999; Tribble, 2000; Galbraith, 2011) with turning points at approximately $1950 and
$23000-26000. This result also supports this paper’s claim that the Kuznets hypothesis only
holds for developing economies, as only two countries, Kuwait and Trinidad and Tobago,
are classified as developing and had income per capita above $23199.
Next, the logarithms of the GDP per capita and its square are instrumented with 10-
year lags using 2SLS methodology. Consistent with this paper’s claim, the inverted-U
relationship between income per capita and income inequality holds only for the sample
with only developing countries (Table 4.5). The turning point for the inverted-U is at ap-
proximately $2500-2700, which is slightly higher than the turning point estimated for all
countries. Kleibergen Paap rk Wald F values again show that the 10-year lags of GDP per
capita and its square are strong instruments21. Among the control variables in Table 4.5,
Government Expenditures/GDP has a significant negative impact on income inequality in
all of the regressions. Hence, according to the estimates, government expenditures have a
redistributive character. Trade openness has a positive but insignificant sign in all of the
regressions. Economic recessions significantly increase the income Gini coefficient only in
the developing countries. Finally, the expenditure Gini coefficient dummy has a signifi-
cant negative sign, which shows that estimating the Gini coefficient through expenditure
inequality gives lower values than the income Gini coefficients.
Next, I estimate the factors leading to the possible inverted-U relationship between GDP
per capita and income inequality using country fixed effects. Table 4.6 presents the results
for the sample including only developing countries. The first two regressions show that
education inequality has a positive impact; however, its coefficient is significant only at the
10% level. Next, I controlled for the impact of the nonagricultural sector’s value added and
20Moreover, all of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM tests in this chapter reject the null hypothesis at 0.1% signifi-
cance level. This shows that the instruments used in this chapter are not underidentified.
21In the first-stage estimations, the square of GDP per capita has a negative sign. This point might seem
counterintuitive at the first sight; however, the 10-year lags of GDP per capita and its square do not have a
negative impact when the influence of the two variables are combined. In the first stages of regressions (3)
and (4) in Table 5, the smallest turning point for GDP per capita is at approximately 30 million $. For the
first stages of (5) and (6), the smallest turning point is $34571. However, Kuwait is the only “developing”
country whose income per capita exceeded $34571.
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employment shares. As expected, the signs for Nonagri Emp, Nonagri VA and Nonagri Gap
are positive, negative and positive at the 5% significance level, respectively. These results
are consistent with the predictions of the previous section that growth in nonagricultural
value added increases income inequality if it cannot create sufficient employment. Hence, in
contrast to the predictions of Kuznets (1955) and Robinson (1976), rising nonagricultural
employment reduces income inequality.
The last two regressions in Table 4.6 also control for the logarithm of GDP per capita
and its square. I controlled these variables to examine whether the effect of the changing
sectoral shares and education inequality on income distribution is an outcome of changing
the GDP per capita. The estimates show that the coefficients for the education Gini,
Nonagri Emp, Nonagri VA and Nonagri Gap variables lose their significance and mostly
significantly decrease when income per capita and its square are controlled22. Moreover,
the signs for GDP per capita and its square significantly support the Kuznets hypothesis,
which shows that income per capita is an important driving force behind the influence of
sectoral shares and education inequality on income inequality.
The relationship between value added and the employment shares of the nonagricultural
sector, education inequality and income inequality might suffer from endogeneity problems.
Therefore, I also instrumented the Nonagri Gap with its 3-year lag and education inequal-
ity’s 10-year lag with its 20-year lag using 2SLS methodology. The dataset for Nonagri
Gap is very discrete, which does not allow us to instrument Nonagri Gap with its further
previous lags.
The last two regressions in Table 4.6 also control for the logarithm of GDP per capita
and its square. I controlled these variables to examine whether the effect of the changing
sectoral shares and education inequality on income distribution is an outcome of changing
the GDP per capita. The estimates show that the coefficients for the education Gini,
Nonagri Emp, Nonagri VA and Nonagri Gap variables lose their significance and mostly
22According to the t-tests, the coefficients in regression (5) for education Gini, Nonagri Emp and Nonagri
VA are significantly smaller at the 1, 5 and 15% significance levels, respectively, than the coefficients in (3).
Similarly, when the coefficients in (4) and (6) are compared, the coefficients in (6) for Nonagri Gap and
education Gini are significantly smaller at the 5 and 20% significance levels, respectively.
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significantly decrease when income per capita and its square are controlled23. Moreover,
the signs for GDP per capita and its square significantly support the Kuznets hypothesis,
which shows that income per capita is an important driving force behind the influence of
sectoral shares and education inequality on income inequality.
The relationship between value added and the employment shares of the nonagricultural
sector, education inequality and income inequality might suffer from endogeneity problems.
Therefore, I also instrumented the Nonagri Gap with its 3-year lag and education inequal-
ity’s 10-year lag with its 20-year lag using 2SLS methodology. The dataset for Nonagri
Gap is very discrete, which does not allow us to instrument Nonagri Gap with its further
previous lags.
Table 4.7 presents results for the dataset including only developing countries. For all
four regressions, the Kleibergen Paap rk Wald F values show that the lags of variables are
strong instruments. The first two regressions show that education inequality significantly
reduces income inequality. The sign for the education Gini coefficient loses its significance
when Nonagri Gap is also controlled. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted
cautiously because the decline in the number of groups might also have reduced the signif-
icance of the education inequality’s coefficients. Last, similar to Table 4.6, the education
Gini coefficient and Nonagri Gap lose their significance when the GDP per capita and its
square are controlled. Moreover, the estimates support the inverted-U relationship between
income per capita and income inequality, which again shows that the income per capita
affects income inequality through the channels of sectoral shares and education inequality.
The regressions on the nonagricultural sector’s value added and employment shares do
not capture the influence of structural changes within the nonagricultural sector. Hence,
the impact of changes in the nonagricultural informal employment and self-employment
are also tested in separate regressions. Charmes (2009) dataset reports observations for
periods rather than exact years. Therefore, for Charmes’s data, I selected the median
23According to the t-tests, the coefficients in regression (5) for education Gini, Nonagri Emp and Nonagri
VA are significantly smaller at the 1, 5 and 15% significance levels, respectively, than the coefficients in (3).
Similarly, when the coefficients in (4) and (6) are compared, the coefficients in (6) for Nonagri Gap and
education Gini are significantly smaller at the 5 and 20% significance levels, respectively.
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years of the periods as observations24. When countries do not have observations of the
Gini coefficient in the median years, I selected the years with Gini coefficients within the
given period and took the nearest to the median of periods. The existence of nonlinear
relationships between informal/self-employment and income inequality is also tested, based
on the concerns discussed in the theoretical section.
Table 4.8 demonstrates that nonagricultural informal employment affects the income
Gini coefficient positively in a linear relationship rather than an inverted-U relationship.
Along with the changing weights of the informal and formal sectors, the higher rates of tax
collection in countries with a larger formal sector might have reduced the inequality, as in
Rosser, Rosser and Ahmed (2000, 2003, 2007). Moreover, similar to the arguments discussed
in the previous chapters, a larger share of informal employment might have reduced the labor
shares in the formal nonagricultural formal sector and contributed negatively to the overall
income inequality.
The rising gap between the nonagricultural sector’s value added and employment shares
has a significant positive effect on income inequality, as in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. More-
over, the Nonagri Gap’s coefficient loses its significance when the GDP per capita and its
square are controlled. The education Gini coefficient is only significant at 10% in one of
the regressions. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted cautiously, as we are left
with only 27 country groups when the education Gini coefficient, Nonagri Gap, and nona-
gricultural informal employment shares are controlled for in the same regressions25. Finally,
the coefficients for informal employment do not change when the GDP per capita and its
square are controlled. Hence, we cannot interpret the GDP per capita’s impact on income
inequality through informal employment merely by using Table 4.8.
Table 4.9 shows the influence of nonagricultural self-employment on income inequal-
ity. In the regressions for self-employment, I use a sample including both developed and
24I selected the years 1975, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 2004 for informal employment and 1975, 1985, 1995 and
2005 for self-employment.
25Indeed, the values of the education Gini coefficient are insignificant even at the 10% level when we run
regressions (4)-(7) using the same observations without controlling for nonagricultural informal employment.
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developing countries due to lack of data for the developing economies26. Nonagricultural
self-employment’s positive impact on income inequality is significant at 5%, when Nonagri
Gap is controlled. However, we cannot observe an inverted-U relationship between self-
employment and income inequality. Similar to the previous estimations, Nonagri Gap has a
significant positive impact. Nevertheless, the influence of education inequality is significant
only at the 10% significance level. Similar to Table 4.9, nonagricultural self-employment’s
coefficient is not significantly different when the GDP per capita and its square and cube
are controlled27,28. Hence, Table 4.9 also cannot suggest anything on regarding the impact
of GDP per capita on income inequality through self-employment. The impact of income
per capita on informal employment and self-employment is examined further in this section.
Next, I tested whether the factors that affect income inequality are influenced by income
per capita. First, income inequality’s effect on Nonagri Gap and its influence on the ratio
between the nonagricultural sector’s value added and employment shares (Nonagri Ratio)
are tested. Due to possible endogeneity problems, I instrumented GDP per capita with
its 10-year lag when the linear effect of income per capita was being tested. Moreover, the
existence of a nonlinear relationship between variables was also considered in the regressions.
Hence, I instrumented GDP per capita and its square with their 10-year lags to test whether
there is an inverted-U relationship between income per capita and Nonagri Emp or between
income per capita and Nonagri Ratio.
According to the estimates in Table 4.10, there is an inverted-U relationship between
income per capita and Nonagri Gap. That is, economic growth increases Nonagri Gap in the
lower income countries and reduces Nonagri Gap in the countries with GDP per capita over
$732-840. This result is consistent with the estimates of Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008); however,
26The number of country groups drops to 23 when nonagricultural self-employment, Nonagri Gap, and
the education Gini coefficient are controlled in the same regression.
27I also control for the cube of GDP per capita, as we use the data for both developed and developing
economies.
28According to the t-test, there is no significant difference between self-employment’s coefficients in re-
gressions (5) and (7).
104
the turning points that I estimated are smaller29 than the ones in either study. However,
the estimates show that rising GDP per capita reduces the nonagricultural sector Nonagri
Ratio linearly, which is different from Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008) and from McMillan and
Rodrik (2012). This result suggests that the per capita incomes in the nonagricultural
and agricultural sectors converge to each other with economic growth. Nevertheless, rising
income per capita in the lower income countries increases Nonagri Gap due to the changing
employment weights of the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors.
Next, I tested the impact of income per capita on the education inequality as in Knight
and Sabot (1983). For this purpose, I again instrumented GDP per capita and its square
with their 10-year lags using 2SLS methodology. The estimates are reported in Table 4.11.
The results suggest an inverted-U relationship between GDP per capita and education in-
equality for developing countries. Hence, economic growth increases education inequality
only in very low-income countries; however, it expands the education frontier in the devel-
oping economies with GDP per capita above $445-576.
Last, I estimate the effect of GDP per capita on nonagricultural informal employment
and self-employment30. Similar to the previous estimations, for Charmes’s data, I used the
median years of the periods as observations. Controlling for other variables, the results
suggest an inverted-U relationship between the informal employment share and per capita
income and between the self-employment share and per capita income (Table 4.12). These
results are consistent with the estimations of Rauch (1993) and Elgin and Oyvat (2013)
that use a relatively smaller dataset of informal/self-employment shares. Nevertheless, the
evidence is weaker for the nonagricultural self-employment rate, as the coefficients for GDP
per capita and its square are only significant at 10% significance level.
29Timmer and Akkus¸ (2008) find that the turning point for the gap between the value added and the
employment shares of the agricultural sector is at approximately $5063-9255.
30Due to data limitations, 2SLS methodology is not implemented in the regressions for nonagricultural
informal employment and nonagricultural self-employment.
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4.3.4 Summary of results
Table 4.13 summarizes the results of the panel regressions. The overall results are con-
sistent with the Kuznets hypothesis. In the very low-income countries, the gap between the
value added and employment shares of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors increases
with economic growth. Moreover, economic growth expands informal employment/self-
employment within the nonagricultural sector and also increases education inequality. These
two processes also increase the income inequality in lower income countries. In countries
with per capita income between $445/576-$1897/2388, economic growth reduces education
inequality; however, income inequality still rises, due partially to the influence of growing
informal employment and self-employment. Hence, urbanization following economic growth
is not itself sufficient to reduce the income inequality in lower income countries. In these
countries, the poverty in the rural sector is merely transmitted to the urban informal sector,
whereas a limited group of households get richer.
In countries with per capita incomes between $1948/2695 - $5131/5283, growing per
capita incomes continue to reduce the gap between nonagricultural and agricultural in-
comes and education inequality. The influence of economic growth through these channels
transcends the impact of growing informal employment on income inequality. Hence, the
income inequality begins to decline at approximately $1948/2695.
Lastly, for per capita incomes between $8982/10277 - $23199/26152, all types of struc-
tural changes listed promote a more egalitarian income distribution. In this phase of growth,
the barriers between different income groups are relieved, which spreads the benefits of eco-
nomic growth to a larger segment of society and reduces income inequality.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter empirically tests the Kuznets hypothesis and examines the factors that
might lead to the Kuznets Curve. The analysis first shows that the Kuznets hypothesis is
valid only for developing economies in which we observe a noticeable trend of urbanization,
expansion of the education frontier and a large share of informal employment. The reasoning
behind the existence of the Kuznets Curve is slightly different from Kuznets’s (1955) own
106
reasoning. The analysis finds that unlike Kuznets’s own argument, the income per capita
in the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors tend to converge following economic growth
even in the lower income developing economies. Nevertheless, increasing the income per
capita still increases income inequality through the urbanization channel due to the changing
population weights effect, as in Robinson (1976) and Anand and Kanbur (1993).
Another important reason behind rising income inequality in the developing countries
is the increasing intrasectoral inequality. During the earlier phases of industrialization,
the shares of informal and subsistence employment in the nonagricultural sector grow,
which also increases overall income inequality. Therefore, urbanization followed by economic
growth does not immediately reduce income inequality. The trend of urbanization possibly
feeds the growth of informal and subsistence employment in the urban sector, which leads
to higher income inequality until the income per capita reaches approximately $1950.
In the latter phases of industrialization, economic growth reduces income inequality as
the labor markets become more homogeneous, the impact of the gap between the nona-
gricultural and agricultural sectors on overall inequality declines, and the informal-formal
and subsistence-modern sector divides shrink. The analysis also finds weak evidence for
the effect of income per capita on income inequality through the education channel. I find
that economic growth raises education inequality in very low-income countries and expands
the education frontier following a turning point. Nevertheless, the evidence for the impact
of education inequality is weaker than of the other mechanisms identified above, and not
significant in all of the regressions.
The Kuznets hypothesis is useful for understanding the general tendencies of the changes
in income distribution in developing economies, which might be crucial for correctly inter-
preting the effects of policies on distribution. Economic growth might lead to structural
changes that would reduce income inequality in the middle and upper-middle income coun-
tries. Nevertheless, policymakers cannot entirely rely on economic growth, as other factors
such as the size of redistributive government expenditures also determine income inequality.
Moreover, the equalizing effects of economic growth on income Gini distribution tend to
disappear as the developing economies converge to a mature economy.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation points to two main conclusions. First, in the second and third chapters
we observed that land inequality and rural poverty are important for the distribution in the
urban sector. Using different types of methodologies - a theoretical model, and an empirical
and a comparative analysis- this dissertation shows that land inequality has an influence on
urban income inequality through its influence on the level of urbanization. It follows that
policymakers should have a broader view as to the importance of agrarian policies. They
should realize that a progressive land reform or any policy favoring small landholders can
also reduce urban income inequality and poverty over the long run. A similar argument
can also be made with respect to labor unions and left-wing opposition parties. These
institutions also should be concerned about agrarian policies, since higher land inequality
leads to overurbanization and creates a larger urban reserve army that would suppress the
bargaining power of the urban working classes.
The second conclusion drawn from this dissertation is that the Kuznets hypothesis is
valid; there is an inverted-U relationship between income per capita and income inequality
with a turning point around $2000-2700. However, the Kuznets hypothesis only holds in
developing economies. Indeed, there are not good reasons to assume that income inequality
will continue to fall in the mature economies once the urban-rural divide starts to disappear
and the share of informal activities is low. This is because income per capita affects income
inequality mainly through the shifts in the sectoral employment shares. Economic develop-
ment affects the urban-rural gaps and the share of informal activities that are determinant
on the overall income inequality.
The Kuznets hypothesis can be important for correctly interpreting the influence of
different policies on income inequality. A middle income country achieving actual growth
close to its potential growth rate might be missing an important opportunity if its income
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inequality is not falling in time. Moreover, the positive effects of rising GDP per capita
will not persist forever; they will disappear as the country starts to converge to a mature
economy.
The evidence for the impact of education inequality on overall income inequality is
relatively weak compared to other factors discussed in this dissertation. The empirical
evidence in the third chapter suggests that land inequality is an important factor that
affects the education gaps in Turkey, Korea and Brazil. The third chapter also shows that
the unusually equitable access to education kept income inequality in Korea at a lower
level. However, Korea is a case in which the education frontier expanded at exceptional
speed following the land reform. The level of education inequality in Korea was lower
than the education inequality in Turkey and Brazil even during 1960s and 1970s, when
Korea’s income per capita was lower. On the other hand, the empirical analysis in the
second chapter cannot prove that the education inequality is determinant on the cross-
country differences of income inequality. The relationship between education and income
inequalities is mostly positive for the majority of estimates; however, the sign for education
inequality is significant at 10% in only one of the regressions.
Similarly, the empirical analysis in the fourth chapter suggests that the impact of ed-
ucation inequality is relatively weaker than the impacts of sectoral shares and informal
employment. The effect of education inequality on income inequality is significant at the
5% level only in some of the regressions; in others it only is significant at the 10% level
or not at all. This is consistent with Young’s (2013) estimates that education inequality
constitutes only 19% of overall inequality in developing economies on average. According to
Young, urban-rural gaps and other factors that influence income inequality within urban and
rural sectors are more important factors than education inequality. Hence, the education
channel might be valid for explaining both land inequality’s and income per capita’s impact
on income inequality. However, factors that influence wage-bargaining and changes in the
sectoral shares and informal employment are more important mechanisms for determining
the income inequality in the developing economies.
The results in this dissertation can be improved through different approaches and new
datasets. Empirical studies using a micro dataset of households might also support this
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dissertation by investigating how land inequality in a region influences the migration be-
havior or individuals’ chances of reaching education. Moreover, wider datasets on income
Gini coefficients, employment and value added shares of urban and rural sectors; informal
employment share, or an education inequality dataset with a urban-rural divide could sig-
nificantly improve the robustness of the results in the fourth chapter. Hence, there is still
space for further examination on the structural factors determining income inequality in
developing economies.
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Table 2.1. Dataset summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Land Gini Coefficient 0.61 0.16 0.27 0.92
Overall Income/Expenditure Gini Coefficient 0.41 0.10 0.24 0.70
Urban Income/Expenditure Gini Coefficient 0.46 0.08 0.30 0.67
Level of Urbanization 0.59 0.23 0.13 0.99
GDP per capita (1000 USD) 12.69 13.57 0.23 49.97
Trade Openness 0.78 0.36 0.23 1.83
Women’s Nonagri Labor Participation Rate 0.39 0.12 0.10 0.52
Education Gini Coefficient 0.36 0.17 0.11 0.83
Polity IV Index 4.26 6.13 -10.00 10.00
Voice and Accountability Index -0.03 0.96 -1.74 1.61
Land Area (000’s) 956.4 1924.3 0.7 9327.5
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Table 2.3. The impact of land inequality from 1960’s on the recent overall income inequal-
ity (OLS regressions - dependent var: Overall income Gini coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land Gini (1960) 0.195* 0.151* 0.170* 0.206* 0.130** 0.142*
(0.018) (0.051) (0.054) (0.070) (0.058) (0.051)
Expenditure 0.010 -0.072* -0.085* -0.017 -0.086* -0.094*
(0.064) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
Log GDP 0.029 0.109* 0.017 0.082*
(0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024)
(Log GDP )2 -0.021* -0.041* -0.020* -0.037*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Openness 0.012 -0.010
(0.022) (0.015)
Women 0.136*** 0.157***
(0.073) (0.092)
Southern Africa 0.126* 0.180* 0.119* 0.171*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Education Gini (2000) 0.134*** -0.032 -0.048
(0.069) (0.072) (0.104)
Constant 0.284* 0.393* 0.259* 0.236* 0.442* 0.342*
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.073) (0.087)
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.52 0.76 0.10 0.57 0.80
Observations 99 99 64 92 92 62
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4. The impact of land inequality from 1960’s on the recent overall income inequal-
ity when institutions are controlled - (OLS regressions - dependent var: Overall income Gini
coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land Gini (1960) 0.173* 0.150* 0.170* 0.195* 0.145* 0.157*
(0.060) (0.051) (0.055) (0.064) (0.052) (0.051)
Expenditure -0.037*** -0.073* -0.088* 0.009 -0.064** -0.080*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
Log GDP 0.029 0.108* 0.031*** 0.099*
(0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025)
(Log GDP )2 -0.020* -0.041* -0.022* -0.040*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Openness 0.012 0.001
(0.022) (0.016)
Women 0.110 0.050
(0.111) (0.097)
Southern Africa 0.127* 0.178* 0.125* 0.179*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
Voice and Acc. (2000) -0.040* -0.002 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
Polity IV (2000) -0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.318* 0.392* 0.275* 0.288* 0.387* 0.303*
(0.042) (0.046) (0.064) (0.045) (0.046) (0.052)
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.51 0.76 0.07 0.53 0.79
Observations 99 99 64 97 97 63
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5. The impact of land inequality from 1960’s on the recent level of urbanization -
(OLS regressions - dependent var: Level of urbanization in 2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land Gini (1960) 0.446* 0.224** 0.245** 0.246**
(0.142) (0.095) (0.101) (0.099)
Log GDP 0.120* 0.131* 0.131*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Openness 0.002 0.018
(0.047) (0.054)
Log Area 0.008
(0.011)
Constant 0.323* 0.243* 0.207* 0.097
(0.089) (0.056) (0.074) (0.167)
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.56 0.62 0.62
Observations 99 99 87 87
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6. The impact of urbanization on the recent overall income inequality - (IV (2SLS)
regressions - dependent var: Overall income Gini coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Urbanization) 0.051*** 0.074** 0.054** 0.075** 0.073**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
Expenditure -0.099* -0.098* -0.121* -0.098* -0.088*
(0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Log GDP 0.030 0.025 0.005 0.024 0.026
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030)
(Log GDP )2 -0.028* -0.027* -0.026* -0.027* -0.028*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Openness 0.021 0.008 -0.006 0.008 -0.001
(0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
Southern Africa 0.135* 0.117* 0.134* 0.135*
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
Education Gini (2000) -0.102
(0.072)
Voice and Acc. (2000) 0.002
(0.010)
Polity IV (2000) 0.002
(0.001)
Constant 0.321* 0.229** 0.400* 0.229** 0.230**
(0.111) (0.108) (0.100) (0.109) (0.110)
First stage for log(urbanization)
Log(Urbanization) - 1990 0.829* 0.827* 0.808* 0.828* 0.826*
(0.066) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F values 157.35 135.67 112.34 132.88 133.10
Observations 87 87 82 87 85
Ordinary least squares
Log(Urbanization) 0.054*** 0.075** 0.052*** 0.075** 0.070**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032)
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for a
15% maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 20% maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 25% maximal IV size.
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Table 3.1. The Gini coefficient values for Brazil
urban rural total urban rural total
1960 0.50 1999 0.63 0.58 0.64
1970 0.54 2001 0.63 0.58 0.64
1981 0.57 2002 0.62 0.55 0.63
1983 0.58 2003 0.61 0.56 0.62
1984 0.58 2004 0.60 0.55 0.61
1985 0.59 2005 0.60 0.54 0.61
1986 0.58 2006 0.60 0.54 0.61
1987 0.59 2007 0.58 0.56 0.59
1988 0.61 2008 0.59 0.53 0.59
1989 0.61 0.57 0.63 2009 0.57 0.52 0.58
1990 0.61 0.55 0.63 2011 0.55 0.53 0.56
1993 0.60 0.59 0.62 2012 0.56 0.52 0.57
1996 0.62 0.58 0.64
Sources: Fox (1983), UNU-WIDER (2008), CEPAL (2013)
Table 3.2. Agrarian structure of Brazil (1950-60)
% value of
% of % of agricultural % labor
farms land product employed
Minifundios 22.5 0.5 3 11
Family farms 39.1 6.0 18 26
Medium sized farms 34.0 34.0 43 42
Latifundios 4.7 59.5 36 21
Sources: Furtado (1976). The table was also published in Barraclough and Domike (1966), which allowed
for corrections to Furtado’s table.
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Table 3.4. The Gini coefficient values for Korea (1965 - 2010)
non-agricultural agricultural total
1965 0.417 0.285 0.344
1970 0.346 0.295 0.332
1976 0.412 0.337 0.391
1982 0.371 0.306 0.357
1988 0.350 0.290 0.336
1990 0.324 0.299 0.323
1993 0.310 0.306 0.310
1995 0.335
1996 0.326
1997 0.317
1998 0.369
2004 0.316
2006 0.306
2007 0.312
2008 0.314
2009 0.314
2010 0.310
Sources: Choo (1985); Kwack and Lee (2007); UNU-WIDER (2008); Kim (2011)
Table 3.5. The agrarian structure in Korea before and after land reform
Tenure category 1945 1954
Full owner 13.8 50.4
Part owner 34.7 39.3
Full tenant 48.8 7.2
Other 2.7 3.1
Source: Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz (2002)
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Table 3.6. The Gini coefficient values for Turkey (1968-2012)
urban rural total
1968 0.50
1973 0.46
1987 0.44 0.42 0.43
1994 0.51 0.41 0.49
2002 0.44 0.42 0.44
2003 0.42 0.39 0.42
2004 0.39 0.37 0.40
2005 0.38 0.37 0.38
2006 0.42 0.41 0.43
2007 0.39 0.38 0.41
2008 0.40 0.38 0.41
2009 0.41 0.38 0.42
2010 0.39 0.38 0.40
2011 0.39 0.39 0.40
2012 0.39 0.38 0.40
Sources: Bulutay, Timur and Ersel (1971), SPO (1976), SIS(1990), SIS(1996), TUIK (2013) Note: Bulutay,
Timur and Ersel (1971) and SPO (1976)’s estimates of total and rural Gini coefficients for 1968 and 1973 are
not reported, as the estimation methods used to calculate rural income Gini coefficients are not consistent
with the standard methodology. Unlike the remaining inequality data on Turkey, rural income inequality
values in these studies do not rely on household surveys. They are estimated using the land distribution in
agricultural surveys.
Table 3.7. Land distribution in Turkey (1950-2002)
1950 1970 1991 2001
Midnorth 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.54
Aegean 0.76 0.54 0.51 0.5
Marmara 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.52
Mediterranean 0.93 0.64 0.6 0.61
Northeast 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.5
Southeast 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.66
Black Sea 0.47 0.53 0.48 0.51
Mideast 0.66 0.57 0.56 0.52
Midsouth 0.74 0.59 0.41 0.58
Turkey 0.73 0.62 0.62 0.62
Source: Ko¨ymen and O¨ztu¨rkcan (1999), U¨nal (2012) Note: The land Gini coefficient values indicate the land
holding distribution for operational units. U¨nal (2012) finds that the land ownership Gini in 2002 is 0.65,
which is slightly higher than landholding Gini for rural Turkey.
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Table 3.9. Average years of schooling in Turkey, Brazil and Korea
Turkey Brazil Korea
Female Total Female Total Female Total
1950 0.633 1.115 1.347 1.499 3.547 4.506
1955 0.799 1.39 1.593 1.758 4.005 5.127
1960 1.037 1.768 1.887 2.054 3.023 4.338
1965 1.225 2.087 2.233 2.377 4.27 5.471
1970 1.483 2.433 2.659 2.811 5.182 6.343
1975 2.046 2.925 2.489 2.57 6.223 7.277
1980 2.55 3.554 2.733 2.768 7.263 8.292
1985 3.526 4.579 3.803 3.702 8.138 9.145
1990 3.944 5.005 4.65 4.463 8.212 9.348
1995 4.352 5.447 5.445 5.35 9.75 10.566
2000 5.084 6.08 6.546 6.411 10.283 11.055
2005 5.551 6.474 7.262 7.168 10.824 11.467
2010 6.149 7.016 7.69 7.539 11.313 11.848
Source: Barro and Lee (2012)
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Table 3.11. Inequality of Education Opportunity in Korea, Turkey and Brazil based on
PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) subject test scores (2006)
Korea Turkey Brazil
Reading 0.214 0.251 0.268
Mathematics 0.209 0.241 0.318
Science 0.173 0.249 0.286
Contribution of durables on IOp in Math scores 0.014 0.045 0.184
Source: Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)
Table 3.12. The impact of land Gini coefficient on urbanization (1960-2010) - (OLS
regressions - dependent var: Level of urbanization(%))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) 20.064*** 15.487***
(0.936) (1.430)
Log(K/L) 14.460*** 14.727***
(0.916) (0.969)
Korea -0.915 -7.463***
(1.349) (1.229)
Brazil 20.528*** 13.792***
(1.186) (1.932)
Land Gini 60.494*** 47.779***
(6.820) (7.356)
Trade openness 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.387*** 0.208***
(0.045) (0.055) (0.072) (0.068)
Constant -127.769*** -92.873*** -123.478*** -121.842***
(7.413) (7.501) (9.514) (6.229)
Adj. R-squared 0.90 0.86 0.81 0.85
Observations 153 140 153 140
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 3.14. The impact of land Gini coefficient on urbanization (1960-2010) - (2SLS-IV
regressions - dependent var: Level of urbanization(%))
(1) (2)
Log(K/L) 17.855*** 17.841***
(1.029) (1.160)
Korea -10.212***
(1.530)
Brazil 14.694***
(2.112)
Land Gini 60.442***
(9.204)
Trade openness 0.150*** 0.197***
(0.058) (0.082)
Constant -124.824*** -160.492***
(9.540) (10.910)
First stage for log(K/L)
Log(K/L) - 10y lag 0.718*** 0.780***
(0.028) (0.027)
Kleibergen-Paap LM (p-values) 0.0000 0.0000
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F values 654.662 860.274
Observations 110 110
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for a
15% maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 20% maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 25% maximal IV size.
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Table 3.15. The impact of land Gini coefficient on the education inequality (1960-2010) -
(2SLS-IV regressions - dependent variables: Overall education Gini coefficient, Education
Gini coefficient for male)
Education Gini Education Gini (male)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) 0.133*** 0.057*** 0.102*** -0.033
(0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023)
Korea -0.094*** -0.081***
(0.023) (0.019)
Brazil 0.152*** 0.220***
(0.026) (0.026)
Land Gini 0.462*** 0.456***
(0.078) (0.097)
Trade openness -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urbanization -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.027 0.201* 0.055 0.670***
(0.163) (0.118) (0.157) (0.169)
First stage for urbanization
Agglomeration - 10y lag 1.967*** 1.062*** 1.967*** 1.062***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.164) (0.165)
Kleibergen-Paap LM (p-value) 0.0018 0.0001 0.0018 0.0001
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F value 143.194 41.54 143.194 41.54
Observations 27 27 27 27
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values are 16.38 for 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for 15%
maximal IV size 6.66, for 20% maximal IV size, 5.53 for 25% maximal IV size.
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Table 3.16. The impact of the land Gini coefficient on urban and overall income in-
equality (1960-2010) - (OLS regressions - dependent vars: Overall and Urban Income Gini
coefficients)
Overall Income Gini Urban Income Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) 0.598** 0.205 0.736** 0.220
(0.269) (0.258) (0.293) (0.387)
(Log GDP )2 -0.034** -0.012 -0.046** -0.019
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023)
Korea -0.058*** -0.062***
(0.018) (0.017)
Brazil 0.180*** 0.156***
(0.016) (0.013)
Land Gini 0.569*** 0.678***
(0.054) (0.118)
Trade openness 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.193* -0.703 -2.487* -0.426
(1.229) (1.139) (1.261) (1.611)
Adj. R-squared 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.91
Observations 48 48 31 31
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 3.17. The impact education inequality and level of urbanization on urban and
overall income inequality (1960-2010) - (OLS regressions - dependent vars: Overall and
Urban Income Gini coefficients)
Overall Income Gini Urban Income Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) -1.509*** -1.052 -1.761 -0.068
(0.416) (0.920) (1.878) (2.217)
(Log GDP )2 0.074*** 0.052 0.088 -0.005
(0.022) (0.048) (0.105) (0.118)
Trade openness 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Urbanization 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Education Gini - 10y lag 0.850*** 1.182**
(0.120) (0.578)
Education Gini (male) - 10y lag 0.803*** 0.757***
(0.112) (0.252)
Gender education ratio - 10y lag -0.142 -0.218
(0.164) (0.266)
Constant 6.802*** 4.723 7.580 0.446
(2.044) (4.300) (7.971) (10.215)
First stage for urbanization
Agglomeration - 20y lag 1.526*** 1.039*** 1.111*** 0.519**
(0.087) (0.127) (0.158) (0.233)
Education Gini - 20y lag 43.326*** -7.906
(10.975) (21.898)
Education Gini (male) - 20y lag 30.024*** 43.811*
(7.472) (22.987)
First stage for education Gini - 10y lag
Agglomeration - 20y lag -0.002 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001)
Education Gini - 20y lag 0.604*** 0.605***
(0.001) (0.183)
First stage for education Gini (male) - 10y lag
Agglomeration - 20y lag 0.001 -0.006**
(0.001) (0.002)
Education Gini (male) - 20y lag 0.568*** 0.780**
(0.130) (0.332)
Kleibergen-Paap LM (p-value) 0.0086 0.0037 0.0281 0.0358
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F value 14.595 12.064 2.985 1.688
Observations 43 43 26 26
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values are 7.03 for 10% maximal IV size, 4.58 for 15%
maximal IV size 3.95, for 20% maximal IV size, 3.63 for 25% maximal IV size.
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Table 4.1. Average yearly rates of urbanization in developed and developing economies
for different per capita income groups
Developing Developed
$0-2500 $2500-5000 $5000-10000 $10000 < All
1980s 0.447 0.636 0.720 0.292 0.547 0.272
1990s 0.353 0.537 0.538 0.621 0.448 0.190
2000s 0.423 0.351 0.407 0.390 0.404 0.234
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Penn World Tables 7.1 (2013)
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Table 4.4. Point change in the education Gini coefficient in developed and developing
economies for different per capita income groups
Developing Developed
$0-2500 $2500-5000 $5000-10000 $10000 < All
1980s -0.068 -0.074 -0.059 -0.031 -0.062 0.003
1990s -0.061 -0.082 -0.055 -0.075 -0.065 -0.031
2000s -0.069 -0.056 -0.053 -0.054 -0.060 -0.033
Sources: Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal (2012), Penn World Tables 7.1 (2013)
133
Table 4.5. The impact of per capita income on income inequality: Only developing coun-
tries and all countries. (Fixed Effects IV regressions (2SLS) - Dependent Variable: Income
Gini coefficient)
All countries Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expenditure -6.622*** -6.326*** -6.069*** -5.782*** -7.391*** -7.222***
(1.258) (1.214) (1.282) (1.235) (1.434) (1.386)
Log(GDP ) 215.573*** 215.593*** -2.857 0.663 31.023*** 32.373***
(42.463) (41.888) (4.286) (4.691) (12.069) (12.041)
(Log(GDP ))2 -24.972*** -24.810*** 0.091 -0.128 -1.964*** -2.061***
(4.812) (4.720) (0.230) (0.251) (0.762) (0.759)
(Log(GDP ))3 0.945*** 0.932***
(0.180) (0.176)
Log(Trade openness) 0.618 0.583 1.055 0.984 0.079 0.350
(0.739) (0.779) (0.774) (0.814) (1.047) (1.078)
Government Exp/GDP -0.444*** -0.450*** -0.277**
(0.105) (0.104) (0.121)
Recession 0.321 0.366 0.716***
(0.272) (0.276) (0.396)
First-stage for Log(GDP )
Log(GDP ) - 10y lag 5.399*** 5.637*** 1.252*** 1.455*** 2.775*** 2.795***
(1.308) (1.185) (0.170) (0.170) (0.332) (0.306)
(Log(GDP ))2 - 10y lag -0.520*** -0.538*** -0.030*** -0.042*** -0.133*** -0.133***
(0.155) (0.140) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.019)
(Log(GDP ))3 - 10y lag 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
First-stage for (Log(GDP ))2
Log(GDP ) - 10y lag 69.203*** 73.676*** 7.521*** 11.290*** 33.916*** 34.265***
(21.745) (19.728) (2.755) (2.730) (5.484) (5.025)
(Log(GDP ))2 - 10y lag -6.968*** -7.294*** 0.333** 0.103 -1.458*** -1.471***
(2.616) (2.360) (0.146) (0.148) (0.353) (0.323)
(Log(GDP ))3 - 10y lag 0.284*** 0.288***
(0.103) (0.093)
First-stage for (Log(GDP ))3
Log(GDP ) - 10y lag 753.973*** 818.758***
(285.975) (262.508)
(Log(GDP ))2 - 10y lag -84.223** -89.008***
(34.728) (31.619)
(Log(GDP ))3 - 10y lag 3.884*** 3.950***
(1.376) (1.248)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 43.59 43.43 224.52 225.93 26.44 31.83
Wald F values
Turning Points 1948, 1967, 2695 2572
23199 26152
No. of Observations 1021 974 1021 974 502 498
No. of Groups 95 92 95 92 70 69
Notes: All panel regressions include a country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered by country.
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. The developing countries in the regressions
are countries that are not classified as having a very high human development level in the 2010 HDI rankings.
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Table 4.6. The impact of education inequality, nonagricultural sector’s value added and
employment shares on income inequality: Only developing countries (Fixed Effects regres-
sions - Dependent Variable: Income Gini coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expenditure -5.627** -5.503** 1.942*** 2.247*** 1.412 1.118
(2.274) (2.247) (0.607) (0.601) (1.135) (0.994)
Education Gini - 10y lag 9.922* 9.901* 7.395 3.931 2.138 0.417
(5.844) (5.915) (7.410) (6.089) (7.052) (6.095)
Nonagri VA 0.245** 0.187
(0.102) (0.113)
Nonagri Emp -0.155** -0.099
(0.075) (0.070)
Nonagri Gap 0.171*** 0.122**
(0.059) (0.048)
Log(Trade openness) 1.094 1.183 1.806 1.958 1.638 1.584
(1.441) (1.453) (2.030) (1.739) (2.215) (2.130)
Government Exp/GDP -0.214 -0.035 -0.066 -0.274 -0.286
(0.135) (0.223) (0.239) (0.233) (0.251)
Recession 0.599 0.268 0.301 0.299 0.320
(0.416) (0.459) (0.430) (0.452) (0.433)
Log(GDP ) 42.993*** 48.382***
(15.079) (17.221)
(Log(GDP ))2 -2.658*** -2.924***
(0.865) (0.984)
Constant 39.640*** 40.930*** 27.305** 36.052*** -138.566** -156.647**
(7.492) (7.197) (11.601) (9.185) (61.986) (68.840)
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.15
No. of Observations 495 491 273 273 273 273
No. of Groups 71 70 51 51 51 51
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively. The developing countries in the regressions are countries that are not classified as having
a very high human development level in the 2010 HDI rankings.
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Table 4.7. The impact of education inequality and nonagricultural sectors’ value added-
employment gap on income inequality: Only developing countries (Fixed Effects IV regres-
sions (2SLS) - Dependent Variable: Income Gini coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditure -6.098*** -5.853*** 2.630** 1.012
(1.554) (1.516) (1.311) (1.578)
Education Gini - 10y lag 9.406** 10.004** 10.375* 8.658
(4.220) (4.288) (5.965) (8.685)
Nonagri Gap 0.244*** 0.149
(0.085) (0.091)
Log(Trade openness) 0.977 1.118 2.327* 1.710
(0.815) (0.817) (1.226) (1.279)
Government Exp/GDP -0.196* -0.228 -0.439**
(0.106) (0.153) (0.174)
Recession 0.576 0.211 0.154
(0.398) (0.434) (0.428)
Log(GDP ) 52.145***
(15.254)
(Log(GDP ))2 -3.100***
(0.892)
First-stage for Education Gini - 10y lag
Education Gini - 20y lag 0.891*** 0.890*** 0.716*** 0.653***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.072) (0.112)
Nonagri Gap - 3y lag 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
First-stage for Nonagri Gap
Education Gini - 20y lag -4.946 -14.200**
(4.913) (5.841)
Nonagri Gap - 3y lag 0.632*** 0.571***
(0.080) (0.075)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F values 426.31 446.54 25.73 30.29
No. of Observations 467 463 220 220
No. of Groups 65 64 27 27
Notes: All panel regressions include a country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered by country.
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values
are 16.38 for a 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 15% maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 20% maximal IV size, and
5.53 for 25% maximal IV size for (1) and (2); 7.03 for a 10% maximal IV size, 4.58 for a 15% maximal IV
size, 3.95 for a 20% maximal IV size, and 3.63 for 25% maximal IV size for (3) and (4). The developing
countries in the regressions are countries that are not classified as having a very high human development
level in the 2010 HDI rankings.
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Table 4.11. The impact of per capita income on education inequality: Only develop-
ing countries (Fixed Effects IV (2SLS) regressions - Dependent Variable: Education Gini
coefficient)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) -0.207*** -0.190*** 0.720*** 0.792***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.161) (0.152)
(Log(GDP ))2 -0.059*** -0.062***
(0.010) (0.010)
Log(Trade openness) -0.027* -0.031*
(0.015) (0.013)
Government Exp./GDP -0.002* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
First-stage for Log(GDP )
Log(GDP ) 0.777*** 0.704*** 1.351*** 1.474***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.475) (0.313)
(Log(GDP ))2 -0.038 -0.051**
(0.030) (0.020)
First-stage for (Log(GDP ))2
Log(GDP ) 11.835* 13.430***
(6.836) (4.745)
(Log(GDP ))2 0.024 -0.154
(0.436) (0.306)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F values 475.22 557.49 31.06 64.92
Turning Points 445 576
No. of Observations 696 642 696 642
No. of Groups 72 70 72 70
Notes: All panel regressions include a country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered by country.
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID critical test values
are 16.38 for a 10% maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 15% maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 20% maximal IV size, and
5.53 for 25% maximal IV size for (1) and (2); 7.03 for a 10% maximal IV size, 4.58 for a 15% maximal IV
size, 3.95 for a 20% maximal IV size, and 3.63 for 25% maximal IV size for (3) and (4). The developing
countries in the regressions are countries that are not classified as having a very high human development
level in the 2010 HDI rankings.
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Table 4.12. The impact of GDP per capita on nonagricultural informal employment
and nonagricultural self-employment: Only developing countries (Fixed effects regressions -
Dependent Variables: Nonagricultural informal and nonagricultural self-employment rates)
Informal Self-Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(GDP ) 129.734** 130.307** 27.209* 25.385*
(61.187) (63.648) (16.392) (15.083)
(Log(GDP ))2 -7.593** -7.601** -1.466* -1.394*
(3.542) (3.720) (0.862) (0.797)
Log (Trade openness) 1.533 1.319 4.816* 3.747
(5.129) (5.189) (2.677) (2.678)
Government Exp./GDP 0.115 -0.429
(0.637) (0.331)
Recession 0.051 -0.436
(2.015) (1.297)
Constant -495.027* -499.446** -113.561 -95.021
(251.970) (260.164) (77.529) (72.746)
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10
Turning Point 5131 5283 10277 8982
No. of Observations 115 115 238 230
No. of Groups 50 50 89 86
Notes: All panel regressions include a country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered by country.
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 4.13. Summary of estimates: Impact of income per capita on different variables in
developing countries
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Figure 2.1. Relationship between land inequality in the 1960s and income inequality today
(Gini coefficients for 62 countries, corr = 0.48)
Note: See Appendix A for the data sources
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Figure 2.2. Relationship between land inequality in the 1960s and income inequality today
- Southern African countries excluded (Gini coefficients for 60 countries, corr = 0.58)
Note: See Appendix A for the data sources
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Figure 2.3. The possible impacts of higher land inequality on income inequality
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Figure 2.4. The impact of a fall in peasant income on the urban capitalist wages
Figure 2.5. The impact of declining peasant income on urban inequality
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Figure 2.6. The impact of rising land concentration on urban inequality
Figure 3.1. Average years of schooling in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1920-2010)
Sources: Morrisson and Murtin (2010); Godo (2011)
Note: The pre-1942 data reflect average years of schooling in Korea as a whole, whereas the post-1955 data
only indicate the average years of schooling in South Korea. The data used here are slightly different from
Barro and Lee (2012)’s data, which are used in the remainder of the paper.
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Figure 3.2. GDP per capita (PPP, $) in Turkey, Korea and Brazil (1960-2010)
Source: Penn World Table 7.1(2013)
Figure 3.3. Education Gini coefficients in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1960-2010)
Source: Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012)
Note: Education Gini coefficients measure inequalities in years of schooling.
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Figure 3.4. Education Gini coefficients and GDP per capita ($, PPP) in Korea, Turkey
and Brazil (1960-2010)
Sources: Penn World Table 7.1, Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012)
Note: GDP per capita values are filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Educational Gini coefficients
measure inequalities in years of schooling.
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Figure 3.5. Number of teachers in primary education per 100 students and land inequality
in Turkey’s 81 provinces
Source: Turkstat (2013)
Note: Land Gini coefficients are the author’s calculations based on land size data from Turkstat (2013). The
first eight years of education are classified as primary education.
Figure 3.6. Number of teachers in secondary education per 100 students and land inequal-
ity in Turkey’s 81 provinces
Source: Turkstat (2013)
Note: Land Gini coefficients are the author’s calculations based on land size data from Turkstat (2013).
Grades 9-12 are classified as secondary education.
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Figure 3.7. Education Gini coefficients for male in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1960-2010)
Source: Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012)
Note: Education Gini coefficients measure inequalities in years of schooling.
Figure 3.8. Public Education Expenditures/GDP (%) in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1979-
2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013); Turkey’s 2008-2010 data come from the author’s calculations
based on Bumko (2013) and Turkstat (2013)
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Figure 3.9. Levels of urbanization and education Gini coefficients in Korea, Turkey and
Brazil (1960-2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012)
Note: Urban population refers to individuals living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices.
Education Gini coefficients measure inequalities in years of schooling.
Figure 3.10. Levels of urbanization and education Gini coefficients in Korea, Turkey and
Brazil (1960-2010, males only)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012)
Note: Urban population refers to individuals living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices.
Education Gini coefficients measure inequalities in years of schooling.
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Figure 3.11. Education expenditures per capita and average years of schooling in Korea,
Turkey and Brazil (1970-2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Barro and Lee (2012), Penn World Table 7.1(2013)
Note: Education expenditures per capita are calculated as Education as a Share of GDP*GDP per capita
($, PPP)
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Figure 3.12. Education expenditures per capita and education Gini coefficients in Korea,
Turkey and Brazil (1970-2010, males only)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012), Penn World
Table 7.1 (2013)
Note: Education expenditures per capita is calculated as Education Share of GDP*GDP per capita ($,
PPP). Education Gini coefficients measure inequalities in years of schooling.
Figure 3.13. The level of urbanization (%) in Turkey, Korea and Brazil (1960-2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Turkstat(2013)
Note: Urban population refers to individuals living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices.
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Figure 3.14. GDP per capita (PPP, $) and level of urbanization (%) in Turkey, Korea
and Brazil (1960-2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Turkstat(2013), Penn World Table 7.1(2013)
Note: Urban population refers to individuals living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices.
GDP per capita values are filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Figure 3.15. GDP per capita (PPP, $) and level of urbanization (%) in Turkey and Brazil
(1960-2010)
Sources: World Development Indicators (2013), Turkstat(2013), Penn World Table 7.1(2013)
Note: Urban population refers to people individuals living in urban areas as defined by national statistical
offices. GDP per capita values are filtered by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Figure 3.16. Ratio of prices between goods in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors
(terms of trade) in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1992=100)
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Center 10-Sector Database (2007), Boratav (1988, 2009)
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Figure 3.17. Capital Stock/Labor ratio in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1963-2010)
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Extended Penn World Tables 4.0 (Marquetti and Foley, 2012)
Figure 3.18. Capital/Value added ratio in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1963-2010)
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Extended Penn World Tables 4.0 (Marquetti and Foley, 2012)
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Figure 3.19. Nonagricultural share of informal employment in Turkey and Brazil (1960-
2012)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on Turkstat (2013) and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (2013)
Note: Informal employment is measured as the share of unregistered employment in total employment.
Figure 3.20. Nonagricultural share of vulnerable employment (self-employed+unpaid fam-
ily workers) in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1988-2010)
Sources: Author’s calculators based on the Korea Statistical Information Service (2013), Turkstat (2013),
Cepal (2013) and Heintz (2008)
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Figure 3.21. The employment share of the services sector and GDP per capita ($, PPP)
in Korea, Turkey and Brazil (1980-2010)
Sources: Penn World Table 7.1(2013), World Development Indicators (2013)
Figure 3.22. Part-time employment rate (%) for Korea, Turkey and Brazil (all individuals
over age 15)
Source: ILO(2013)
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Figure 3.23. Part-time employment rate (%) for Korea, Turkey and Brazil (males over
age 24)
Source: ILO(2013)
Figure 4.1. Change in inequality in the Kuznets Process
Source: Anand and Kanbur (1993)
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Figure 4.2. The impact of urban sector enrichment and enlargement on the overall income
inequality
Figure 4.3. Average education Gini coefficients in different groups of countries (1960-2010)
Source: Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal (2012)
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APPENDIX A
THE DATASETS ON URBAN AND OVERALL
INCOME/EXPENDITURE GINI COEFFICIENTS AND LAND GINI
COEFFICIENTS
Table A.1. Urban income/expenditure Gini coefficients
Year Urban Gini Source E/I
Algeria 1995 0.350 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Argentina 2010 0.449 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Austria 0
Australia 0
Bahrain 0
Bangladesh 2005 0.347 Khan (2005) 1
Belgium 0
Bolivia 2007 0.499 CEPAL(2011) 0
Botswana 2001/02 0.500 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Brazil 2009 0.569 CEPAL(2011) 0
Cameroon 2001 0.406 IMF(2003) 0
Canada 0
Central African Republic 2003 0.420 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Chad 0
Chile 2009 0.524 CEPAL(2011) 0
China 2008 0.355 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Colombia 2009 0.555 CEPAL(2011) 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004/05 0.400 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Congo, Rep. 0
Costa Rica 2009 0.494 CEPAL(2011) 0
Cote d’Ivoire 2008 0.440 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Denmark 0
Dominican Republic 2009 0.585 CEPAL(2011) 0
Ecuador 2009 0.485 CEPAL(2011) 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.1.(cont.) Urban income/expenditure Gini coefficients
Year Urban Gini Source E/I
El Salvador 0
Ethiopia 2004/05 0.440 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Finland 0
France 0
Gabon 0
Germany 0
Ghana 1998 0.600 UN-HABITAT(2010b) 0
Greece 0
Guatemala 2006 0.547 CEPAL(2011) 0
Guinea-Bissau 0
Haiti 2000 0.574 Pedersen and Lockwood (2001) 1
Honduras 2009 0.469 CEPAL(2011) 0
India 2009/10 0.393 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Indonesia 2011 0.422 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2004 0.4 Salehi-Isfahani(2009) 1
Iraq 0
Ireland 0
Israel 0
Italy 0
Jamaica 0
Japan 0
Jordan 1992 0.435 UNU-Wider(2008) 1
Kenya 2006 0.450 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Korea, Rep. 0
Kuwait 0
Lebanon 0
Lesotho 1991 0.580 Eastwood and Lipton (2004) 0
Liberia 0
Madagascar 0
Malawi 1998 0.520 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Malaysia 1999 0.420 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Mali 0
Mexico 2008 0.487 CEPAL(2011) 0
Morocco 1998 0.380 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Mozambique 2002/03 0.480 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Nepal 2003/04 0.440 Sharma (2010) 0
Netherlands 0
New Zealand 0
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.1.(cont.) Urban income/expenditure Gini coefficients
Year Urban Gini Source E/I
Nicaragua 2005 0.500 CEPAL(2011) 0
Niger 0
Nigeria 2006 0.580 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Norway 0
Pakistan 2004 0.340 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Panama 2009 0.475 CEPAL(2011) 0
Paraguay 2007 0.480 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Peru 2009 0.422 CEPAL(2011) 0
Philippines 2003 0.450 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Poland 2008 0.300 Brzezinski and Kostro (2010) 0
Portugal 0
Puerto Rico 0
Saudi Arabia 0
Senegal 2001/02 0.380 UN-HABITAT(2010b) 1
Sierra Leone 2002 0.390 UN-HABITAT(2010b) 1
South Africa 2008 0.670 Leibbrandt et. al.(2010) 0
Spain 0
Sri Lanka 2006/07 0.550 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Sudan 0
Swaziland 0
Sweden 0
Switzerland 0
Syrian Arab Republic 0
Tanzania 1993 0.420 Eastwood and Lipton (2004) 1
Thailand 1986 0.460 Eastwood and Lipton (2004) 0
Togo 2006 0.310 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 1
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 0.514 UNU-Wider(2008) 0
Tunisia 2000 0.391 Lahouel (2007) 0
Turkey 2010 0.389 Turkstat (2011) 0
Uganda 2005/06 0.430 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
United Kingdom 0
United States 0
Uruguay 2009 0.433 CEPAL(2011) 0
Venezuela, RB 1997 0.496 UNU-Wider(2008) 0
Vietnam 2002 0.420 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Zambia 2006 0.660 UN-HABITAT(2010a) 0
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.2. Overall income/expenditure Gini coefficients
Year Overall Gini Source E/I
Algeria 1995 0.353 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Argentina 2010 0.449 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Austria 2010 0.261 Eurostat(2012) 0
Australia 2008 0.336 OECD(2011) 0
Bahrain 2006 0.390 Bahrain EDB(2011) 0
Bangladesh 2010 0.321 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Belgium 2010 0.266 Eurostat(2012) 0
Bolivia 2007 0.565 CEPAL(2011) 0
Botswana 2006 0.600 Martin(2009) 0
Brazil 2009 0.576 CEPAL(2011) 0
Cameroon 2007 0.389 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Canada 2008 0.328 OECD(2011) 0
Central African Republic 2008 0.563 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Chad 2005 0.350 World Bank(2008) 0
Chile 2009 0.524 CEPAL(2011) 0
China 2006 0.434 Asian Development Bank (2012) 1
Colombia 2010 0.578 CEPAL(2011) 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005/06 0.444 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Congo, Rep. 2005 0.473 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Costa Rica 2010 0.492 CEPAL(2011) 0
Cote d’Ivoire 2008 0.415 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Denmark 2010 0.269 Eurostat(2012) 0
Dominican Republic 2010 0.554 CEPAL(2011) 0
Ecuador 2010 0.495 CEPAL(2011) 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2008 0.307 PovcalNet(2012) 1
El Salvador 2010 0.454 CEPAL(2011) 0
Ethiopia 2005 0.295 World Bank(2011) 0
Finland 2010 0.254 Eurostat(2012) 0
France 2011 0.299 Eurostat(2012) 0
Gabon 2005 0.415 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Germany 2010 0.293 Eurostat(2012) 0
Ghana 2005/06 0.428 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Greece 2010 0.329 Eurostat(2012) 0
Guatemala 2006 0.585 CEPAL(2011) 0
Guinea-Bissau 2002 0.355 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Haiti 2001 0.592 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Honduras 2010 0.567 CEPAL(2011) 0
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.2. Overall income/expenditure Gini coefficients (cont.)
Year Overall Gini Source E/I
India 2010 0.370 Asian Development Bank (2012) 1
Indonesia 2011 0.389 Asian Development Bank (2012) 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2005 0.383 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Iraq 2006 0.309 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Ireland 2010 0.332 Eurostat(2012) 0
Israel 2001 0.372 UNU-Wider(2008) 0
Italy 2010 0.312 Eurostat(2012) 0
Jamaica 2004 0.455 UNU-Wider(2008) 1
Japan 2006 0.329 OECD(2011) 0
Jordan 2010 0.354 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Kenya 2005 0.477 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Korea, Rep. 2010 0.310 Kim (2011) 0
Kuwait 1999 0.360 Ali (2003) 1
Lebanon 2004 0.360 Bibi and Nabli (2010) 1
Lesotho 2002 0.520 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Liberia 2007 0.382 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Madagascar 2010 0.441 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Malawi 2004 0.390 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Malaysia 2009 0.462 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Mali 2010 0.330 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Mexico 2010 0.481 CEPAL(2011) 0
Morocco 2007 0.409 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Mozambique 2007 0.457 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Nepal 2010 0.328 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Netherlands 2010 0.255 Eurostat(2012) 0
New Zealand 2001 0.335 UNU-Wider (2008) 0
Nicaragua 2005 0.532 CEPAL(2011) 0
Niger 2007 0.335 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Nigeria 2009 0.488 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Norway 2010 0.236 Eurostat(2012) 0
Pakistan 2007 0.300 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Panama 2010 0.519 CEPAL(2011) 0
Paraguay 2010 0.533 CEPAL(2011) 0
Peru 2010 0.458 CEPAL(2011) 0
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.2. Overall income/expenditure Gini coefficients (cont.)
Year Overall Gini Source E/I
Philippines 2009 0.430 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Poland 2010 0.311 Eurostat(2012) 0
Portugal 2010 0.337 Eurostat(2012) 0
Puerto Rico 2003 0.529 UNU-Wider(2008) 0
Saudi Arabia 2006 0.397 World Bank(2011) 0
Senegal 2005 0.392 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Sierra Leone 2003 0.425 PovcalNet(2012) 1
South Africa 2008 0.700 Leibbrandt et. al.(2010) 0
Spain 2010 0.339 Eurostat(2012) 0
Sri Lanka 2006 0.403 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Sudan 2009 0.353 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Swaziland 2009 0.515 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Sweden 2010 0.241 Eurostat(2012) 0
Switzerland 2010 0.295 Eurostat(2012) 0
Syrian Arab Republic 2004 0.374 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Tanzania 2007 0.376 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Thailand 2009 0.400 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Togo 2006 0.344 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 0.403 PovcalNet(2012) 0
Tunisia 2005 0.414 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Turkey 2010 0.402 Turkstat (2011) 0
Uganda 2009 0.443 WB(2011) 0
United Kingdom 2010 0.330 Eurostat(2012) 0
United States 2008 0.378 OECD(2011) 0
Uruguay 2010 0.422 CEPAL(2011) 0
Venezuela, RB 2010 0.394 CEPAL(2011) 0
Vietnam 2008 0.354 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Zambia 2006 0.546 PovcalNet(2012) 1
Note: 1 stands for expenditure and 0 for income Gini coefficient.
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Table A.3. Land Gini Coefficients
Year Land Gini Source
Algeria 1973 0.650 Muller and Seligson(1987)
Argentina 1960 0.740 Frankema (2010)
Austria 1960 0.671 Frankema (2010)
Australia 1960 0.820 Frankema (2010)
Bahrain 1970 0.521 Taylor and Jodice(1983)
Bangladesh 1961 0.418 Frankema (2010)
Belgium 1959 0.600 Frankema (2010)
Bolivia 1960 0.768 Frankema (2010)
Botswana 1969 0.459 Frankema (2010)
Brazil 1960 0.835 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Cameroon 1972 0.407 Frankema (2010)
Canada 1961 0.526 Frankema (2010)
Central African Republic 1974 0.336 Frankema (2010)
Chad 1973 0.340 Muller and Selingson(1987)
Chile 1965 0.865 Frankema (2010)
China 1960/61 0.474 Berry and Cline(1979)
Colombia 1960 0.860 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1970 0.592 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Congo, Rep. 1973 0.270 Muller and Seligson(1987)
Costa Rica 1963 0.739 Frankema (2010)
Cote d’Ivoire 1974 0.415 Frankema (2010)
Denmark 1959 0.442 Frankema (2010)
Dominican Republic 1960 0.745 Frankema (2010)
Ecuador 1954 0.804 Frankema (2010)
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1961 0.633 Frankema (2010)
El Salvador 1960 0.783 Frankema (2010)
Ethiopia 1977 0.424 Frankema (2010)
Finland 1959 0.338 Frankema (2010)
France 1963 0.502 Frankema (2010)
Gabon 1975 0.410 Muller and Seligson(1987)
Germany 1960 (FRG) 0.524 Frankema (2010)
Ghana 1970 0.530 Frankema (2010)
Greece 1961 0.597 Berry and Cline(1979)
Guatemala 1964 0.770 Frankema (2010)
Guinea-Bissau 1960/61 0.397 Author’s calculations
Haiti 1971 0.462 Frankema (2010)
Note: Author’s calculations are based on data in Lott(1979)
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Table A.3. Land Gini Coefficients (cont.)
Year Land Gini Source
Honduras 1952 0.706 Frankema (2010)
India 1960 0.583 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Indonesia 1963 0.527 Frankema (2010)
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1960 0.623 Frankema (2010)
Iraq 1958 0.820 Frankema (2010)
Ireland 1960 0.575 Frankema (2010)
Israel 1970 0.698 Frankema (2010)
Italy 1960 0.620 Frankema (2010)
Jamaica 1961 0.757 Frankema (2010)
Japan 1960 0.411 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Jordan 1983 0.643 Frankema (2010)
Kenya 1960 0.762 Frankema (2010)
Korea, Rep. 1961 0.354 IFAD(2001)
Kuwait 1970 0.725 Frankema (2010)
Lebanon 1970 0.770 Muller and Selingson(1987)
Lesotho 1960 0.381 Frankema (2010)
Liberia 1971 0.681 Frankema (2010)
Madagascar 1961 0.804 Frankema (2010)
Malawi 1969 0.340 Muller and Selingson(1987)
Malaysia 1960 0.680 Frankema (2010)
Mali 1960 0.451 Frankema (2010)
Mexico 1960 0.607 Frankema (2010)
Morocco 1962 0.577 Frankema (2010)
Mozambique 1970 0.705 Author’s calculations
Nepal 1961 0.570 El-Ghonemy(1990)
Netherlands 1959 0.557 Frankema (2010)
New Zealand 1960 0.696 Frankema (2010)
Nicaragua 1963 0.759 Frankema (2010)
Niger 1960 0.468 Author’s calculations
Nigeria 1973 0.370 Griffin Khan Ickowitz(2002)
Norway 1959 0.362 Frankema (2010)
Pakistan 1960 0.596 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Panama 1960 0.699 Frankema (2010)
Paraguay 1961 0.863 Frankema (2010)
Peru 1961 0.854 Frankema (2010)
Philippines 1960 0.508 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Poland 1960 0.511 Frankema (2010)
Note: Author’s calculations are based on data in Lott(1979)
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Table A.3. Land Gini Coefficients (cont.)
Year Land Gini Source
Portugal 1968 0.756 Frankema (2010)
Puerto Rico 1959 0.707 Frankema (2010)
Saudi Arabia 1974 0.780 Muller and Selingson(1987)
Senegal 1960 0.467 Frankema (2010)
Sierra Leone 1970 0.436 Frankema (2010)
South Africa 1960 0.643 Frankema (2010)
Spain 1960 0.791 Frankema (2010)
Sri Lanka 1961 0.627 Frankema (2010)
Sudan 1965 0.577 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Swaziland 1971 0.835 Frankema (2010)
Sweden 1961 0.488 Frankema (2010)
Switzerland 1969 0.504 Frankema (2010)
Syrian Arab Republic 1971 0.643 Frankema (2010)
Tanzania 1960 0.790 Frankema (2010)
Thailand 1963 0.444 Frankema (2010)
Togo 1961 0.452 Frankema (2010)
Trinidad and Tobago 1963 0.691 Frankema (2010)
Tunisia 1961 0.616 Frankema (2010)
Turkey 1960 0.608 Frankema (2010)
Uganda 1963 0.481 Frankema (2010)
United Kingdom 1960 0.687 Frankema (2010)
United States 1959 0.677 Frankema (2010)
Uruguay 1960 0.791 Frankema (2010)
Venezuela, RB 1961 0.924 Deininger and Squire (1998)
Vietnam 1960 0.562 Frankema (2010)
Zambia 1971 0.699 Frankema (2010)
Note: Author’s calculations are based on data in Lott(1979)
170
APPENDIX B
CALCULATING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
HDIs are calculated using the methodology explained in the Human Development Report
- 2010 (2011). The HDI’s in the HDR were calculated based on life expectancy, expected
and mean years of schooling, and the GNP per capita. The calculations are based on
UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2011) and the Penn World Tables 7.1 (2013) databases.
First, separate dimension indices are formed for education, life expectancy and GDP per
capita using the estimated and assumed minimum and maximum values of variables. The
dimension indices are estimated using the following formula:
dimension index =
actual value−minimumvalue
maximumvalue−minimumvalue (B.1)
Following the HDR’s methodology, I used the logarithms of GDP per capita to estimate
the GDP index. The maximum and minimum values were the lowest and highest values
between 1960-2010. I relied on UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2011) and Penn World
Tables 7.1 (2013) databases for the minimum values. Following the HDR, the minimum
values for life expectancy and the expected and mean years of schooling were assumed to
be 20, 0, 0, respectively. The minimum and maximum values are reported in Table B.1.
Two separate indices were estimated for the mean years of schooling and expected years
of schooling. The geometrical mean of these two indices gives the combined education in-
dex. The combined education index over the observed maximum combined education index
(0.951) is the education index. Using the geometrical mean of life expectancy, education
and GDP per capita indices, I generated the Human Development Index for each year and
country:
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HDI = L
1/3
Life + L
1/3
Income + L
1/3
Education (B.2)
The HDI values that I estimated are different from the HDI values that UNDP estimated
in each HDR, as the maximum and minimum values used might change every year. The
HDR report classifies the countries with HDI above 0.800 as being at the “very high human
development” level. These countries are classified as “developed” in this paper. The number
of countries that are classified as “developed” and “developing” in the years 1985, 1995,
and 2005 are shown in Table B.2.
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Table B.1. The minimum and maximum values of variables
Dimension Observed Maximum Minimum
Life expectancy 85.6 20
(Israel, 2006)
Mean years of schooling 13.3 0
(United States, 2010)
Expected years of schooling 20.8 0
(Australia, 2002)
Combined education index 0.951 0
(New Zealand, 2010)
Per capita income (PPP, $) 52502 161
(Kuwait, 2008) (Liberia, 1995)
Table B.2. Number of countries classified as developing and developed for each year
Developing Developed
1985 96 10
1995 84 22
2005 83 23
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